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Abstract. 
This thesis is an investigation into the image of the emperor 
Heraclius as depicted by the ancient sources who cover his reign 
(610-641 A. D. ). In order to establish the relevant criteria for the 
portrayal of an emperor it was first necessary to provide the reader 
with a synopsis of writings on the role of the emperor from the time 
of Eusebius onwards. The reign of Heraclius was then treated in 
roughly chronological fashion, there follow four chapters concerning 
the sources' description of his military exploits, his coup, and the 
warfare with the Avars and the Persians, including the siege of 
Constantinople. Here the discussion concerns the personal role of 
Heraclius in events and his culpability for their outcome. ' Heraclius' 
triumph in these wars led him to seek a compromise. - with the 
Monophysite Church that was defeated by opposition from the 
Chalcedonian Church in the recently liberated provinces. His failure 
to achieve any lasting settlement is then discussd as a reason for the 
success of the Arab invasions that followed. Heraclius' reputation as 
a reformer, amongst ancient and modern authors alike, is then 
considered with special reference to the controversy surrounding the 
introduction of the themes. The last chapter is a review of the 
interrelationship of all the sources that describe Heraclius' reign, in 
an attempt to define their various influences. 
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Introduction. 
The significance of the reign of Heraclius has been variously 
interpreted by modern historians. It has been seen as the beginning 
of the Byzantine empire, the start of that empire's dark age or the 
end of the Roman era. A consideration of the reign as a whole 
suggests that all of these interpretations have a degree of relevance. 
This stems from the multiplicity of attitudes and incidents that the 
reign, encompassed. Whilst some of these looked back to Roman 
tradition and others were innovations that were to form part of 
Byzantine culture, some only lasted as long as their initiator. The 
subject of this study is provided by the fact that this myriad of 
different topics is bound together by a single theme, a theme that 
looks both forwards and back, that of the image of the emperor. We 
shall be concerned with how Heraclius was represented and how he 
himself wished to be presented. The underlying theme of imperial 
ideology will be shown to be as consistent as it was in the day of the 
first Christian emperor, Constantine. What was liable to fluctuation 
was the personal standing of an individual emperor at significant 
junctures throughout the reign, and retrospective comments on the 
whole of his reign. 
The reign of Heraclius has been subject to investigation by 
historians at various times since the turn of this century.. However, 
there has been a marked tendency to concentrate on specific aspects 
of the reign rather than the reign as a whole. These aspects have 
ranged from attempts to provide an accurate chronology of the reign, 
through discussion of supposed economic reforms, to theories on the 
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extent of the devastation of the empire by invasion. Heraclius 
reigned in momentous times. His reign saw the final defeat of the 
Persian empire, the break up of the Avar federation and the 
expansion of Islam, and the diversity of this has been reflected in 
previous studies. This study aims to provide a more comprehensive 
approach to the reign, an approach that takes as its theme the image 
of Heraclius the ruler. All of the major controversies will be 
discussed, but emphasis will be placed upon those which reflect upon 
the role of the emperor. This will not amount to a narrative of 
events, rather it will be a series of discussions, in roughly 
chronological order, that have as their unifying theme the image of 
the emperor. 
The last comprehensive survey of Heraclius' reign was 
written by Stratos as part of his treatment of the empire in the 
seventh century (1968). For this approach Stratos took his lead from 
Pernice, whose L' Imperatore Eraclio, published in 1906, was 
basically a narrative of the reign with special reference to the poems 
of George of Pisidia. Stratos' work was also a narrative of events, but 
he made use of various contemporary articles to include the 
occasional discussion of the major controversies that had excited 
modern scholarship. 
Stratos' account needs to be replaced, partly for 
methodological reasons, partly because scholarship has progressed in 
the past two decades. Stratos' approach to the sources of Heraclius' 
reign, which are admittedly diverse and very problematic, was not 
sufficiently critical: he did not resolve the interdependence of 
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sources within the Greek and Syriac traditions, nor did he establish a 
hierarchy of reliability that would facilitate the resolution of some of 
the numerous contradictions, but instead tended to accept at face 
value what the sources reported without considering the effect of 
possible distorting factors. Furthermore, in a study much of which 
was necessarily devoted to military events, he did not base his 
discussions of strategy upon a detailed knowledge of the relevant 
campaign theatres. Scholarship, too, has naturally progressed since 
the composition of his multivolume study. Since the early 1970's 
there has been a steady increase in writing on the second half of the 
sixth century. This has led to a reawakening of interest in the 
seventh century to which the reign of Heraclius is seminal, since 
Heraclius' reign cannot be divorced from that of his predecessors. 
Earlier emperors had fought wars with Persia, suffered barbarian 
incursions, excited ecclesiastical controversy, and been short of 
money. Heraclius may have been ruling over a changing empire but 
it was one that was evolving rather than assuming an identity 
completely separate from that which had gone before. This is 
exemplified, for example, by Averil Cameron whose writings on the 
Theotokos investigate the development of Marian devotion through 
the sixth century and into the reign of Heraclius, and indeed it was 
the work of Cameron that initiated and directed interest in the late- 
sixth century. Her approach, in for example her article 'Images of 
Authority: Elites and Icons in Late Sixth-Century Byzantium', is a 
thematic one which draws upon a variety of sources, both eastern 
and western, to examine the workings of the imperial court. It is this 
style that the present piece of work seeks to imitate and develop. 
The theme is the image of an emperor, but the subject is restricted to 
one emperor, making the discussion more detailed but less extensive. 
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I hope that such a study can make a limited contribution to the need 
to construct a replacement for Stratos' narrative, a highly desirable 
project that is, however, too large for a single thesis. 
Other thematic treatments of the period have been 
published in recent years. John Haldon, in addition to specialist 
investigations of military recruitment and organisations, has 
examined the economic and administative measures of Heraclius in 
his survey of the seventh century. Though Haldon's work 
concentrates on different subject areas from that of Cameron his 
conclusion does provide a link between the two. He alludes to a 
break-down in the "traditional, stable framework through which the 
world could be made to make sense", 1 a framework which Cameron 
argues was consistently being developed during the sixth century. 
Both the work of Haldon and that of Cameron delve much more 
deeply in terms of analysis than the studies of Pernice or Stratos, for 
which the main concern was the attempt to establish what happened 
during this period. This type of examination, whilst it provides an 
important starting point for other research, does not go as far as to 
explain the events that it describes in terms of previous historical 
development: for Pernice and Stratos events were significant only in 
their contemporary contexts. Because of their limited approach one 
is far more likely to see in the writings of modern historians wide 
ranging references to treatments of aspects of the reign of Heraclius 
than to the overall narratives of Pernice and Stratos. These may not 
necessarily be contemporary, since Baynes' work on Heraclius' first 
Persian campaign, and Brooks' article on the sources of Theophanes 
1 Haldon, Byzantium p. 440. 
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have continued to influence scholars' research for most of this 
century. 2 
Baynes was attempting to solve a problem of chronology, 
whilst Brooks was concerned with establishing the methods of an 
important source for the reign. The present piece of work seeks to 
combine and add to both these interests. Problems of chronology 
must be examined if they have a direct bearing upon the way in 
which Heraclius was presented at a certain stage in his career, and 
the source(s) that are used to conduct this inquiry must be evaluated 
in order that any inherited bias may be detected. An examination of 
previous trends in the writing of imperial history provides an 
introduction to the late Roman concept of political theory, and hence 
establishes the necessary criteria for a judgement to be made on the 
reign of Heraclius. However, then the investigation continues with an 
examination, broadly arranged in chronological order, of Heraclius' 
image during his reign; his usurpation, diplomacy with the Avars, 
war with the Persians, the siege of Constantinople, ecclesiastical 
disputes, and finally the loss of the eastern provinces to the Arabs. 
Each contributed separately to the overall reputation of Heraclius, 
some positively, others negatively while for some the standpoint of 
the particular source is crucial. This is not a jumbled version of the 
Stratos' approach as events are arranged chronologically only for the 
reader's convenience. These "chronological" chapters are followed by 
a chapter on Heraclius' economic reforms, the penultimate discussion, 
but one which both draws upon and has a direct bearing upon all the 
chapters that it follows. The final chapter is a review of all the major 
2 Baynes, 'Military Operations', p. 526-533, and Brooks, 'Sources', p. 
582-587. 
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sources for the reign, conducted in the light of the particular studies 
of individual sequences of events in the earlier chapters. This 
produces an overview of the complex issues of source bias and 
derivation, as well as providing an opportunity to comment on 
specific source's overall presentation of the reign. 
Heraclius' actions have been assessed and judged by ancient 
and modern historians alike. This investigation concerns the ways in 
which Heraclius' actions were presented by ancient writers and the 
relationship of these with modern scholarly thinking. The symbiotic 
nature of the ancient and modern schools of thought should not 
surprise us as the image of an individual emperor is constantly 
changing. For example, Heraclius is treated differently by 
Theophanes and The Chronicle of 1234 and by Shahid and Haldon: 
sources and scholars have their individual perspectives and 
prejudices which may influence the way they approach and analyse 
events, and the ancient and modern may interact. Thus part of 
Theophanes' account formed the cornerstone for the work of 
Ostrogorsky and Oikonomides on the "themes", namely the 
hypothesis that Heraclius was responsible for introducing these 
major administrative changes, a view which Shahid has developed, 
whilst Haldon has sought to undermine the significance of the 
passage, and hence Heraclius' role in the innovation to which it 
alludes. This particular discussion exemplifies the importance of 
combining ancient and modern scholarship when investigating 
Heraclius' image. Theophanes did not give Heraclius the credit for 
instituting the themes, but merely mentioned them in passing. 
However, this mention was seized upon by modern historians to date 
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a crucial seventh century development in the organisation and 
functioning of the Byzantine Empire. Therefore, Heraclius' image was 
enhanced by some modern historians who used an ancient text 
whose author did not intend such an interpretation. 
So, when one investigates Heraclius' image there are equally 
as many problems in the secondary literature as there are in the 
primary. There are two different types of problem. The first 
involves solely the primary sources and concerns the availability of 
information. Although the sources for Heraclius' reign come from all 
parts of his empire, none is consistently well informed. Thus whilst 
we may know details of what was happening in Egypt in the summer 
of 610, we are relatively unaware of events in the capital during 
those same months immediately before the appearance of Heraclius' 
fleet outside the walls. Not only are the sources incomplete, but they 
are also biased. Religious affiliations condition the reporting of the 
reign, and this distortion can take a variety of forms. Heraclius is 
criticised by Theophanes for his attempt to introduce a compromise 
creed for his subjects, in the Monergist and Monothelete disputes of 
the 630's, whereas Nicephorus is also openly critical of Heraclius' 
marriage to his niece, which contravened the church's code on 
degrees of kinship for marital purposes. On the other hand the 
Chronicon Paschale prefers to register its disapproval by not 
describing the wedding, alone of all major imperial events in the 
capital in the 610's, only mentioning Martina herself once, in the 
context of Martina's departure to the East in 624, and concludes its 
narrative before the Christological disputes sullied the triumph of the 
Persian victory. On a more general Christian theme, the Chronicle of 
1234 lambasts Heraclius for his Chalcedonian stance whilst telling 
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us nothing of his argument with leading personalities of that Church. 
Thus, rather than one variously reported account, a preliminary 
examination of the emperor's image provides us with a variety, and 
a study of one aspect of his reign may not take in all the sources that 
make up this patchwork of accounts. This is the importance of the 
present work. It is a investigation into how the conglomerations of 
accounts build up into the variety of different pictures that different 
authors have painted for us of Heraclius' reign. 
The second problem concerns modern historians' use of 
these sources. The incomplete nature of the sources can lead to a 
concentration on the well documented aspects of Heraclius' reign, 
which in turn can affect his modern image. We have plenty of 
information about Heraclius' Persian campaigns, even if this is 
bedevilled by problems of geography and strategy, but to rely upon 
the fuller sources would be to accept misrepresentations of the 
events. The sources that wrote about these campaigns intended to 
show Heraclius himself to be the hero and, because he was 
successful, they were able to indulge this inclination: George of 
Pisidia exploited to the full Heraclius' eastern successes, and his 
interpretation was followed by Theophanes who used George as an 
important source. But for the modern historian to place as much 
emphasis on these campaigns as an ancient historian would be to 
continue George's propaganda triumph, because Heraclius fought an 
equally long series of campaigns against the Arabs which do not 
receive as much attention in the sources as the Persian camaigns, but 
which were of much greater long-term significance: imperial defeat 
did not attract contemporary attention, and so our understanding of 
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these important campaigns depends largely on material transmitted 
by or through Syriac sources. 3 The sources only detail the 
emperor's victories for a reason and the modern historian needs to 
be aware of that before a judgement can be made on the sources 
merit, let alone that of Heraclius. Similarly if there is only the 
sparsest amount of information it is tempting to incorporate it into 
the investigations on the strength of its rarity value. However, 
uniqueness is no guarantee of quality: thus Baladhuri has a list of 
towns that surrendered to the Arabs upon their advance in the 630's 
that suggests a wholescale capitulation of Roman provinces, until one 
remembers that Baladhuri was writing well after this invasion and 
the information that he preserves suited rather well the legal 
position of the cities that were now permanently under Arab rule. 
Conversely the sources' meagre and ambiguous information can be 
used by modern historians for their own ends: an example of this 
concerns developments in the Balkans, and the arguments of 
Fallermayer and Kyriakiades about the proportion of Slavs in the 
overall population of Greece, but these are less related to the 
achievement of Heraclius in the Balkans than about the issue of 
Greek nationalism. 
Perhaps it has been these problems that have precluded any 
recent study of Heraclius' reign. Indeed, at the 26th Spring 
Symposium of Byzantine Studies, 'New Constantines: The Rhythm of 
Imperial Renewal in Byzantine History', not one speaker dealt with 
the emperor directly. Since the periods before and after his reign 
were covered in varying degrees of detail it may be fair to assume 
that the reign occupies a pivotal position in the course of 
3 See Conrad, 'Theophanes', p. 1-45, and 'Arwäd', p. 317-401. 
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Roman/Byzantine history, but that its attendant problems make any 
kind of concise appraisal appear superficial. 
That the image of Heraclius was susceptible to manipulation 
by both contemporary and later writers makes its study both 
complicated and interesting. However, there is one constant 
yardstick against which it can be measured, namely the writings of 
ancient authors on the hypothetical and practical behaviour of 
emperors. It is to these that we must turn first, for in order to 
understand the representation of early seventh century Christian 
imperialism we must first investigate its conception. 
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Theory and Image. 
The image of Heraclius is a central aspect of the emperor's 
place in society. In order to establish criteria for judging how his 
actions were variously interpreted, it will be useful to set the scene 
by surveying earlier literature on the role of the Emperor. This 
survey does not claim to be comprehensive. The writers that have 
been included have been chosen in order to give a general yet 
concise account which does not flounder in search of subtleties that 
could provide the inspiration for books. Furthermore this survey is 
concerned with two specific themes, Byzantine political theory and 
the portrayal of an Emperor. This chapter sets out to show that the 
tenets of Byzantine political theory remained constant, although 
within the genre of historiography certain development takes place. 
This is a change in terms of style rather than of values which 
remained faithful to their earliest exposition by Eusebius. 
The discussion will begin with Menander Rhetor who produced 
a definitive treatise on panegyric writing which will serve as a 
convenient model for us to discuss the objectives of the genre and its 
metamorphosis during the following three centuries. It was the 
individual prowess of an Emperor that concerned the panegyricists. 
These writers were intending to expound the virtues of an emperor, 
but the virtues that they could include were affected by the 
individual nature of their sovereign's rule. It was the task of the 
panegyricist to discover as many of the virtues as possible and 
present them in a favourable light. These limitations that the writers 
were placed under led Sabine MacCormack to write: 
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"Panegyrics are not a good basis upon which to 
generalise. It is a mistake to extract from them 
an amalgam of qualities attributable to the Late 
Antique ideal emperor". 1 
However, these virtues were used not only by panegyricists but also 
by historians. By studying panegyrics we will be able to see how 
Emperors wanted to be depicted. This may vary from one instance 
to another depending on the political context of the reading, and not 
all the defined virtues will appear every time. Nevertheless a study 
of an amalgam of panegyrics should give us an insight into the 
mixture of qualities that went to make up the ideal Emperor in the 
eyes of the ruler and of his subjects, for the panegyricist was as 
much the mouthpiece of the Emperor as he was of the people. 
The basic rule is that a panegyric allows for no debate. 
"It will thus embrace a generally agreed 
amplification of the good things attaching to the 
Emperor, but allows no ambivalent or disputed 
features, because of the extreme splendour of 
the person concerned". 2 
as Menander writes, the writer must "elaborate it on the assumption 
that it relates to things universally acknowledged to be good". 3 
1 MacCormack, 'Panegyrics', p. 159. 
2 Men. Rh. p. 368 3-8. 
3 Men. Rh. p. 368 8-9. 
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The value of Menander's work is that he clearly lays out what is to 
be acknowledged and how. He believes that: 
"the two greatest things in life are piety towards 
the divine and honour to the Emperors". 4 
Whether he was pagan or not he has isolated a theme for later 
eulogies of the Emperor, the relationship of the Emperor to God and 
its importance for the well-being of the Empire. Menander then 
proceeds to order the procession of attributes that a writer must 
dwell on. Firstly, the Emperor's origins, either his city or failing that 
his nation. Thus, the Thessalians were brave but only the son of 
Peleus was thought worthy of the leadership of the tribe. 5 Next 
come family and birth which like city and nation can be omitted if 
they lack prestige, and one should then move on to birth as Callinicus 
did in his Great Oration. 6 For birth one should look for divine 
signs, and Menander gives the examples of Romulus and of Cyrus of 
Persia. This stress on the Emperor's birth is in keeping with the 
classical tradition that a monarch's ancestry should be greater than 
those of his fellow men. Nature and nurture are considered next. An 
Emperor is either raised for the throne from birth, "Swaddling 
clothes robes of purple", 7 or reaches it by "felicitous chance". 8 In 
either case the man in power is the one best suited to the task, and 
thus the legitimate ruler. Having introduced his subject Menander 
now considers his actions. These he divides into peacetime and 
4 Men. Rh. p. 368 17-20. 
5 Men. Rh. p. 370 6-8. 
6 Men. Rh. p. 370 14. 
7 Men. Rh. p. 371 19. 
8 Men. Rh. p. 371 21-22. 
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wartime, placing wartime first. Courage is the first of the requisite 
virtues. "Courage reveals in an Emperor more than do other 
virtues". 9 Menander does not say why this is the case, perhaps it 
is because as a general the Emperor is able to reveal the other three 
virtues of justice, temperance and wisdom while he is in the field. 10 
The description of the Emperor's successful prosecution of warfare 
may include the other virtues in context. Wisdom is needed to 
command armies, "Through your wisdom, you discovered their traps 
and ambushes but they understood nothing of what you were 
doing". 11 Justice can be brought in, in the form of humanity, "for 
when victorious, the Emperor did not repay the aggressors in kind, 
but divided his actions in just proportion between punishment and 
humanity". 12 
The Emperor's role in peace is to be discussed under the 
three cardinal virtues of justice, temperance and wisdom. Justice is 
needed "to commend mildness towards subjects, humanity towards 
petitioners and accessibilty". 13 This is the role of a paternal figure. 
Justice is concerned with legislation: 
"You should say that his laws are just and that 
he strikes out unjust laws and himself 
promulgates new ones". 14 
9 Men. Rh. p. 372 30-31. 
10 Men. Rh. p. 373 7-8. 
11 Men. Rh. p. 373 23-25. 
12 Men. Rh. p. 374 29-31. 
13 Men. Rh. p. 375 8-10. 
14 Men. Rh. p. 375 24-25. 
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Temperance continues the image of the father of the Empire and the 
paradigm for his people. "People choose a style of life like that which 
they observe in the Emperor". 15 Wisdom is' necessary for all the 
Emperor's actions and he is blessed with more than normal men so 
that all his "other virtues come to successful fruition". 16 The last 
virtue that Menander mentions is fortune. This "accompanies our 
mighty Emperor in all things both actions and words". 17 The 
epilogue merely exhorts the benefits that a ruler with those 
qualities gives to his Empire. " Prosperity and good fortune of the 
cities", "the earth is filled with peace, the seas are sailed without 
danger, piety towards God is increased" and "we fear neither 
barbarians nor enemies". 18 
A perfect Emperor has created a perfect world. It is for this reason 
that the Pseudo-Dionysius, who wrote a treatise on the form of praise 
for a festival, can state: 
"let the climax of your whole speech be in praise 
of the Emperor because he who presides over 
peace is really the organiser of all festivals since 
it is peace that enables them to be held". 19 
15 Men. Rh. p. 376 8-9. 
16 Men. Rh. p. 376 18-20. 
17 Men Rh. p. 376 26-27. 
18 Men. Rh. p. 377 10-16. 
19 In Russell a nd Wilson, who place it as contemporary to Menander 
Rhetor, p. 362. 
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The discussion can now proceed to the writings of Eusebius 
on Constantine, which provided the basis for development in 
subsequent centuries in treatments of political theory and the 
imperial imagery. Constantine was the first Christian Emperor and 
Eusebius began a theory and a theme which were to continue beyond 
the reign of Heraclius. Eusebius brought Christianity to classical 
political theory and the portrayal of an Emperor. However great a 
debt later writers and thinkers owed to Eusebius he too had looked 
to the past for the basis of his theory, when he married the classical 
conceptions of monarchy to Christian belief. 
To develop this assimilation of the Christian religion and 
Roman imperial rule a writer needed to be aware of classical political 
concepts as well as being a Christian scholar, and Eusebius of 
Caesarea possessed both these attributes. 20 He took on board 
Origen's argument that the Pax Augusta had served to propagate the 
Gospel: the monarchy of Augustus was the beginning of Monotheism, 
and the collapse of nation states was the end of polytheism (Dem. 
Evag. III. 7,30-35 and Dem. Evag. VIII. intro. ). In his Life of 
Constantine Eusebius continues to use Origen's argument as he links 
Augustus with Constantine, the founder of the Empire with the man 
who raised it to a divine monarchy. 
Eusebius did not only borrow from Origen. He looked back 
further to the classical writers on monarchy. He was to give 
Christian expression to the pagan idea that a ruler should imitate 
God's perfection. 
20 For writers from Eusebius to Justinian I am indebted to Dvornik, 
Political Philosophy p. 614-724. 
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"the all pervasive Logos of God from whom and 
through whom, bearing the image of the higher 
kingdom, the sovereign dear to God, in imitation 
of a Higher Power, directs the helm and sets 
straight all things on earth". 21 
But not only is the Emperor an imitation of God (without being an 
incarnate God), his reign is to be a replica of that of God's in Heaven, 
and his function on Earth to be that of Soter and Logos. He is the 
one who "Brings those whom he governs on Earth to the only 
begotten Word and Saviour and renders them fit subjects of His 
kingdom". 22 And who "has modelled the kingdom on Earth into a 
likeness of the kingdom of Heaven". 23 Constantine is shown to have 
the classical virtues required of a monarch but now these derive 
from God (In Praise V). Wisdom, courage, justice and prudence are 
listed in Christian form as his guides. This is in keeping with the 
writings of Diotogenes and Pseudo-Ecphantes. For Eusebius there 
was a real connection between the Emperor and God: 
"the numerous apperances of our Saviour and 
the many visions in dreams when He showed 
you this divinity". 24 
Constantine believed that this connection had a political context. To 
him the prosperity of the Empire depended upon the unity of the 
21 Eusebius, In Praise of Constantine I. 
22 Eusebius, In Praise of Constantine II. 
23 Eusebius, In Praise of Constantine IV. 
24 Eusebius, In Praise of Constantine XVIII. 
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Christian Church, and for this reason he assumed a leading role in the 
settlement of the Donatist and Arian disputes. 25 
However, Eusebius did not go as far as to apply the 
definition of animate law to the Emperor. This had been claimed for 
Emperors by Philo whom Eusebius followed for other classical 
conceptions such as the paternal nature of imperial rule, "knowing 
only how to save, saved even the godless to teach them how to live 
piously". 26 This was because the notion of Living Law was reserved 
for Christ and Eusebius only applied it to the Logos. "There. is only 
one sovereign and His word and royal law are one". 27 The Emperor 
was "appointed by, and the representative of the Almighty 
Sovereign". 28 
This was done, however, by the pagan orator and near 
contemporary Themistius. In his Oration to Constantius he stated 
that the Emperor was superior to all laws because he was the law. 
He developed this theory in an oration praising Theodosius, lauding 
the humanity of Theodosius for pardoning Antioch after an 
insurrection there. Here judge and Emperor do not have the same 
function: 
"it befits the one to obey, the other to amend the 
laws and to mitigate what in them is cruel and 
hard. For he is the animate law, not merely a 
25 Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius p. 224-244. 
26 Eusebius, In Praise of Constantine VII. 
27 Eusebius, In Praise of Constantine III. 
28 Eusebius, In Praise of Constantine VII. 
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law laid down in permanent and unchangeable 
terms". 29 
This is our first example of an orator claiming for the emperor 
powers that he wishes to be implemented. Themistiu s wants 
Theodosius to change the law, this explains his emphasis on the law 
animate. Yet, Themistius is extending Eusebius' Christian approach to 
divine monarchy (whether or not he himself was familiar with his 
writings), showing that by the end of the century the classical 
conception of kingship was still the foundation for Byzantine political 
thought. 
Classical ideas continued to be the source for political discourse 
in the writings of John Chrysostom. He made use of the classical 
distinction between tyranny and kingship to portray his ideal ruler. 
The true king possessed self-control: 
"masters his passions of anger, envy and lust and 
subordinates everything to the laws of God". 
(Homily XXI). 
The tyrant on the other hand is not fit to govern the Empire because 
he cannot govern himself. Chrysostom like Eusebius sees all earthly 
power as deriving from God (Homily XXIII), and he does not question 
the idea of one man rule. He does not criticise the form of 
government only its application. He wants a ruler with the personal 
attributes to "deal with his subjects like a father and govern the 
29 Themistius, Dv. Oration XIX. 
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cities with restraint". 
There is attributed to John Chrysostom a comparison, of 
dubious authenticity, betwen the priesthood and monarchy. 30 The 
monk is superior because whilst the king rules over external things, 
armies and cities, the monk's rule is internal, over his own passions. 
Thus the monk is a true king whilst the king is in fact a tyrant. In 
his Fifteenth Homily this distinction is employed again. Ecclesiastical 
rule is superior because it is exercised over willing men using gentle 
persuasion whilst secular rule is over unwilling subjects. The 
comparison that Chrysostom is now making is between the tyranny 
of the state and the kingdom of the Church. These writings are 
included to show another way of 'looking at the role of the Emperor 
in society. However, it should be remembered that they are heavily 
dependent upon Chrysostom's feelings at a given moment in time - 
monastic withdrawal or priestly involvement - and they never 
question the political theory of kingship, as Chrysostom's arguments 
are continually couched in classical terminology. 
Homily XXI appeals to the virtues of philanthropy, philosophy 
and piety, all of which are well-used classical ideals for rulers. In his 
Homily to the Antiochenes (Homily VII) Chrysostom dwells on the 
elective character of the Roman monarchy which is at variance with 
his statement in Ecloga de Imperio (Homily XXI) where he quotes 
Paul (Rom. 13: 1), saying that all authority derives from God: 
30 Schummer, Chrysostom p. 126-131. Schummer believes that this 
is not Chrysostom's work, but that, of a contemporary or near- 
contemporary for it has none of his personality, making a neat 
summation of Chrysostom's thoughts into a continous text. 
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"For by a dispensation of divine wisdom there 
must be magistrates and they must give orders, 
whilst others must obey". 
Homily VII says "Rule is either natural or created by elections; 
natural as that of a lion over the four-legged animals or that of an 
eagle over the birds; elected, as our own Emperor". 
Because of Chrysostom's huge oeuvre and various impassioned 
stances at different moments in his career this contradiction can be 
used to argue against a wholesale adoption of classical political 
theory, as no systematic thoughts on kingship can be ascribed to him. 
However, the contradiction is important as it shows up a problem 
that later writers were prepared to deal with, that of the 
contradictory origins of divine and elective kingship. The Church's 
supremacy over the empire is not initially evident, and rulers can be 
pious examples to the people: when the relics of St. Phocas arrive 
from Rome, at a time of co-operation between Chrysostom and the 
emperor, he says: 
"and see, the emperors take part with our 
procession. What excuse would a simple man 
have, if even the emperors leave the royal halls 
behind? " 
(De s. hieromartyre Phoca I. 49-50). 31 
But later the church is a sanctuary when Arcadius is ineffective, and 
31 Schummer, Chrysostom p. 220. 
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it does not co-operate with the empire: 
"In the shipwreck of others I want to make a 
safe port for you. When one sees all around the 
soldiers and swords, when the city is on fire, 
when the diadem is not strong, when the purple 
is slighted, when madness rules all, where are all 
the riches? " 
(De Capto Eutropio III. PG 51-52). 32 
For Chrysostom the church was to take on an ascendency over the 
empire. When he returned from his first period of exile Chrysostom 
was not in a forgiving or humble mood, and he leaves us in no doubt 
as to where he believes the ultimate power in earth resides: 
"Yes, take me out of the city, and you will see the 
affection of the church for its shepherd,... you will 
see the splendour of my diadem, the abundance 
of our treasures,... the general is distant, but the 
soldiers stand armed... when the basileus enters 
here, he doffs his diadem... and leaves the 
symbols of his power at the door". 
(Post Reditum ab priore exsilio II. 2). 33 
All the sources surveyed so far have been ecclesiastical 
writers and it requires a considerable gap of some hundred years 
before we come to a series of secular writings on the subject. The 
32 Schummer, Chrysostom p. 223. 
33 Schummer, Chrysostom p. 224-225. 
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treatise on political theory, the anonymous On Political Science 
concerns itself with political theory and kingship in the abstract 
rather than with actual state politics. Fotiou believes that it was 
written sometime between the reign of Anastasius and the Nika Riot 
of 532.34 The writer wonders whether it is possible to find a 
theory for the imitation of God which he sees as the true nature of 
kingship (V. 1). The writer acknowledges his debt to Socrates, Plato, 
Xenophon and Aristole and quotes from them. In Chapter 5 he 
incorporates the elective principle into what is essentially classical 
thought, with the first of his laws for the conduct of a monarch. 
"the first to be enacted by kingship for its own 
self concerns the legal inauguration so that the 
candidate to the title shall be worthy of it and 
justly receive it as it is given to him by God and 
offered by the citizens". 
(V. 5) 
From this point in the argument the elective principle gives way to 
the idea of a divinely appointed monarch, and the Anonymous, (V. 7- 
8), deals with the qualities of a king that are necessary in order for 
him to be able to imitate God's kingship. These virtues are the 
common classical ones of wisdom, justice and philanthropy. The 
importance of his subjects is discussed in relation to the Emperor not 
in the context of their elective power but in terms of the paternal 
nature of kingship. This is the classical notion of the king as 
euergetes and soter (benefactor and saviour). The ruler should 
34 Fotiou, 'Dicaearchus', p. 534. 
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suitabilty for the throne (Chp. 3-4). From Chapter 7 we hear of 
Anastasius' military exploits including his defeat of the Isaurian 
rebels in Chapter 9. The recitation of Anastasius' peacetime 
accomplishments begins in Chapter 13, especially praiseworthy for 
Procopius being the abolition of the collatio lustralis. Procopius 
continues with a long list of Anastasius' acts of beneficence towards 
cities; Caesarea (Chp. 19), Alexandria (Chp. 20) and his building of the 
Long Wall in Thrace (Chp. 21). Anastasius' reign is favourably 
compared with heroes of old; Cyrus (Chp. 25), Agesilaus (Chp. 26) and 
even Alexander (Chp. 27). Procopius of Gaza hardly deviates from 
the path that Menander has laid down for his genre. 39 
By the time that Agapetus wrote The Mirror for Princes for 
Justinian the contradiction between elective and divine monarchy 
had been diluted to advice on how to act towards your subjects when 
you hold power from God, so following the Anonymous. Agapetus 
leaves us in no doubt as to how he stands on the matter. 
"Having a dignity which is set above all other 
honours, Sire, you render honour above all to 
God, who gave you - that dignity, in as much as he 
gave you the sceptre of earthly power after the 
likeness of the heavenly kingdom, to the end 
that you should instruct men to hold fast the 
cause of justice, and should punish the howling 
of those who rage against that cause; being 
yourself under the kingship of the law of justice 
39 For the significance of such comparisons see Matthews, 
Ammianus, p. 242-245. 
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and lawfully king of those who are subject to 
you". 40 
The classical tradition of God-given power for the purpose of ruling 
in the image of God is explicit here, as is the duty of the ruler to be a 
father-figure to his subjects in order to justify his position. If this is 
taken as Agapetus' basic thesis on the source and working of 
kingship then it is easy to see how he could include Chapter 35: 
"Consider yourself to be surely and truly a king 
when you rule with the consent of your subjects. 
For a subject people which is unconsenting 
revolts when it finds an opportunity; but when a 
people is attached to its sovereign by the bonds 
of good will it will keep firm and true in its 
obedience to him". 
This Chapter shows a monarch how he will benefit when his rule is 
acceptable, and is similar to the distinction Lydus draws between 
kingship and tyranny. It implies that although kings may rule 
without the consent of their subjects they will not be kings in the 
truest sense because they are not ruling in imitation of God. 
Throughout the exposition classical terms abound. "A man should 
know himself (a Delphic inscription, Chp. 3), philanthropy (Chp. 6), 
piety (Chp. 15), philosophy (Chp. 17), beneficence (Chp. 19), justice 
(Chp. 27), and mercy (Chp. 37). Chapter 37 presses home this need 
to imitate God: 
40 Agapetus, Chp. 1, tr. Barker, Byzantium, p. 54-61. 
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"He who has attained to great authority should 
imitate, so far as he can, the Giver of that 
authority. If in any way he bears the image of 
God best he thinks that nothing is more precious 
than mercy". 
Not only are the virtues needed for this ideal rule listed but 
Agapetus includes suggestions for good government on the practical 
level. The officials that the Emperor uses are to be vetted to 
determine their suitability, for they represent his government. 
"do not employ wrongdoers in the management 
of affairs; for he who has given wrongdoers their 
power will owe account to God for what they 
have wrongly done. Therefore let the 
appointment of officials be made after strict 
examination". 41 
Again the ruler is accountable not to the people but to God. He must 
rule for the good of the people not because he is given power by 
them but because he is given power by God. Whilst Agapetus 
continues the main thrust of the argument of the Anonymous he 
does develop it further along Christian lines. He corrects the 
Hellenistic idea expounded by Menander Rhetor that the ancestry of 
the king should outshine all others: 
41 Agapetus, Chp. 30. 
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"Let no man feel conceit about nobility of birth. 
All men alike have clay for their first ancestor- 
both those who boast themseleves in purple and 
fine linen and those who are affected by poverty 
and sickness" 42 
This equality in the eyes of God is repeated in Chapters 16 and 21, 
where the crucial point about God-given power is reiterated: 
"In the nature of his body the king is on a level 
with all other men, but in the authority attached 
to his dignity he is like God who rules over all; 
for he has no man on earth who is higher than 
he". 
Courage is the one virtue included by Menander that Agapetus does 
not mention. For courage Agapetus substitutes piety because by the 
middle of the sixth-century the Emperor was no longer required to 
be a successful general as had been the case in the days of the 
Tetrarchy. Moreover not only has the role of his office changed so 
has its nature. There is now a Christian significance attached to his 
actions which is wont to play down warfare and emphasise piety in 
order to fulfill the imperial duty of ruling in God's image. 
Having demonstrated the source of a monarch's power and its 
relationship to the subject people writers were free to discuss how a 
particular ruler measured up to the ideals of political power that had 
been defined for him. However, before we examine Procopius, 
42 Agapetus, Chp. 4. 
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Agathias, Evagrius, Corippus and Theophylact in their respective 
application of the principles of political theory to various emperors 
we must consider how one emperor, Justinian, saw his role. Here we 
are concerned with one last problem in the definition of the 
Emperor's position, the question of animate law. We have seen 
Eusebius reluctant to apply it, Themistius encourage it and the 
Anonymous (Chp. 5), Agapetus (Chp. 27) and Lydus (De Mag. I, 3) 
avoid it out of respect for the laws. Justinian introduced a 
compromise solution. 43 He was aware of his divinely held 
monarchy, "the glory of the republic which God has entrusted to us" 
(Nov. LXXXI), and also of Roman respect for the law, "we have 
enacted the present law in order to exclude all iniquity and injustice" 
(Nov. CXLVIII pref. ). He considered legislating to be a primary 
function of a king, and that this was a God-given right unique to him: 
"We, to whom God has also given legislative 
power we refuse... to delegate such power to any 
other judge... since what has been decided by 
ourselves cannot be annulled by anyone " 44 
Justinian believed that God was the only source of law and that it 
was to the Emperor and to the people that He had given this right: 
"Considering therefore that God has sent us the 
Imperium from Heaven so that it might remedy 
difficulties through its own perfection and adapt 
43 On Justinian's legislation see, Honore, Tribonian, and Maas, 
'Reform', 17-31. 
44 Nov. CXIII. 
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the laws to the variety of nature; for this reason 
we have deemed it necessary to draft this 
45 law" 
This was classical theory combined with Christian belief which left 
the old Roman polity behind. This new approach was encapsulated 
in Justinian's Constitution of October 30 529: 
"a doubt existed in the ancient laws as to 
whether the decision of the Emperor should be 
regarded as a law... we hold that every 
interpretation of the laws by the Emperor... shall 
be free from all ambiguity; for if by the present 
enactment the Emperor alone can make, laws it 
should be the province of the Imperial dignity 
alone to interpret them". 
This is well within the spirit of classical political theory. Only a 
statement on animate law is missing. Justinian provided this in a 
Novel for 536: 
"The Imperial station, however, shall not be 
subject to the rules which we have just 
formulated, for to the Emperor God has subjected 
the laws themselves by sending him to man as 
46 the incarnate law". 
45 Nov. LXXIII pref. 
46 Nov. CV. 
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Indeed the emperor must be completely flexible in his legislating. 
For the constant variety of Nature, a superhuman agency that caused 
random and unpredictable changes in society, provided a continuous 
need for Imperial legislation: 
"almost nothing remains stable in Nature, which 
is always inconsistent and introduces many 
changes which are neither easy to forsee nor 
possible to provide for, and... only God, and after 
him the Emperor, is able to exercise control over 
these things". 47 
In addition to his definition of the exact legislative function of an 
Emperor Justinian also dealt with his relationship with the clergy. 
In the preface to Novel VI, addressed to the Patriarch of 
Constantinople, he sets out the same relationship that Eusebius had 
first emphasised upon Constantine's conversion. 
"The priesthood ministers to things divine, the 
Imperial authority is set over, and and shows 
diligence in, things human, but both proceed 
from around the same source and both adorn the 
life of man". 
47 Nov. LXIX 69. 
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"If the priesthood be in all respects without 
blame and full of faith before God, and if the 
Imperial authority rightly and duly adorns the 
commonwealth committed to its charge, there 
will ensue a happy concord which will bring 
forth all good things for mankind". 
Like Constantine, Justinian is aware of the correlation between the 
well-being of the Empire and Church unity. Paul the Silentiary also 
recognised this relationship in his Ekphrasis. Addressing Justinian 
he defined his position vis-a-vis the Patriarch: 
"For when, Sceptre, in the life-giving counsel of 
your mind, you appointed the great Initiate to 
your precincts, straightaway the assault of the 
wicked minded demon collapsed, straightaway 
you routed the grievous battle of all the 
passions, straightaway you bound on the wreath 
of victory for toils in protection of the city-. 48 
Until now we have been examining the relationship between 
Christian belief and classical political concepts as regards Byzantine 
political theory. From this point the discussion will centre around 
the writing of history and panegyric, and how it was affected by this 
theory and and how it may have modified it. When Procopius of 
Caesarea wrote a damning account of the reign of Justinian in his 
Secret History he did not put forward any new theory for the 
48 Paul Sil. Ec. S. Sophia lines 970-980,1 am indebted to Mary 
Whitby for a translation. 
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government of the Empire. It is not Imperial power that is criticised 
but its application. Procopius is very sensitive to the personal role of 
the Emperor in government. He criticises his right to be ruling not in 
terms of proposing an alternative form of government but in the 
context of the actual ruler's personality. Thus there is recurring 
critcism of Justinian's loyalty, his respect for the laws and his 
avarice. These criticisms are the opposite values to the traditional 
virtues of philanthropia, justice and beneficence. Indeed the fasting 
and sleeplessness, which in the Buildings prove his piety, are used 
in the Secret History to illustrate the strength of a demon: 
"For all the days which precede the Feast of 
Easter, and which are called days of fasting, he 
observed a severe routine... Indeed he had gone 
two whole days without food and that too while 
rising regulary from his bed at early dawn... And 
although he went to his couch late in the night 
he immediately rose again, as if he could not 
endure his bed". 49 
"He made it his task to be constantly awake and 
to undergo hardships and to labour for no other 
purpose than to contrive constantly and every 
day more grievous calamities for his subjects". 50 
49 Procopius, Buildings I. 7,7. 
50 Procopius, Secret History XIII. 28. 
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This demon image is the opposite of the theory that the Emperor 
should act in imitation of God. Many of Procopius' criticisms are not 
to do with the warfare which he had concentrated upon in his Wars, 
instead they are concerned the administration. This may reflect the 
classical idea that the Emperor was responsible for the overall well 
being of his subjects and not just their internal security. The case of 
Africa shows contradictory use of information. In the Secret 
History Africa is seen as depressed and depopulated: 
"after the defeat of the Vandals Justinian not 
only did not concern himself with strengthening 
his dominion over the country, not only did he 
not make provision that the safeguarding of its 
wealth should not rest solely in the goodwill of 
its people but straightaway he summoned 
Belisarius to return home". 51 
Whilst in the Buildings the town of Caputvada in Byzacium is 
transformed from an army camp into a city by Justinian: 
"made strong by a wall and distinguished by its 
other appointments as worthy to be counted as 
an impressive and prosperous city... the rustics 
have thrown away the plough and lead the 
existence of a community, no longer going the 
51 Procopius, Secret History XVIII. 4. 
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round of country tasks but living a city life". 52 
In the Secret History, the Emperor is being criticised for his inability 
to see to the needs of his subjects. This is on a purely personal level. 
In order to go beyond this Procopius would have to take into account 
the problems of reconquest and plague but he does not, instead 
merely calling Justinian's administration corrupt. Even this 
illustrates the personal nature of Procopius' criticism, Justinian is 
ruling badly and so therefore are his representatives to whom he 
has delegated authority. Individual quaestors are maligned, 
Tribonian, Junillus and Peter Barsymes (Secret History XX. 16-23 
and for Barsymes Secret History XXII. 3). Indeed according to 
Procopius Justinian's officials were chosen for their corrupt nature. 
"picking out the best men he would sell to them 
at great price the offices that were corrupted by 
53 them". 
What Procopius' criticism amounts to is little more than personal 
abuse with no attempt at analysis. Cameron sees this as "applying a 
standardised vocabulary of abuse". 54 Indeed, it is difficult to see 
how else he could have commented on the regime, when we have 
already seen it to revolve, in terms of political theory, around the 
person of the Emperor. Procopius does not question the role of the 
Emperor, but he does disagree with his rule. The theory is not 
questioned, only the practice, as Justinian fails to match up to 
Procopius' expectations of how an Emperor should act. 
52 Procopius, BuildingsVl. 6,12-18. 
53 Procopius, Secret History XXI. 9. 
54 Cameron, Procopius p. 66. 
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These expectations would appear to be fulfilled in the 
Buildings. There are three main areas of praise here; church 
building, fortifications and the water supply. So the main theme of 
the work is the beneficence of Justinian, expressed through the 
advantages accruing to the Empire from his building policy. He is 
compared to Cyrus the founder of the Persian Empire whose rule 
Procopius says Justinian would regard as "a sort of child's play" 
(Buildings I. i. 15-16. ). Instead of being a demon Justinian's 
closeness to God is emphasised: 
"It was in requital for this honour which the 
Emperor showed them that these Apostles 
appeared to men on this occasion. For when the 
Emperor is pious, divinity walks not afar from 
human affairs, but is wont to mingle with men 
and take delight in 5 associating with them". 5 
This Christian interpretation of the reign is very different from that 
of the Secret History. God supplies the best craftsmen as well as 
the inspiration for S. Sophia: 
"Indeed this was also an indication of the honour 
in which God held the Emperor, that He had 
already provided the men who would be most 
servicable to him in the tasks which were 
55 Procopius, Buildings I. iv, 20-22. 
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waiting to be carried out". 56 
It is this innovative and restorative activity of Justinian that is most 
important, rather than the precise detailing of a catalogue of works, 
giving him a paternal role in the welfare of the 57 Empire. 
The existence of these two widely divergent works allows 
us to see not only how an Emperor was either praised or criticised 
but it also tells us something about the literary conventions of the 
Byzantine world. Averil Cameron writes in Procopius, 
"There is no room for unbiased mean when 
literary expression is forced habitually into 
extremes. It is simply therefore that the Secret 
H ist ory offers the understandable 
counterbalance to the excesses of panygeric". 58 
We have already seen that if Procopius wanted to criticise the 
government then he had to criticise the Emperor because there was 
no other viable political system for him to advocate. Procopius was 
prepared to go as far as to write the Secret History but he was still a 
believer in Imperial government. It was in the practical nature of 
this power that he found faults, not in its theoretical basis. 
56 Procopius, Buildings I. i, 24. 
57 Procopius, Buildings I. i. 15. 
58 Cameron, Procopius p. 60 
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Despite an adherence to literary convention Procopius was a 
politically aware historian. The same can be said of Agathias who 
continued his work. Agathias came to the genre from poetry but he 
was no newcomer to the politics of writing. He prefaced the 
collection of poems that he edited, The Cycle, with a piece in praise 
of the Emperor Justin II. This political sensitivity may have been 
motivated by the desire for personal advancement, for Cameron says 
of him that: 
"From the close parallel between the preface to 
The Cycle and Corippus' laudatory poem on the 
accession of Justin II it is clear that The Cycle 
was in fact meant when published as a 
compliment to the new emperor". 59 
He says that he chose to write history because friends persuaded him 
that it was close to poetry. Whatever his motivation his work 
reflects both sides of contemporary attitudes to the reign of 
Justinian. Belisarius' recall from the front in 559, Agathias says, is 
due to jealous courtiers not Justinian himself: 
"They put about slanderous rumours to the 
effect that the popularity that he was enjoying 
had turned his head and that he was aspiring to 
higher things. These calamities brought about 
his speedy return and prevented him from 
consolidating his achievements". 60 
59 Cameron, Agathias p. 9. 
60 Agathias, V. 20.5-6. 
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Though Agathias blames the l og o th etes not Justinian for the 
sufferings of the troops (V. 14.3-4), there is an undercurrent of 
criticism of the Emperor for permitting the decline in troop numbers. 
Yet Agathias defends Justinian's role in government when he 
discusses the policy of paying the barbarians a subsidy: 
"To the inhabitants of Constantinople the terms 
agreed upon seemed cowardly, dishonourable 
and base, since they seemed to involve the 
passive acceptance of an intolerable state of 
affairs... But the Emperor's decision was aimed at 
the attainment of a different and more ambitious 
object which was realised shortly afterwards and 
to such good effect that it convinced his former 
critics of his remarkable foresight and 
6 sagacity", 1 
Agathias like Procopius avoided religious affairs, 
concentrating instead on wars and foreign policy. There is no trace 
of the relationship between Church and State, with the Emperor as 
the representative of God on Earth, which Paul the Silentiary 
expounded, and about which we have seen Justinian to have been 
concerned in his Novel VI. This is primarily due to Agathias' 
perception of what he was producing. The time had not yet come 
when literary convention would allow for secular and ecclesiastical 
history to come under consideration in one work. Furthermore 
Agathias was limited by the belief that to write authoritative history 
61 Agathias, V. 24.1-2. 
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one had to write in a classicising manner. He followed this belief to 
such an extent that many modern historians have seen him as a 
pagan. 62 This desire to model himself on the past has not led to 
Agathias advancing any new notions of political theory. On the 
contrary, he has the same implicit faith in Imperial government that 
Procopius does. His methods may weaken his value as a source but 
he would not have seen himself in this light. He aimed to write 
about the current political scene in order to comment upon events by 
moralising rather than to seek explanations and question the very 
structure of the political framework that he was describing. 
The Chronicle of John Malalas, which ends with the death of 
Justinian, includes short character sketches of the emperors which 
provide a contrast with the high-blown descriptions of their virtues 
that Procopius and Agathias dwell on. 63 Anastasius is, 
"very tall, with short hair a good figure, a round 
face, both hair and beard greying; he had a grey 
pupil in his right eye and a black one in his left 
although his eyesight was perfect; and he shaved 
his beard frequently". 64 
This is not to say that John Malalas does not make judgements on 
emperors but if he does apply a set of criteria for them to meet we 
62 Cameron, Agathias p. 89 n. 1 lists Vossius, Niebuhr, Fabricius, 
Levcenko and Irmscher. 
63 On Malalas see Jeffreys, Studies esp. p. 55-85. 
64 Malalas, XVI. 1. 
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do not hear it: Anastasius is called "sacred" and "the great" but this is 
was a standard way of referring to emperors without actually 
implying any specific qualities, and acts as an appendage to a factual 
account of his deeds, rather than a piece of criticism intended to 
stand out as independent comment. 
Like the secular bias of Agathias, and Procopius before 
him, the ecclesiastical historians who followed Eusebius had their 
interests narrowed by the limitations literary convention placed 
upon their subject matter. Although we have seen secular and 
ecclesiastical affairs linked by the role of the Emperor as the 
representative of God on Earth, Socrates in his Church History (from 
305 A. D. to 439 A. D. ) still feels that he must apologize for his 
inclusion of secular events. Socrates saw disorder in the Church as a 
corollary of turmoil in the State and vice versa. Thus he can justify 
the inclusion of the reign of Julian because that Emperor was 
apostate, the civil troubles under Valens and the revolt of 
Magnentius because of similar ecclesiastical division. Socrates was 
used as a source by Sozomen who also includes numerous apologies 
for covering secular events. The murder of Rufinus led to an 
increase in piety, conflicts in the Church of Constantinople led to the 
invasions of the Goths and Huns. Sozomen believed that it was God's 
design that piety was rewarded. Ecclesiastical history was not 
intended to be contemporary, unlike classical history which aimed to 
record events up to the present day - or at least the death of the 
preceding Emperor. However Sozomen found his interests too 
compelling. In Books VIII and XI the accent is on secular affairs. 
The death of Theodosius I and the wars of Stilicho and Alaric are 
detailed. In his last book Sozomen only includes one chapter on 
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ecclesiastical affairs, the discovery of the relics of the Prophet 
Zachariah and of Stephen. 
Evagrius saw himself as the continuator of these 
ecclesiastical historians. 65 However at the end of Book V (V. 24) he 
catalogues historians that he considers to have been influential. The 
Church historians Eusebius, Theodoret, Socrates and Sozomen are 
there but Evagrius also names secular writers. Zosimus, Priscus, 
Eustathius of Epiphania, Procopius, Agathias and John of Epiphania 
are included. Pauline Allen considers this to be "a synthesis of 
secular and ecclesiastical historiography". 66 Evagrius feels a sense 
of heritage from Procopius and Agathias. He concocts rousing 
speeches for the troops ( V. 14 and VI. 12), which are delivered by 
the general Justinian and the Patriarch Gregory of Antioch. Evagrius 
is well-disposed to indulge in Kaiserkritik. He follows the line of 
Socrates, begun by Eusebius on Constantine, that there is an 
identifiable link between Christian piety and prosperity. Evagrius 
says that the army which Maurice commanded before his accession 
killed the Persian general not by bravery but by the piety of their 
leader (V. 20). 
This belief gives us two themes in Evagrius' work central 
to his portrayal of Emperors, and which can be found in Eusebius. It 
is the duty of Emperors to stamp out doctrinal division, as 
Constantine did, in order to guarantee the prosperity of the Empire. 
Secondly, violent or sudden death is the result of an impious reign. 
65 Allen, Evagrius for a full discussion. 
66 Allen Evagrius p. 20 
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Thus Herod Agrippa (Ecc. Hist. ii. 10) and Maximinus (Ecc. Hist. ix. 
10) die horribly whilst Constantine passes away peacefully (Ecc. 
Hist. viii. 13). This argument is in the tradition of Lactantius' De 
Mortibus Persecutorum, in which divine retribution is manifest in 
the deaths of Diocletian and Galerius. 67 When Evagrius is dealing 
with division in the Church he does not follow his Chalcedonian 
beliefs consistently. Thus Zeno is censured for his life of pleasure 
whilst Maurice is master of his passions. However, this criticism does 
not blacken the whole of the reign of Zeno. He may be condemned 
by John Lydus, Cedrenus and Zonaras, but Evagrius approves of 
Zeno's objective in using the Henoticon to find a modus vivendi for 
the Church. This lack of bias in favour of Monophysite or 
Chalcedonian belief means Evagrius prefers to put the emphasis on 
piety, and his account of the reign of Anastasius is the least biased of 
the ancient authors. That Emperor's abolition of the collatio lustralis 
is attributed to his piety by Evagrius. Whereas the Oracle of 
Baalbek and John Lydus criticise Anastasius for his greed, Evagrius 
does not accuse him of avarice although he does say that his 
economic reforms were not up to the standard set by the abolition of 
the collatio lustralis. For Evagrius Anastasius' philanthropy brought 
him close to Maurice as an ideal Emperor, illustrated by his 
reluctance to spill blood, similar to Maurice's sparing of Mundhir 
(VI. 2). 
Evagrius' depiction of the reign of Justinian illustrates 
contemporary confusion about the Imperial couple. The Emperor's 
death is quick, possibly because he was about to remove Anastasius 
of Antioch, which Evagrius considered to be an act of impiety. 
67 Allen, Evagrius p. 161. 
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Justinian is reviled for the chaos that he brought to the Empire. In 
Book IV. 30 and 32 Evagrius is in agreement with Procopius about 
Justinian's rapacity which unlike Procopius he sees as manifesting 
itself in the building programme. Procopius only complains that 
Justinian built too much over the sea (Secret History VIII. 7,8) whilst 
Evagrius condemns the use of appropriated funds and the misplaced 
motivation of the pursuit of earthly glory. In common with 
Menander (frg. 8), but unlike Agathias (V. 14) Evagrius criticises 
Justinian's liberality towards the barbarians. In IV. 32 Evagrius 
agrees with Procopius that the lawlessness of the factions disrupted 
civil harmony. Against this picture of strife Theodora is praised for 
her kindness and generosity towards the provinces (IV. 10) despite 
her Monophysite views, and in contrast to Procopius' opinion of her 
(especially Secret History X ). 
The personal nature of Imperial rule continues to be 
emphasised in the last three reigns of the History. Evagrius may be 
breaking new grounds in terms of content but his view of the 
political framework of the Empire is the same as that of Eusebius or 
Procopius. The Emperor's position is not in question, merely a 
particular Emperor's fitness to govern. Again this is discussed in 
terms of his personality. Justin II 's personal life is condemned, he is 
"wallowing in wantonness and perverted pleasures". This leads to a 
denunciation of his policies. He began warfare with Persia but failed 
to mobilise the necessary war effort (V. 7). For Evagrius an Emperor 
had God's favour even before he assumed the purple, so that Tiberius 
was saved by divine providence from the Avars (V. 11). Justin II is 
able to make a speech on Tiberius becoming Caesar due to a 
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supernatural grace which allowed him to confess his errors and 
make suggestions for the benefit of the State (V. 13). The eulogy for 
Tiberius stresses his liberality as being his chief characteristic after 
his physical beauty. However he undid much of Justin II's careful 
economising, although Evagrius does say that Tiberius did use the 
money to mobilise troops unlike his predecessor. Maurice's accession 
is foreshadowed by prophecies in the tradition of Menander Rhetor. 
The Emperor sees a vision of Christ exhorting him to avenge him. 
Maurice's conception and birth are also detailed (V. 21). Maurice is 
the culmination of Evagrius' history and his accession is seen as the 
most important legacy of Tiberius' reign (V. 22). Book VI 
concentrates on Maurice and Gregory of Antioch. There is little 
reference to ecclesiastical affairs. Only in VI. 22 are the Severans of 
Antioch mentioned, otherwise the Monophysites are ignored. The 
wedding of Maurice to Tiberius' daughter Constantina is seen by 
Evagrius as the real beginning of his reign, for it is here that the 
author describes the virtues of an ideal ruler. He must wear the 
purple not only on his body but also on his soul, a well used theme 
from Sozomen (pro. 2) and Agapetus (Chp. 9), and be a paradigm for 
his subjects, the same relationship with the people that has been 
emphasised from as far back as the Anonymous and Agapetus. 
A less classicising, more Christian example of the genre of 
the panegyric is provided by Corippus' description of the accession 
of Justin 11.68 Corippus' panegyric takes on a different structure 
from Menander's model. It is a chronological sequence narrating 
Justin's dream, his coronation ceremonies, dealings with an Avar 
68 Cameron, Corippus for a full discussion. 
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embassy, and it then breaks off while describing his taking of the 
consulship. A panegyric in the Menander tradition would not include 
so much narration. The Christian side of the Imperial dignity is 
immediately apparent, in contrast with Menander, "The almighty 
Father has honoured you with the divine office" (I. 45-50). This 
theme continues throughout the work, "it could not happen if the 
voice of God did not order it" (II. 45). "The Roman state belongs to 
God and does not need earthly arms" (III. 333). 
Corippus is able to use the Christian ideals emphasised by 
Agapetus that would have been inconceivable for Menander writing 
as he did before the first Christian Emperor. Justin's virtues seem to 
be more practical than the abstract ones of courage, justice, 
temperance and wisdom expounded by Menander. According to the 
Virgin in his dream they are "virtue and strength" : 
"your age is excellent you have sound 
judgement, a stable mind, a holy willingness and 
vigilance watching over all and your own 
wisdom worthy of Heaven, guardian of the wide 
Earth. " (I. 50-55). 
This dream of the Virgin is analogous to the various portents of 
Maurice's access ion discussed above and there are more portents for 
the accession of Justin II in The Life of Patriarch Eutychius. These 
virtues make him a legitimate Emperor, for like Menander Corippus 
does not allow for any debate, and so no mention is made of any 
other claimants, of whom Justin, a cousin, was the main rival. All 
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Justin II must do is "Accept the name of Augustus which alone you 
lacked. " (1150-155). No mention is made either of the Excubitors 
who were guarding the royal palace or the rapidity of the ceremony 
inside the palace. Instead Justin's legitimacy is emphasised by the 
smooth way the various ceremonies run together. His clothing shows 
the uniqueness of h is office and Corippus dwells on it (II. 90-125). 
Purple boots with Parthian ties, girdle, chlamys and brooch are all 
described. Looking the part Justin is then invested with the power of 
office. He is raised on a shield (II. 130-155) , and next crowned (II. 
160-175). Then in his coronation speech he defines his 
responsibilities. "The maker of all has imposed on us the care of 
ruling" (II. 181), so "We strive to be the imitators of our maker" (II. 
215). 
He is to be the ideal Christian Emperor, and also in contrast 
to Menander Corippus introduces a criticism of the preceeding reign. 
Justinian's financial problems are to be solved. If the Emperor is the 
"head" of the Empire (11.195) and the Senate the "breast and arms of 
this head" (II. 260) then the treasury is the "stomach" much 
neglected in Justinian's reign (II. 260). Justin II continues in this 
vein when he arrives before the p eople in the Hippodrome and pays 
Justinian's debts. "What popularity that brought him" (II. 389): 
"more generous than his father and more 
merciful for in the virtue of his soul he trampled 
the greed of the mind". 69 
Corippus may have felt that he could afford this comparison because 
69 Corippus, In Laud. Just. II. 400. 
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he had already demonstrated the greatness of Justinian when Justin 
was grief-stricken at his funeral (I. 225-270). Further comparisons 
are made with the past in Book III, where Justin II is "A better man 
than Augustus Caesar " (III. 25) and " the iron age has now gone, and 
the golden age is rising in your time" (II. 75-80). The first of these 
comparisons is very similar to Eusebius' desire to link Augustus the 
founder of the Empire with Constantine the founder of the Christian 
Empire. The second comparison is also concerned with the birth of 
the Empire. It seems to conflate the prophecy of Daniel which 
foretold that the final age of the world would be an iron one with the 
Hesiodic tradition which said that the it would be a golden one. 
In his description of the Coronation banquet and the Avar 
embassy Corippus deals with virtues common to classical thought. 
He speaks of Justin's "accustomed frugality" (111.106) and his 
reluctance to squander the resources of the Empire, "our hand is 
generous but not extravagant , it does not know waste" (III. 350). 
The Avar spokesman is aggressive and proud but Justin, like 
Evagrius' Maurice, is serene and collected in his thoughts. "The 
tranquil Emperor was not moved in anger and looked at the young 
man as he made these boasts with eyes peaceful with piety, and said 
this in calm speech. " (III. 305-310). This confidence is founded on 
Justin's position in the world, "The Imperial palace with its officals is 
like Olympus" (III. 178). This may be a classical turn of phrase but 
we are left in no doubt that power comes from Christianity. "They 
[the Avars] believed that the Roman palace was another Heaven". 
(III. 243). Corippus has created orderly and overtly Christian 
panegyric with occasional recourse to the style of Menander. Justin 
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II has all the necessary virtues because he is pious. Once he is made 
Emperor he assumes all the power that that office carries with it. He 
is in the image of God and on earth is as powerful. As far into his 
reign as we see him Justin is the ideal Emperor, because he has all 
the necessary virtues to assume power there is no questioning of his 
authority, when he ascends to the throne. In the short space of time 
that Corippus describes we are left in no doubt that the great power 
that Justin wields comes from God. Once again the Emperor has to be 
judged as a personality, the intrinsic power of the office is made 
explicit by Corippus' description of the throne room and the Avars' 
reaction to it . How the Emperor wields this authority depends upon 
the variable factor of his personality, which is the only factor that is 
open to criticism as well as praise. Though the importance of the 
personality of the Emperor is still essential to the writing of 
panegyric the format of the genre has changed. Sabine MacCormack 
sees the role as becoming more institutionalised: 
"We see the Emperor in these later panegyrics 
less as an individual with particular 
characteristics and more as the focal point of a 
complex courtly ritual". 70 
The content of the panegyric has come to coincide with the content of 
the ceremony. So, like the ceremony the panegyric is not merely 
propaganda, how the Emperor wants to be seen, but a token of the 
legitimacy of his rule. 
Corippus' view is Constantinopolitan. For a provincial view 
70 MacCormack, Art and Ceremony p. 6. 
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of imperial power we must turn to Dioscorus of Aphrodito who also 
wrote a panegyric on Justin 11.71 Like Corippus, Christianity at work 
was one of his main themes but in contrast to Corippus he does not 
dwell on the centre stage - the palace, the Hippodrome and the 
throne room - but instead on the benefits to the provinces (especially 
Egypt) that Justin II can bring. Dioscorus like Corippus does not use 
Menander's framework, but neither is his a narrative account. The 
Emperor's place in the empire is defined in Christian terms: "Much 
praised Emperor who loves Christ which delightful gift God has 
granted to the world". 72 He does have some of Menander's virtues, 
"big with statutes of glorious wisdom", but it is primarily a Christian 
role that Dioscorus marks out for him, "You exalt the divine faith 
which glorifies mankind. " Constantinople is still seen as the centre of 
the empire, and so Corippus' view is not challenged but 
supplemented. "From the many sceptred palace.... the rays of your 
beautiful voice flash out". 73 
Theophylact continued the approach of criticising individual 
Emperors without questioning the system that they represented, and 
yet he adds two extra dimensions that we have seen before but in 
separately defined contexts: these are the inclusion of religious 
affairs and personages as an integral part of his history, rather than 
writing a secular history and making apologies for their inclusion, 
and the interweaving of a contemporary panegyric into an account of 
past events. 74 Theophylact still discusses what makes a good 
71 MacCoull, 'Dioscorus', p. 575-585. 
72 tr. MacCoull, lines 8-9. 
73 tr. MacCoull, line 7. 
74 Whitby, Maurice for a full discussion. 
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Emperor. Justin II gives Tiberius advice when he becomes Caesar 
(III. 11.8-11), and Tiberius lectures Maurice on his responsibilities 
and objectives before he dies (1.1.15-20). Whilst this is no different 
from the attitudes of Procopius, or the Anonymous and Agapetus, 
Theophylact is breaking new ground in giving greater prominence to 
religion in secular history. The Patriarch, bishops and religious 
ceremonies are depicted as an integral part of Byzantine society. 
Procopius only mentions the Patriarch twice (Wars III. 12.2 and 
Secret History VI. 26) and Agathias does not mention him at all. 
Maurice's actions on the other hand are closely linked with the 
Church, before he sets out on campaign he visits S. Sophia and marks 
a Roman victory by a vigil there. Theophylact even composes two 
speeches for Bishop Domitian of Metilene (IV. 16 and V. 4). Both are 
full of religious terms but are made for secular ends. Roman victory 
over the Persians is a victory for Christianity which brings us back 
full circle to the work of Eusebius, where Christianity and order in 
the Empire were inexorably linked. 
The writing of this history as contemporary panygeric has 
been asserted by Frendo. 75 The introductory dialogue between 
History and Philosophy fulfills " the pressing needs of the new 
. regime's offical political propaganda" 
(p. 149). In his history 
Theophylact must deal with the reign of Maurice the last legitimate 
Emperor, and the usurpation of Phocas whose reign Heraclius 
brought to an end. Thus, writing under Heraclius, he has to praise 
Maurice, criticise Phocas and legitimise Heraclius. However, if as 
seems probable the composition of the History is to be dated to the 
late 620's then it was not a "new regime" that it was written for and 
75 Frendo, 'History', p. 143-153. 
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the panegyrical thrust of Theophylact's presentation had longer-term 
relevance. 76 The speech of Tiberius to Maurice emphasises the 
importance of the passing on of legitimate power and the need to 
surpass the achievements of the preceding emperor: 
"for the struggle is not only to preserve the 
power that has already been entrusted, but also 
to pass on the inheritance to others in the proper 
manner. For sucessors must be better than 
preceding leaders, so that they may introduce 
their personal correction for earlier errors, or 
else, in, short, the entire dominion must slip 
away, when a weaker foundation supports the 
kingdom". 77 
This is a legitimisation of the usurpation of Heraclius in 610, 
justifying a change in ruler who did not have any blood ties or 
personal association with the throne. Phocas had proved the 
illegality of his usurpation by failing to live up to the standards set 
by Maurice, whereas Heraclius had demonstrated the rectitude of his 
coup by correcting Phocas' mistakes. Further to this end Theophylact 
accords with panegyrical tradition by praising Heraclius' family, 
when he details the exploits of the Emperor's father. Here he is 
sometimes guilty of misrepresenting the facts. For example 
Comentiolus' victory at Sisarbanon in 589 is put down to the 
76 There is a danger of circularity in Frendo's argument since some 
of our best evidence for Heraclius' needs in terms of political 
propaganda is in fact provided by Theophylact. 
77 Th. Sim. i. 1.10-12. 
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initiative of the Elder Heraclius: 
"Comentiolus turned his back on the engagement, 
and after his flight had become lengthy and his 
escape had culminated at Theodosiopolis, 
Heraclius the father of Heraclius the emperor, 
with exceptional courage won distinction for 
valorous deeds, and was conspicuous through his 
78 glorious achievements with the spear". 
Evagrius does not describe Comentiolus' actions as cowardly and no 
name is attached to the hero who saves his life during the 
fighting. 79 Whitby believes that this account may have come from a 
lost source, possibly in the form of a panegyric written to celebrate 
the accomplishments of Heraclius' family or from oral tradition, 80 
and he also points out other contemporary themes that Theophylact 
has incorporated into his history. 81 The speech of Domitian the 
bishop of Melitene illustrates the sense of ascendancy that Heraclius' 
victory over Persia in 628 must have brought to the Empire, and 
reflects the tone of the imperial dispatch that announced this 
triumph with its biblical presentation. 82 Being couched in biblical 
terms it is also similar to other seventh-century writers' styles, such 
as George of Pisidia and Theodore Syncellus. Theophylact also 
criticises the populace, especially the circus factions, and the Jews. 
These might have been two commonly held opinions, since the 
78 Th. Sim. iii. 6.1. 
79 Evagrius, vi. 15.5-10. 
80 Whitby, History of Theophylact Simocatta tr. p. xxiii 
81 Whitby, Maurice p. 334-335. 
82 For Heraclius' dispatch see C. P. p. 727-734. 
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former had exacerbated civil unrest in the capital during Heraclius' 
coup, whilst the latter had collaborated with the Persians after the 
capture of Jerusalem in 614.83 
Throughout this chapter the Emperor's legitimacy, 
relationship with the Church, and responsibility for the internal and 
external well-being of the Empire have been stressed by historians 
and panegyricists alike. Heraclius' reign was no different in this 
respect. We have seen the stance of the orator change depending 
upon his personal circumstances as in the cases of Themistius and 
Chrysostom, or remain consistent as Eusebius does in a positive vein 
throughout his work. Procopius was conceptually consistent in each 
of his accounts of Justinian's reign and yet not in the overall picture 
of that reign that his oeuvre projects. Corippus combined the pagan 
theory of panegyric with Christianity, and Theophylact's history 
includes both secular and religious affairs. It is in this continual 
adjustment of style that we see a development in the depiction of 
emperors. The parameter of autocratic rule was not constrictive to 
style. In the following chapters we will examine the emperor's role 
in relation to those who wrote about Heraclius in a similar vein to 
their predecessors. They will not criticise the institution of Imperial 
government, but rather the personal role of the man who represents 
that ideology. It is to how he was represented, and to how he 
presented himself, that we must now turn. 
83 Dagron, 'Juifs', p. 170-246, for a discussion of the Jews in the 
Seventh century. 
Heraclius The Usurper. 
The coup that put Heraclius on the throne in 610 was 
indicative of his reign as a whole, for the consequences were felt 
empire-wide. The revolt began in Africa and spread in two 
directions, Nicetas went east into the province of Egypt, whilst 
Heraclius sailed north to confront Phocas in Constantinople. This 
chapter will examine not only how Heraclius achieved his success but 
also how his coup compares in the sources to that of Phocas in 602. 
For neither Phocas nor Heraclius were legitimate emperors, they 
were both the victors of bloody military revolts. However, as 
Heraclius is never seen as anything other than legitimate an 
examination of his course to the throne will reveal how an emperor 
was legitimised. 
Heraclius' coup falls into three geographically distinct parts; 
Nicetas' capture of Egypt from Bonosus, Heraclius' own triumphant 
entry into Constantinople and his execution of Phocas, and the defeat 
of Comentiolus the following winter in western Anatolia. Sources 
from each of these areas are extant along with the poems of George 
of Pisidia, who extols his hero throughout the first two decades of his 
reign, to provide detail that is used by the later historians 
Nicephorus and Theophanes, who themselves provide supplementery 
information from non-extant material. All the sources for this revolt 
are unfavourable to Phocas, regardless of whether or not they praise 
the reign of Heraclius. We are thus left with varying extremes of 
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bias from a dry reporting of events, though with no exaggerated 
praise of the new ruler conducive to propaganda. 
The most detailed account of the capture of Egypt comes 
from the contemporary John of Nikiu. Nicetas' campaign preceded 
that of Heraclius and John emphasises the importance of its victory 
to the overall success of the revolt. John begins with the inception of 
the revolt, listing its suporters; Bonakis the general of Nicetas, and 
Tenkera and Theodore plotters in Alexandria. John of Nikiu attaches 
importance to the role of the factions even if their allegiances seem 
to be confused. For events in Constantinople John of Nikiu is more 
brief: the rivalry between the Blues and the Greens is mentioned but 
no specific action in the revolt is recorded although the Blues are 
accused of a pro-Phocas stance. Priscus the son-in-law of Phocas is 
not mentioned but the execution of other officals of Phocas is. John 
of Nikiu places the coronation of Heraclius in the Church of St. 
Thomas the Apostle before returning immediately to provincial 
events, although he does indicate that Heraclius' problems are far 
from over when he notes Phocas' sinking of the state treasure in the 
harbour. I 
The contemporary Constantinople-orientated sources are 
John of Antioch and the Chronicon Paschale of which the latter is the 
fuller. This provides very little information on anything other than 
events in the capital, Nicetas' capture of Egypt is ignored, and it is 
only when Heraclius' fleet comes into sight at Constantinople that his 
involvement is narrated. The attitude of the Chronicon Paschale 
1 John of Nikiu CX 5. 
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towards Heraclius is a positive one throughout his reign and this is 
apparent at the outset. The revolt is seen as the triumph of good 
over evil and for this reason the attention centres on the actions of 
Phocas and his general Bonosus, who is made a scapegoat for the 
emperor's policies and the firing of the Caesarion harbour. 
Presumably the grave nature of their crimes is reflected in their 
humiliating executions. Bonosus is cowardly enough to die 
attempting to desert his emperor's cause whilst Phocas is treated like 
a common criminal, dressed in black, and is mutilated before 
execution. Their bodies, together with those of Phocas' other 
servants Leontius and Domentiolus, are burnt at the Forum of the Ox. 
Heraclius' coronation is now dealt with before the chronicle's account 
for the year ends, not with any information on the revolt by 
Comentiolus or even Persian successes in the east but with a report 
of an earthquake that affected the city. 
The fragmentary source John of Antioch ends with the death 
of Phocas and can be dated to a point no later than the reign of 
Heraclius himself. 2 His perspective is aa little wider than that of 
the Chronicon Paschale but its focal point remains the same - 
Constantinople. From John of Antioch we learn of Heraclius' voyage 
from Egypt via Abydos, Heracleia and Selymbria, but it is for events 
within the city that John reserves his detailed description. Phocas' 
preparations are listed with the factions assigned to protect the 
harbours. Indeed the Green faction plays a significant role in the 
narrative. It is they who rescue Heraclius' mother and his fiancee 
and create the decisive confusion which ends resistance by setting 
fire to the Caesarion harbour. This is a different account from that of 
2 Mango, Nikephoros intro. p. 14. 
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the Chronicon Paschale which blames the fire on Bonosus and does 
not mention the factions. This illustrates the chronicle's more official 
line which is reluctant to give any role to the turbulent factions, 
preferring to blame Phocas' government for any misdeeds and to 
hand all the credit for victory to Heraclius. John of Antioch like the 
Chronicon Paschale, dwells on the mutilation of Phocas and also 
preserves an exchange of insults between Heraclius and Phocas about 
whether Heraclius will be able to reign any better than the man he 
has castigated as a criminal. John's account ends with the burning of 
the bodies in the Forum of the Ox, Domentiolus, Phocas' brother being 
added to the list of punished culprits. 
George of Pisidia is writing in praise of Heraclius rather than 
detailing every step of his hero's path to the throne. Heraclius' 
achievement has destroyed the serpent of tyranny that was 
Phocas. 3 In In Heraclium Redeuntem George celebrates "the 
divinely-inspired wisdom of your spiritual energy" rather than 
Heraclius' martial success. 4 George goes on to praise Heraclius' 
personal qualities; his peaceable nature, strength of reason, and 
piety. 5 This is a list that reads more like a panegyric than an 
account of a successful coup. This is George's aim, since he is 
attempting to legitimise his hero's success. Heraclius comes to the 
aid of the empire even though he is not responsible for the troubles 
that it is suffering. In doing so he was brave and courageous, 
scorning personal safety for the sake of the empire. 6 Heraclius' 
3 G. P. Bell. Av. line 50. 
4 G. P. H. Red. line 5. 
5 G. P. H. Red. lines 14 - 39. 
6 G. P. H. Red. lines 40 - 55. 
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noble actions have legitimised his claim to the throne that Phocas 
does not deserve. Now that Heraclius is on the throne stability will 
return to the empire, the influence of the Theotokos will again be felt 
after the evils of Phocas' reign: 
"For lately, I think, she was modestly hidden, 
blushing to look on illegitimate slaughter". 7 
So Phocas' reign had alienated divine favour. Whilst Heraclius, by his 
personal qualities, will usher in a new period of piety and legitimacy 
that will lead to a return for the city to the protection of the 
Theotokos. 
The accounts of Nicephorus and Theophanes both include 
the story of a race to the throne between Heraclius and Nicetas. 8 
This can only represent a means of legitimising the eventual 
coronation of Heraclius, for the account of John of Nikiu combined 
with elementary logistics illustrate that there could have been only 
one winner of such a race. Nicetas was Willing a vital role in his 
seizure of Egypt, a province whose importance Heraclius and his two 
advisors, Heraclius the Elder and Gregorias, father of Nicetas, would 
not have been unaware of as they resided in Africa. Theophanes, 
unlike Nicephorus, mentions the revolt as being incited by the 
Senate and Priscus and he includes detail of Heraclius' route to the 
capital, though the notion of the rivalry between Phocas and Priscus 
over the latter's statue in the hippodrome is also in Nicephorus. 9 
Nicephorus does have more detail on the actual fighting in the city 
7 G. P. H. Red. line 70. 
8 Niceph. 1, and Theoph. p. 297. 
9 Theoph. p. 294 and Nicephorus 1. 
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and this may come from John of Antioch. He includes Priscus' 
deceitful attitude towards Phocas and the activitiy of, the Greens in 
firing the Caesarion quarter. Nicephorus also credits Photius with the 
capture of Phocas in the palace, before including the exchange of 
insults between Heraclius and Phocas which is in John of Antioch and 
preserves the same list of the executed notables as John. All this 
detail is missing from Theophanes' account which merely states that 
Phocas was burnt in the Forum of the Ox and that Heraclius was 
crowned in the oratory of St. Stephen, before remarking that the 
Persians had captured Apamea and Edessa, and defeated a Roman 
army outside Antioch. 10 Though Theophanes ends his account of 
the revolt with an indication of Heraclius' immediate problems he is 
not as specific as Nicephorus. Nicephorus first has Heraclius urge 
Priscus to accept the throne before taking it himself, and then goes 
on to narrate the quarrel between Heraclius and Priscus, who had 
been appointed commander of the eastern armies, outside the 
Persian held city of Caesarea. 11 
The tonsuring of Priscus and his replacement by Philippicus 
solved this problem of personalities for Heraclius and finally allowed 
him undisputed power, but there was one other threat to his position 
that is only hinted at in John of Nikiu but which threatened to erase 
all that he had acheived. "Now great uncertainty prevailed in the 
churches because of the long duration of the war". 12 This was not 
due merely to events that John had described. From the monk 
George's Life of Theodore of Sykeon, written in 611, we have 
10 Theoph. P. 299. 
11 Niceph. 2. 
12 John of Nikiu CX 12. 
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details of a bid for the throne that came from beyond the environs of 
Constantinople and which had significant military backing. 13 The 
revolt was led by a brother of Phocas, Comentiolus, who had been 
commanding an army in the east. His ambitions were ended by his 
assassination, by an Armenian on his staff, before he could do any 
more than threaten the new regime. This, like the references in John 
of Nikiu is a rare detail about any pro-Phocas support. There is no 
indication of the extent of support for Comentiolus and George says 
that Theodore considered the insurrection foolish, though it is not 
possible to say whether this pronouncement was made on a careful 
evaluation of the military situation or the biographer merely 
inserted the statement in the light of Heraclius' success. 
Although none of the sources are pro-Phocas it is still 
possible from the information that they give us to make a 
comparison between his revolt and that of Heraclius in order to 
investigate how Heraclius legitimised his image. This requires us to 
go back to the reign of Maurice and to use the most detailed source 
for that reign the History of Theophylact Simocatta. The 
importance of this source is two-fold: it provides a full narrative of 
the revolt of Phocas yet it was written in the reign of Heraclius and 
not Phocas. So it enables us to see two different views of the 
usurpation of an emperor, the condemnation of a pretender written 
from the viewpoint of the regime which had in turn replaced him. 
Heraclius' revolt was just as illegitimate as Phocas'. Theophylact 
13 The Life of Theodore of Skyeon, Chp. 152 translated by 
Festugiere. The translation by Baynes in Three Byzantine Saints 
does not include details of the revolt. For further discussion of the 
source and the revolt see Kaegi, Military Unrest p. 137-14. 
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describes Phocas as a tyrant even before he has been crowned whilst 
John of Antioch calls Heraclius basileus before he sets foot in the 
capital. 14 Clearly the sources have two distinct attitudes to the two 
revolts, but the real difference lay in the reigns themselves rather 
than their violent inceptions. Both the practical and abstract nature 
of usurpation must be discussed: how the revolt was precipitated, its 
development from dissatisfaction to open rebellion, what gave 
opponents the right to depose a ruler, and how the new ruler 
justified his newly won power. This does not only take in the 
military campaign to establish material dominance but also the use 
of ceremony and ritual to emphasise that new authority. The major 
problem with the sources now becomes apparent: because the revolt 
of Phocas preceded that of Heraclius by only eight years there is no 
extant source sympathetic to the regime that Heraclius overthrew. 
We can see the processes that Phocas used only in the light of 
unfavourable reporting but we can do no more than conjecture what 
their effect might have been by a study of Heraclius' similar actions. 
Both aspirants to the throne faced problems in justifying 
their opposition to the existing regime. The revolt of Phocas was a 
result of spontaneous disobedience. Military discontent on the 
Danube was excited in order to further his personal ambitions. At 
the start of the revolt the sources denigratingly call him a centurion. 
However, he was one of the ambassadors that went to the general 
Peter, and to Maurice himself in 600 A. D. to complain about 
Comentiolus. This embassy was objecting to what was commonly 
seen, even by Peter, as Maurice's worst fault, his avarice. 15 Phocas' 
14 Th. Sim. viii. 8.1. and John of Antioch frg. 218 f. 
15 Th. Sim. viii. 7,2-3. 
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rise to prominence is not clearly explained, John of Nikiu writes: 
"They cast lots and the lot fell upon Phocas and 
marked him out as emperor". 16 
That is the only reason that is advanced for his rise to pre-eminence. 
We have more detail on how this new-found power was depicted. 
Theophylact says that he was proclaimed emperor by being raised on 
a shield after a meeting of the troops. 17 This shield-raising 
ceremony would have been for the benefit of the troops whom he 
expected to fight for him, and would have been as far as he could go 
in terms of pageant until he arrived in Constantinople. Then he could 
hold a full coronation ceremony that would help to legitimise him in 
the eyes of the empire rather than just his assembled troops. A 
Nestorian history preserves what Phocas saw as a legitimate reason 
for his revolt, the weakness of Maurice that was threatening to result 
in parts of the empire being lost. 18 
Although Phocas had been raised on a shield his destiny as 
emperor was not assured. Maurice fled the city in the wake of public 
disturbances, but Stratos believes that he could have saved his 
throne had he abdicated in favour of Theodosius. 19 Since 
Theodosius was Maurice's son he may well have been accepted by 
the army which had been trying to get in touch with the emperor. 20 
16 John of Nikiu CII 11. 
17 Th. Sim. viii. 7,7. 
18 Nau, 'Maurice', Chp 6 (p. 776). 
19 Stratos, Byzantium I p. 48. 
20 Th. Sim. viii, 8,5. 
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But Theodosius fled with his father, and his father-in-law Germanus, 
whom the army also considered a suitable candidate, had his chances 
reduced to naught by the vehement opposition of the Green faction 
which protested about his partisan support for the Blues. 21 Thus 
Phocas entered the capital with little opposition. He was at the head 
of the Thracian army, the populace had opened the gates for him and 
the Senate had no other candidate. The only role the factions had in 
the whole affair was a passive one. The Greens may have vetoed the 
candidature of Germanus, but Maurice either trusted them 
sufficiently or was sufficiently desperate to place both Factions on 
the walls to defend his throne. Phocas' command of the army was 
the decisive influence in the confusion of the capital. He reinforced 
his position by appealing to all sections of society in his coronation 
ceremony. He was again raised on a shield but he was also crowned 
in a church, that of St. John at the Hebdomon, by Patriarch Cyriacus, 
after the Patriarch and the Senate had been invited out to the army's 
camp. The formal setting' for the coronation gave an air of 
legitimacy to the occasion that Phocas built upon on his entry to 
Constantinople. 22 The coronation of the Augusta Leontia took the 
form of another ordered ceremony, although the impression of good 
order was marred by the Blues and the Greens actually fighting for 
the Ambelion, the forecourt of the Palace, traditionally reserved for 
the Blues. Phocas' final act in assuming power was less ceremonial 
and yet equally effective. According to John of Antioch the Greens 
chanted "Maurice is not dead, learn the truth", to which Phocas 
retaliated with his execution. 23 
21 Th. Sim. viii. 9,14-16. 
22 The Church of St. John at the Hebdomon was outside the city 
walls to the west. See Janin, Constantinople Byzantine p. 408 - 411. 
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Heraclius' revolt for all its greater degree of preplanning 
was no less confused or bloody. He was incited to rebellion by a 
widespread and deep-rooted resentment of Phocas' government of 
the empire. How the revolt began is impossible to decipher as there 
is no one action of Phocas' that we can pinpoint as being the catalyst, 
similar to Maurice's order for the troops to winter north of the 
Danube. John of Antioch and Theophanes have the Senate and Africa 
in communication before the revolt breaks out and mention Priscus 
as a prime mover in this correspondence. 24 However, John of Nikiu 
and Nicephorus do not cite correspondence as the reason for the 
revolt, and they suggest that the revolt was conceived in Africa by 
the Exarch there, Heraclius the Elder, and his brother and 
subordinate commander Gregorias. Heraclius the Elder had been 
successful as a general under Maurice who had apppointed him 
Exarch. It is quite conceivable that he was in touch with his 
Senatorial colleagues in Constantinople and after the tonsuring by 
Phocas of Philippicus he may well have felt insecure about his 
family's future. 25 Nevertheless Heraclius the Elder had no choice 
but to wait since the logistics of attacking Constantinople from Africa 
would require careful planning. 
It is from John of Nikiu that we learn most about this 
preparation. At the time Africa had no real fleet, and the western 
Roman fleet was controlled by the Exarch of Ravenna. The garrison 
army was also small, about 18,000 men according to Stratos. 2 6 
23 John of Antioch frg. 218 d. 
24 Theoph. p. 295. 
25 Theoph. p. 293. 
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Heraclius solved this lack of manpower by hiring recruits from the 
barbarians of Tripolis and Pentapolis. 27 Negotiations were also 
conducted with Leontius, Phocas' prefect of Mareotis, who provided 
troops for the expedition against Egypt. Heraclius unlike Phocas was 
able to issue coinage before he was crowned. Even at the beginning 
he was aware that he needed to give his enterprise as legitimate an 
image as possible. He did not strike coins in his name as emperor for 
he had not yet been crowned, and to have done so would have 
offended the Senate and populace of Constantinople where he most 
needed to cultivate support. The bronze and silver coinage used 
within Africa had one bust with Heraclius the Elder as consul, but the 
gold coinage that circulated outside of Africa had two busts, of father 
and son, with Heraclius the Elder as consul again to show that it was 
not he who aspired to the throne. 28 Even this striking of consular 
coinage was irregular, but then again so was revolt and Heraclius 
must have hoped to profit from the respect that his father had 
earned in his career. 
Heraclius' attack was two-pronged. This has given rise to 
the historical fallacy of the race to the capital between Nicetas and 
Heraclius. This story is preserved by both Theophanes and 
Nicephorus because it is of anecdotal interest. Nicetas left Africa well 
before Heraclius but he did not sail directly for Constantinople even 
after capturing Alexandria, since John of Nikiu tells us that he 
remained in Egypt to reorganise that province. 29 This suggests that 
Egypt was crucial to Heraclius' cause. Heraclius needed Nicetas to 
26 Stratos, Byzantium I p. 25. 
27 John of Nikiu CVII 2. 
28 On the coinage of Heraclius see Grierson, 'Catalogue'. 
29 John of Nikiu CIX 17. 
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secure it in order protect the province of Africa - from invasion, put 
pressure on Phocas in- Constantinople by withholding the grain 
supply and prevent a fleet from Alexandria opposing his own 
expeditionary force. 
Nicetas was encouraged by insurgents in Alexandria who 
were plotting against the Patriarch there even before he had set off, 
and he was well supported by the Egyptians during his campaign. 
John of Nikiu gives a balanced account of the fighting in Egypt which 
also shows substantial support for Phocas. The governor of 
Alexandria did not desert Phocas as quickly as his populace and that 
of Constantinople did, 30 and indeed the duration and intensity of the 
fighting was greater than that in Constantinople. This included a full- 
scale siege of Alexandria, a pitched battle outside it and various mass 
executions. Victory against Bonosus did not end Nicetas' problems. 
He was confronted with a province that had been given over to 
faction fighting during a civil war. 31 The appointment of prefects to 
cities and repression of plundering calmed any lingering civil strife 
and the reduction of taxes for three years further smoothed the 
transition of from one regime to another. 32 These actions allowed 
Nicetas to consolidate the gains that he had made on behalf of 
Heraclius. 
Heraclius' journey to Constantinople was broken by visits to 
islands in the Sea of Marmara where he received material aid and 
moral support. As Phocas had been raised on a shield before 
30 John of Nikiu CVII 16 - 21. 
31 John of Nikiu CIX 16. 
32 John of Nikiu CIX 17. 
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marching on Constantinople Heraclius was crowned before he 
entered the capital. This took place at Heracleia and was performed 
by Stephen, the bishop of Cyzicus. Here too Heraclius was able to 
learn of the civil unrest in Constantinople and he may well have 
delayed his advance in order to allow this to escalate. Any amount 
of consternation in the capital would be bound to impede Phocas' 
preparations for its defence. While Heraclius was at Abydus he 
received exiles from the government of Phocas as his support and 
repute grew. 33 
Heraclius did not have to face the skilled and enthusiastic 
manoueverings of Bonosus in the field, for although the general was 
in Constantinople his presence was neutralised by the chaotic public 
behaviour that was brought on by the appearance of Heraclius' fleet 
in the Bosporus. Heraclius had icons of the Theotokos on the masts of 
his ships, an exploitation of that cult that was to develop throughout 
his reign. 34 This was supplementary to his earlier imagery which 
although still religiously-orientated looked back to the tradition of 
Constantine. Heraclius' coinage at Carthage (the follis and half-follis) 
had the same legend that Constantine used at the Milvian Bridge 
when he too was attempting to win an empire that he had no 
legitimate right to. This legend was iv -rovro v(Ka , and the reverse M 
or K with three crosses. 35 So Phocas became Maxentius, opposed by 
Heraclius' devotion to the cross and the image of Constantine, and a 
form of proto-crusade is evident in his earliest imperial actions. 
33 John of Antioch frg. 218 f. 
34 Theoph. p. 298. 
35 See Grierson, 'Catalogue'. 
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Phocas, like Maurice in 602 was to lose control of the 
populace of Constantinople. Like Maurice too Phocas placed the 
Factions in positions of defensive responsibility, and it was the 
Greens around the Caesarion Harbour that deserted him. He had no 
fleet to oppose Heraclius who thus had the initiative, since all Phocas 
could have mustered were some Alexandrian corn ships that he had 
confiscated, no match for Heraclius' small navy. The crucial event in 
the attack upon the capital was the firing of the Caesarion harbour. 
This turned the defenders' confusion into panic and Heraclius won 
the day. The Chronicon Paschale blames Bonosus for the fire: 
presumably the general believed that act would keep the Greens 
obedient. 36 John of Antoich says that the Greens were responsible 
for the fire, and started it as a deliberate act of aggression towards 
Phocas. We have already seen that the Chronicon Paschale is loath 
to see any blame attached to Heraclius' allies or any credit given to 
the Factions. John of Nikiu does not mention the fire but does say 
that the confusion was increased by inter-faction aggression. 37 
This confusion seems to have been so great that Heraclius 
was carried along by events rather than directing them. However, he 
was in control when Phocas is brought before him. According to 
Nicephorus Phocas was removed from the palace by Photius. Photius 
had suffered at the hands of Phocas' personal government as his wife 
had been seduced by the emperor. This personal crime was not the 
only one which Phocas had committed, for he is immediately 
stripped of the imperial insignia and dressed in the black clothes of 
a common criminal. This was the first in a series of very public and 
36 C. P. p. 700. 
37 John of Nikiu CX 25. 
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overt humiliations which graphically illustrated his downfall. Phocas 
was brought to Heraclius who, seeing him as a criminal, asked him if 
that is how he has governed the state. This story is in John of 
Antioch and repeated in Nicephorus, and serves to show why 
Heraclius thought that he was justified in removing an emperor' from 
his throne. Phocas is then mutilated before being burnt. The same 
summary execution was also meted out to Leontius, Domentiolus and 
Bonosus. All four corpses were then dragged through the streets to 
the Forum of the Ox which was a common site for public burnings. 
So Phocas ended his life not as a vanquished emperor but as a 
private citizen convicted and punished for crimes that he had 
committed during his illegal tenure of government, part of this point 
being that Phocas had no right to the throne. 
Heraclius was now in a position to assume the throne that 
the punishment of Phocas had left vacant. However, John of Nikiu 
says that Heraclius was loathe to accept the crown and Nicephorus 
writes that he offered it to Priscus saying that he had come to punish 
Phocas not to take the throne, but Priscus would not accept it. 3 8 
This attitude does not accord with the image of legitimate 
candidature for the throne that Heraclius had employed throughout 
his campaign, and does not explain why he was at so great pains to 
secure Egypt. It may well have been no more than an appeal to the 
public for their consent, for Priscus must have known that he was 
not acceptable to the populace. His attude to the revolt had been 
ambiguous throughout. Phocas had appointed him Count of the 
Excubitors in 602.39 In 607 he had become Phocas' son-in-law, and 
38 John of Nikiu CX 9, Niceph. 2. 
39 Theoph. p. 292. 
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it was only because of a quarrel between the two on his wedding day 
that he turned against the emperor, as Germanus had done in 602.40 
Although Count of the Excubitors was the position from which both 
Tiberius and Maurice had risen to become emperor, it is unlikely that 
the people of Constantinople would accept someone with such close 
links to the old emperor, especially when they could choose the man 
who had done most to oust that emperor. Regardless of these facts 
Heraclius was the man who controlled both Egypt and Constantinople 
by force as much as public approval, and in the last analysis he was 
the only strong candidate because there was nobody in the city to 
stand against him. 
The sources do not agree upon where Heraclius was 
crowned. John of Nikiu has St. Thomas', Theophanes places it in St. 
Stephen's and S. Sophia is the location for the Chronicon Paschale. 
All the sources give the ceremony performed by the Patriarch 
Sergius a cursory mention and add that Heraclius married his fiancee 
Eudocia on the same day. The speed at which all this was 
implemented illustrates not only the complete nature of Heraclius' 
success in the capital but also ease with which ceremonies could be 
staged. On the day on which a battle had been fought within the 
walls of the city Heraclius was able to be proclaimed emperor by the 
Senate and people. 41 Heraclius legitimised his authority further by 
assuming the consulship. 42 He did not have the resources for as 
lavish an affair as that of Justin II, and he did not even parade in a 
chariot, 43 though he could make donations to all and sundry. 
40 Th. Sim. viii. 9,14-16. 
41 Niceph. 2, Theoph p. 299, C. P. p. 701 and John of Nikiu CX 9. 
42 See Cameron and Schanes, 'The Last Consul', p. 126-145. 
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Important though the opportunity was for imperial largesse another 
advantage accrued to Heraclius with the taking of the consulship. 
Justin II had taken the consulship to usher in a new age and 
proclaim new confidence after the bleak last years of Justinian. 
Heraclius would have been attempting to do the same. It did not 
matter that all the emperors since Justin II had taken the consulship; 
what was important for Heraclius, as it had been for Phocas, was the 
opportunity to legitimise his rule through the taking of the title. This 
was because chroniclers worked out their chronology on the basis of 
consular years, and another ceremony celebrating the personality of 
the new emperor was bound to emphasise his right to rule. By the 
same token there is nothing more in Heraclius' giving of offices to 
members of his close family, Theodore his brother and Nicetas his 
cousin, than there had been in the same practice by Tiberius, 
Maurice or Phocas. It was expected that the emperor would 
associate power with his family. This was not a sign of domestic 
insecurity, although the situation in Anatolia was not yet secure. 
Theophanes mentions the Persian menace immediately after 
dealing with Heraclius' coronation, 44 and this was to plague 
Heraclius for the next twenty years of his reign. However, in 610 he 
was not able to do anything about it immediately, since John of Nikiu 
refers to "great uncertainty" in the churches due to the long duration 
of the conflict, and the nature of this internal conflict is revealed in 
the Life of Theodore of Sykeon which shows that, although Heraclius 
was crowned emperor in Constantinople, he had not yet extinguished 
all opposition to his claim. The Life of St. Theodore of Sykeon 
43 C. P. p. 701. 
44 Theoph. p. 299. 
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shows that Comentiolus began a rebellion after he had brought his 
army from the east to winter at Ancyra. 45 Comentiolus held the 
rank of patrikios and was the last member of Phocas' family still at 
large. The Life reveals that Theodore wrote to Heraclius asking him 
to spare Domentiolus the younger brother of Phocas whom 
Theophanes places in Constantinople at this time, 46 and whom 
according to John of Antioch and Nicephorus was executed there with 
his brother. Whatever the fate of Domentiolus, Comentiolus must 
have thought that his own future was more than uncertain if he 
surrendered. There is no evidence that he was moving to aid Phocas 
when he reached Ancyra, for Theodore of Sykeon heard of Phocas' 
deposition on the 7 October, only two days after it had happened. 
Comentiolus probably heard the news as quickly, but may well have 
believed that he had some chance of success; for Heraclius' army was 
not that strong, as is revealed by his later problems against the 
Persians, and he was newly established on the throne. Revenge for 
his brother's death would only have served to strengthen 
Comentiolus' resolve, and his army remained loyal to him just as 
Bonosus' had in Egypt. This may have been out of loyalty to Phocas 
or their to own commander, or even more materially, out of the 
opportunity to capture the spoils of empire by a swift attack on a 
newly occupied throne. 
The collapse of the revolt was not based upon military 
exploits. Comentiolus was unexpectedly assassinated by the 
Armenian Prefect Justinus. 47 It does not appear that Heraclius had 
45 Th. Syk. Chp. 152,19, Festugiere's edition. For a discussion of 
the revolt see Kaegi, Military Unrest p. 141-143. 
46 Theoph. p. 298. 
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been expecting this turn of events for he sent a number of 
embassies, the first of which was the monk Herodianus who visited 
St. Theodore on his way to Comentiolus. He was followed by 
Philippicus who had been tonsured by Phocas, and who was arrested 
by Comentiolus when he was found in Bithynia. Comentiolus clearly 
presented Heraclius with a threat to his authority, and the Life says 
that he fully intended to march on Heraclius. 48 However, this was 
not the only threat to Heraclius. Comentiolus had been commanding 
on the eastern borderlands, presumably as a replacement for 
Domentiolus who had suffered a defeat at the hands of the 
Persians. 49 His choice of Ancyra as his winter headquarters shows 
that he was concerned about the Armenian front, for Caesarea would 
have been a more convenient headquaters for a campaign in 
northern Syria. We do not know how much of Anatolia Comentiolus 
controlled directly but if his power extended to the environs of 
Sykeon and if he could arrest Philippicus in Bithynia, then Heraclius' 
own area of authority must have been small, and any prolonged 
resistance by Comentiolus could have resulted in whole of Asia Minor 
going over to his cause. This was the greatest risk to Heraclius, but 
the empire faced an even greater threat. 
The revolt of Comentiolus cut Heraclius' communications 
with the east. The murder of Maurice in 602 had been the pretext 
that Chosroes II had been awaitng to attack the Roman empire with 
which he had been on friendly terms since Maurice had restored him 
to his throne in 591. The gains of the Persians were rapid; Dara fell 
47 Kaegi, Military Unrest, p. 141-143. 
48 Th. Syk. Chp. 152 49-52. 
49 Theoph. p. 293. 
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in 606, between 607-609 Mardin and Amida were captured and in 
609-610 Edessa was lost. The Persians also held the initiative in 
Syria. Shahbaraz crossed the Euphrates in 610 and took Aleppo and 
Hierapolis. It was the same story in the north, where prominent 
locals like Sembat Bagratuni were appointed as satraps. 50 In 607 
the Persians won a decisive victory at Dwin in Armenia, and in 610 
Caesarea fell. It was now crucial that Heraclius be able to begin 
diplomatic correspondence with the Persians to limit the scale of 
their conquests by a peace treaty. The revolt of Comentiolus 
prevented not only this but also imperial organisation of resistance 
in the east, as the eastern army was pointing in the opposite 
direction, towards Constantinople. This breakdown in 
communications with Persia is preserved in the Chronicon Paschale : 
"When he who is now piously ruling over us 
together with his father of eternal memory 
discovered what had been done by that 
corrupter they planned to liberate the Roman 
state from the great duress of that man. This in 
fact they achieved though they found that state 
humbled by your might. On account of the 
disturbance prevailing between the two states 
and in addition because of the intestine strife, he 
did not have an opportunity to do what ought to 
have been done, to present by means of an 
embassy the honour that was owed to the 
superabundant might of your serenity-. 51 
50 Sebeos Chp. 14. 
53 C. P. p. 701. 
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This is evidence from a letter written in 615 to Chosroes by the 
Senate, apologising for not having sent an embassy earlier. The 
eastern nexus of sources maintain that Heraclius did indeed send 
such an embassy immediately upon ascending the throne, but 
Theophanes first mentions a Roman embassy in 613-614 and 
Nicephorus does not record any communication with the Persians 
until Shahin is on the banks of the Bosporus (dated by Theophanes to 
615 - 616). 52 Heraclius had been able to avoid a costly civil war in 
terms of military resources but had failed to translate his prestige in 
Constantinople as the avenger of Maurice into tangible diplomatic 
gains, as Chosroes chose not to recognise his rule. This is the greatest 
significance of the revolt of Comentiolus. It prevented the diplomatic 
and military action that was needed quickly on the eastern front. 
This was not the end of Heraclius' internal problems and 
they continued to hamper his dealings with Persia. Although Kaegi 
treats his tonsuring of Priscus in 612 as the end of a series of revolts 
that had looked to use the eastern army as a means to the throne, 5 3 
I would prefer to see the relationship between Heraclius and Priscus 
in the light of the former's revolt against Phocas. This is because 
Heraclius' confrontation with Priscus shows his success in 
consolidating power since 608. The quarrel gets most attention in 
Nicephorus, whereas Theophanes does not mention it, and the 
Chronicon Paschale only preserves the day (December 5) on which 
Priscus became a monk. 54 Nicephorus provides us with details of 
52 Theoph. p. 300 and Niceph. 6. 
53 Kaegi, Military Unrest p. 147. 
54 C. P. p. 703. 
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the relationship before Heraclius is crowned. Theophanes last 
mentions Priscus in 607-608 when he asked the Elder Heraclius for 
aid. 55 John of Antioch does preserve the jealousy of Phocas towards 
Priscus when he married the emperor's daughter. John of Antioch 
and Nicephorus agree that the attitude of Priscus during Heraclius' 
revolt was ambiguous. Priscus had owed his rise to prominence 
initally to Maurice, but he had also benefitted from Phocas' need to 
associate his repute with his own newly won power. It may be that 
Priscus believed that he was in a position to ascend the throne. 
Nicephorus has the story of Heraclius offering the throne to Priscus, 
and John of Nikiu says that Heraclius was carried into the church 
against his will to be crowned. However, this imperial feigning of 
worthiness is a trait that goes back all the way to Tiberius in A. D. 14, 
and is in fact a contradiction of Nicephorus' own statement that 
Nicetas and Heraclius were involved in a race for the crown. Indeed 
it does seem unlikely that Heraclius would stake his life and those of 
his family on a bid to put someone else on the throne. The coinage 
that he minted backs up this impression. On the two bust series the 
unbearded figure (that is Heraclius) is on the spectator's left when 
the senior colleague is normally represented on that side; Theodosius 
II and Valentinian III, Leo I and Leo II, Leo II and Zeno, Justin II 
and Sophia, Tiberius II and Anastasia, Maurice and Constantina and 
Phocas and Leontia. To his African subjects Heraclius not Priscus was 
the potential ruler of the Roman empire. 
Priscus was not forgotten by Heraclius. In 611 he was given 
Comentiolus' command in the east. He was immediately unsuccessful 
as the Persians escaped his encirciment at Caesarea, a situation from 
55 Theoph. p. 296. 
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which the Life of Theodore says the public expected a Roman 
victory. 56 This failure was the opportunity Heraclius needed to 
establish his own personal prestige and authority outside of Africa, 
Egypt and the capital. Pricus saw the arrival of Heraclius at the front 
as a personal slight and feigned illness to avoid an audience. 
Nicephorus says that Heraclius realised that Priscus was acting, noted 
the insult to his majesty and returned to the capital to concentrate on 
other affairs. If Heraclius was prepared to let the matter rest Priscus 
was not. He told Heraclius that the place for an emperor was in the 
palace not on the front line and that the fighting should be left to 
more able men. 57 
Heraclius was only just to avoid a problem that Phocas had 
faced in 603. There was a real need for an emperor to assert his 
authority in the east. It was along this frontier that the majority of 
Roman forces were concentrated, and in 603 Phocas was confronted 
with a revolt by his general Narses. 58 Narses had been a general of 
Maurice and now he was prepared to side with the Persians in order 
to overthrow the man who had murdered his former emperor. This 
revolt, like that of Comentiolus, had the result of preventing any 
effective imperial action in the east, and dissipated valuable men and 
money. The underlying need therefore was for an emperor to 
impose himself upon the army in the east. Phocas had won his 
throne by the volition of the Thracian army and its influence in the 
capital, not by the consent of the whole empire. Narses was 
56 Th. Syk. Chp. 153 lines 13-16. 
57 Th. Sim. v. 2-4. for similar opposition to Maurice going on 
campaign. 
58 Theoph. p. 291. Kaegi, Military Unrest p. 140 - 141. 
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questioning his right to rule by testing the military forces of the east 
against those of the west. Heraclius had defeated Phocas in Egypt 
and Constantinople, and had diffused the reprisal of Comentiolus, but 
he had still to impose his personal will on the eastern army. That he 
was able to do this shows how far he had progressed in his 
assumption of power. In neutralising the threat from Priscus he was 
surmmounting the threat of a revolt by the general in the east, which 
Kaegi believes had already happened. 59 
The arrival of Nicetas from Egypt and the birth of a son 
were the pretexts that Heraclius used to recall Priscus from Caesarea. 
Now it was Heraclius' turn to play-act. He pretended to want Priscus 
to be the god-father of his son, named Constantine in a return to 
earlier imagery, and on account of this Priscus came to the palace, 
having already journeyed to the capital to welcome Nicetas. 
Heraclius had assembled the Patriarch and the Senate and asked 
them "When a man insults an emperor, whom does he offend? " They 
answered that he offends God who has appointed the emperor. 
Priscus was then asked to give his opinion, and as he did not 
understand that it was his behaviour at the centre of the debate said 
that such an offender should be severely punished. Heraclius then 
remined him of his attitude at Caesarea, and commented that Priscus 
had not made a good son-in-law (for Phocas) so how could he hope to 
make a good friend (for Heraclius). Priscus was tonsured and 
Heraclius immediately went out to face Priscus' soldiers; having 
received their usual allowance they acclaimed him, and Heraclius 
assigned them to other commanders. Heraclius had achieved his 
objective, to impose himself over the eastern army and its 
59 Kaegi, Military Unrest p. 147. 
79 
commander. 60 Heraclius took a very public role in the degrading of 
Priscus and the winning of his army. He was prepared to use his 
new authority to the full even if it was against the Count of 
Excubitors and a member of the Senate. The Senate was involved to 
demonstrate the legality of what Heraclus was doing, to give 
legitimacy to what was already a relatively public humiliation. 
Heraclius needed the Senate to validate his actions not to give him 
authority. 61 The removal of Priscus was the end of domestic 
opposition to Heraclius, although the ease in which he was able 
manoeuvre in internal politics was not mirrored externally. Yet it 
was by imposing his own personality and methods upon the army at 
the beginning of his Persian campaigns that Heraclius was not only 
able to prevent the reccurrence of any unrest in the east, but also to 
further not only his own cause but that of the empire as a whole. 
The revolt of Comentiolus and the quarrel with Priscus give 
Heraclius' usurpation not only a longer duration but also a wider 
perspective than is to be found in any one source. The consequences 
of his victory were not immediately of obvious benefit to the empire. 
We have already seen how Comentiolus' revolt led to an aggravation 
of the problems that the Persians were creating on the eastern 
frontier. This is not to blame Heraclius for usurping the throne at an 
inopportune moment, for Phocas had already been having problems 
with the Persians. Indeed Heraclius could claim that any short-term 
damage that his revolt may have caused would be far les than the 
effects of a longer period of rule by Phocas, and at least now the 
60 Niceph. 2. 
61 Contra Herrin, Formation p. 192 who states that Heraclius 
needed Senatorial aid at this point. 
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empire was united. Africa was no longer estranged from the throne 
so all the resources of the empire could be exploited towards a more 
secure domestic and international future. 
It is this empire-wide perspective that holds the key to the 
explanation for the success of Heraclius' coup. He was successful in 
two theatres of war and had the ability to combine military strength 
with political awareness to consolidate these gains. Indeed it was not 
only military muscle that brought him victory, since he had small 
forces at his disposal. What comes across from all the sources is not 
only the strength and courage of Heraclius' generals and soldiers but 
also their communal zeal that also manifested itself in the local 
populace. In both Egypt and Constantinople the battle was almost 
over before it had begun. Heraclius took his time to move north, and 
gave Phocas time to prepare the defence of the capital because there 
was sedition in the city and he wanted to give it time to ferment. 6 2 
If Phocas' revolt was spontaneous and direct then Heraclius' was 
planned and circuitous. He correctly identified Egypt as the key to 
his strategy: defeat there would have jeopardised the whole 
campaign, and yet it was vital that he himself go straight to the 
capital. By taking this course he was ensuring that his homeland was 
protected and its power-base extended, whilst he sailed into the 
midst of the confusion hoping that his opponents' reputation would 
count as much against him, as his father's repute would count for his 
own pretentions. 
There was already support for him in Constantinople. The 
62 John of Antioch frg. 218 f. 
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revolt may have begun militarily in Africa but Theophanes tells us 
that the Senate were at least in touch with the rebels. This would 
explain futher why Heraclius the Elder did not sail to the capital. His 
prestige could be represented by his son and his son's backers in 
Constantinople, the Senate. Both Phocas and Heraclius had an army 
and a faction behind them in 610. Heraclius' advantage lay in the 
depth of aristocratic support that Phocas had never managed to 
develop. 63 This prevented other aristocrats from stealing his 
limelight, and allowed for maximum disruption in the days and hours 
leading up to his arrival in the harbour. Heraclius' coup was 
successful because it was based on the three main struts of Roman 
society; the senate, the army and the people. All three traditionally 
took part in proclaiming an emperor, in the case of Heraclius they all 
took part in making one. 
63 Theoph. p. 293-295 has an extensive list of executions of 
aristocrats (or at least senior officals) under Phocas. 
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The Avars, the Slavs and Heraclius. 
The Avars and the Slavs posed very different long term 
threats to the Roman empire, and yet it was the continued military 
menace of both peoples that was most keenly felt in the reign of 
Heraclius. This diversity of long term interests amongst the 
barbarians was a product of their contrasting societies. The Romans 
had been struggling to contain barbarian pressures on their frontiers 
since before Valens' defeat at Adrianople in 378. The Goths had 
sought land, Attila's Huns had demanded tribute, but now the empire 
had to deal with both types of demand at once. Nor were the 
Balkans the only sphere of Roman military activity in the first 
decade of Heraclius' reign. The threat from Persia was ongoing and 
considerable, necessitating the commitment of resources of men and 
money that were needed equally as badly in the west. 
The Avars first came to the attention of the Romans in 558 
when they sent an embassy to Constantinople asking for gifts, yearly 
payments and fertile land. 1 They were a nomadic people from 
Central Asia who had moved west due to pressure from the 
expansion of the Turk federation in the mid-sixth century. The 
Turkish Chagan reasoned that the Avars that had fled were in fact 
fugitive slaves, and sought to destroy them. They themselves 2 
1 For the information on the background to Heraclius' dealings with 
both the Avars and the Slavs I am indebted to Obolensky, Byzantine 
Commonwealth Chp. 2. 
2 Men. Prot. frg. 4.2. 
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were warlike and ambitious, and may well be the remnants of the 
Juan-Juan, who were the the most powerful Central Asian grouping 
before the rise of the Turks. This aggression saw them conquer 
tribes living north of the Black Sea, including the Cotrigurs. Their 
federation hinged upon the personality of their monarch, the Chagan, 
since it was he alone who united the various tribes that made up the 
federation. The Avars' military proficiency was to be well 
appreciated by the Romans. They used an irregular battle line 
consisting of various sized units, that was a single line in appearance 
only. This was more flexible than the rigid single line favoured by 
both the Romans and the Persians. 3 
In 558 Justinian received an embassy from them. 4 The 
envoy boasted of the Avars' military might and their ability to 
destroy the Romans. The Avars' diplomatic tactic was to offer the 
Romans the opportunity to avoid this menace by entering into an 
alliance with them that would guarantee the Romans protection, in 
return for valuable gifts, annual payments and fertile land. These 
were the consistent objectives of the Avars. Land to inhabit and 
income for the Chagan to distribute to maintain his prestige within 
his federation. Justinian decided to avoid any conflict, and so sent 
them gifts and entered into an alliance with them. However, he also 
encouraged the Avars to make war on the Avar's own enemies, for as 
Menander points out, both an Avar victory or defeat would suit the 
Romans equally well. 5 At an early juncture in their dealings with 
the Romans Menander emphasises their predeliction for 
3 Strategicon XI. 2 (Dennis, p. 117). 
4 Men. Prot. frg. 5.1. 
5 Men. Prot. frg. 5.2. 
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treachery. 6 Justinian won the confidence of Kunimon, one of' the 
embassy sent to Constantinople to ask the emperor to settle the 
Avars in Scythia Minor. Kunimon told Justinian that although the 
Avars appeared reasonable and friendly this was only a mask for the 
treachery that they hoped would be instrumental in enabling them 
to cross the Danube. Justinian was careful to fortify the Danube and 
ordered Justin, the commander on the Danube, to remove any 
weapons from the returning envoys. This caused an outbreak of 
hostility between Romans and Avars that Menander says had been 
growing for some time. By this time, 562, the Avars had crushed and 
subjugated the Utigurs, Kutrigurs, Antes and Sabiri in the region 
north of the Black Sea, and were threatening the Danube and 
Dobrudja. 565 saw a complete change in Roman policy towards them 
with the beginning of the reign of Justin II, who refused them the 
tribute demanded in a diplomatic encounter which is described by 
Corippus and Menander. 7 Both writers show the Avars as 
possessing diplomatic skills, referring to the "ambiguous speech , 
now pleading, now threatening". This is the same tactic as the one 
they used in attempting to cowe Justinian. The technique was 
unsuccessful as Justin II dismissed the embassy; with a blunt refusal 
according to Menander, or by a sophisticated justification of Roman 
power and influence in the work of Corippus. However, there can be 
no doubting their political acumen as an alliance with the Lombards 
saw the subjugation of the Gepids which left them in control of the 
Pannonian plain, 8 and in 568 the Lombards themselves felt the 
Avars were becoming too aggressive and moved into Italy. The Avar 
6 Men. Prot. frg. 5.4. 
7 Corippus, In Laud. Just. III. 271-307, and Men. Prot. frg. 8. 
8 Men. Prot. frg. 12.1-2. 
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Chagan appeared just as deceitful to the Lombards as he had to the 
Romans. "Now he claimed that he could not join them, now that he 
could but was unwilling". 9 _ 
In that year, the Avars turned against 
the empire once more, besieging Sirmium for the first time. The 
Chagan showed his hostility immediately by imprisoning the Roman 
interpreter, Vitalian, and the Roman envoy, Comita. Menander says 
that this was "in contravention of the universally recognised rights of 
ambassadors". 10 The Avar negotiations outside Sirmium were 
aimed at producing some gifts that the Chagan could distribute 
amongst his followers so as not to lose face after his withdrawal from 
the city. However, the Romans on the spot would do nothing without 
the approval of Justin II and the Avars retreated in anger to 
continue the ravaging of the Gepids. The Avar Chagan continued 
diplomatic wrangling for Sirmium: he claimed this former Gepid 
possession as his inheritance, through his conquest of the Gepids, and 
also asked for the annual payments that the Kutrigurs and Utigurs 
had received from the emperor. 11 Justin II gave a bellicose reply 
that not only asserted Roman strength, but also reminded the Avar 
envoy that he was aware of the nature of the Avars. "It is more 
painful to be the friends of the Avars - nomads and foreigners - than 
their enemies, since their friendship is treacherous". 12 Two more 
such exchanges took place without resolution and the Avars mounted 
an attack and defeated the Roman general Tiberius. 13 In 570-571 
a treaty was made but the extant fragments of Menander do not 
detail its terms. 
9 Men. Prot. frg. 12.2. 
10 Men. Prot. frg. 12.4. 
11 Men. Prot. frg. 12.6. 
12 Men. Prot. frg. 12.6. 
13 Men. Prot. frg. 15.5. 
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Thereafter since they were at war with Persia, the Romans 
intended to turn the Avars' military proficiency to their own 
advantage in the West. In 578 Tiberius II ferried 60,000 Avars 
across the Danube and through Roman territory to attack the Sclavini 
of Wallachia. This was a punitive raid as the Slavs had been 
ravaging Greece. Tiberius also calculated that the Avars would be 
keen to reprimand the Slavs for their independent attitude towards 
them. 14 However, it only served to show up the Romans' military 
weakness, and the Avars took full advantage. In 579 when the Avar 
envoy, Targitius, had collected the annual payment of 80,000 
nomismata the Chagan again showed the treacherous side of his 
nature. "Without seeking an excuse or a pretext or even troubling to 
invent a false charge against the Romans, suddenly with a most 
barbarous lack of shame broke the treaty which he had made with 
Tiberius immediately after he had become Caesar". 15 The Avars 
wanted to capture Sirmium to give them a bridgehead from which to 
raid into Thrace, but the Chagan continued to aver that he intended 
to cross the Danube in order to attack the Slavs whom he presented 
as the mutual enemy of the Avars and the Romans. He continued to 
build a bridge over the Danube, and threatened that the Romans 
would be guilty of breaking the treaty if they attempted to prevent 
this. The Chagan swore barbarian and Roman oaths that he was not 
about to use the bridge to attack the Romans. This he did 
"treacherously concealing his intent". 16 Tiberius attempted to put 
off an Avar attack by feigning that the Turks were at Cherson but 
14 Men. Prot. frg. 21. 
15 Men. Prot. frg. 25.1. 
16 Men. Prot. frg. 25.1. 
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the envoy saw through this bluff as easily as Tiberius had spotted 
the Chagan's deception. Tiberius had believed in the treaty that he 
had made with the Chagan and so did not have any supplies laid up 
in Sirmium. Sirmium held out until 582, but peace was then made 
on the basis of the city's surrender and a back-payment of 80,000 
nomismata for each of the last three years. 17 The possession of 
Sirmium allowed the Avars to cross the Danube at will and they 
began to play a significant role in internal Roman affairs. 1 8 
However, this peace was not a permanent settlement as the Chagan 
took advantage of Roman weakness: whilst the Slavs raided Thrace in 
583/584, the Avars took Singidunum and advanced through the 
Danube provinces, capturing Viminacium and Augustae. 19 Roman 
envoys to the Chagan reminded him of his faithlessness. 20 The 
Chagan continued in this vein, demonstrating his anger towards the 
envoys by putting one of them, Comentiolus, in chains. 21 The peace 
that the Romans gained the next year saw their payments increase 
from 80,000 nomismata to 100,000 nomismata. 22 Though the 
Avars now vacated the empire the peace was not complete as the 
Slavs raided Thrace as far as the Long Walls. Comentiolus managed 
to defeat the invaders and by a series of victories pushed them out 
of the Astike (in the vicinity of Philippopolis and Adrianoplis). 23 Yet 
again the Avars regained the initiative, devastating the provinces of 
Lower Moesia and Scythia in 586/587.24 
17 Men. Prot. frg. 27.3. 
18 See Men. Prot. frg. 12.1.14-20 for the Avars' awareness of the 
strategic importance of Sirmium. 
19 Th. Sim. i. 4.1-5. 
20 Th. Sim. i. 5.5,7 and 9-10. 
21 Th. Sim. i. 6.1-4. 
22 Th. Sim. i. 6.4-5. 
23 Th. Sim. i. 7.3-6. 
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In 590 Maurice himself led an expedition to Anchialus. 
Theophylact records oppositon to the personal involvement of the 
emperor by senators, the Patriarch John Nesteutes, and the imperial 
family. 25 This was the beginning of a Roman offensive that began at 
the eastern end of the Stara Planina and continued westwards along 
the Danube. In 594 Peter and in 595 Priscus marched armies along 
the north bank of the Danube in order to cowe the Slavs and disrupt 
the Avars' attempt to take Singidunum. 26 The Avars now seem to 
have turned their attention to the west temporarily, raiding the 
Frankish kingdoms, but in 598 a surprise attack left Priscus 
blockaded in Tomi, on the Black Sea. 27 The Avars then advanced 
south and only withdrew from Drizipera after a large payment had 
been made. 28 However, by the terms of this new treaty the Romans 
were allowed to cross the Danube to attack the Slavs. This was a sign 
of Avar weakness that the Romans were keen to exploit. In 599 
Priscus and Comentiolus crossed the Danube and the Avars suffered 
a series of defeats. 29 The Avars had to make a perpetual alliance 
with the Lombards and the Franks, such was the pressure that the 
Romans were now exerting on the Avar federation. The decline of 
the Avars was such that their attack upon the Antes, allies of the 
Romans, caused them to suffer desertions as their prestige and 
power were seen to ebb. 3 ° This achievement was brought to 
24 Th. Sim. i. 8.10. 
25 Th. Sim. v. 16.2-4. 
26 Th. Sim. vii. 10.1-11.9. 
27 Th. Sim. vii. 13.1-2. 
28 Th. Sim. vii. 15.14. 
29 Th. Sim. viii. 2.7-3.15. 
30 Th. Sim. viii. 5.13-6.1. 
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nothing by the mutiny of the Roman army in 602, which was caused 
by Maurice ordering his army to winter north of the Danube. This 
was the season that the Slavs were most vulnerable to attack, and 
was a tactic recommended by the Strategicon. 31 This escalation of 
military activity was designed to break up the Avar federation by 
reducing their prestige, and to impress upon the Slavs that unless 
they respected the Danube as the frontier then the Romans would 
not leave the territory north of the river in peace. The Roman army 
did not take on board these military considerations, believing instead 
that the order was an economising measure. Phocas was raised on a 
shield and the army marched towards Constantinople rather than 
north against the Slavs. 32 
The Strategicon of Maurice is our best source of 
information on the Slavs. The outer limits for the work's composition 
are 575 when war with the Persians restarted and the 630's when 
the Arabs emerged as a serious Roman enemy. Evidence from the 
text suggests a date in the latter part of the reign of Maurice or the 
reign of Phocas. There are probably references to Chosroes II 
ordering the Persians to poison barley for the Romans' horses in 591, 
the siege of Aqbas in 583, and an Avär tactic at Heracleia in 592. 
The identity of the author is unknown, though there have been 
various proposals. Aussaresses believed that the evidence pointed to 
the emperor Maurice himself, although there was no clear proof. 3 3 
31 Strategicon xi. 4. 
32 Th. Sim. viii. 7.8. 
33 Aussaresses, 'L' auteur de Strategicon', p. 23-40, as cited by 
Dennis, Stategicon p. xvii. 
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Wiita has put forward a theory that Philippicus, the brother-in-law 
of Maurice was the author: 34 from 583 he was the magister 
militum per orientem and had a reputation for his appreciation of 
history and interest in other nations; he even had the opportunity to 
write the work as Phocas banished him to a monastery from 
605/6.35 The date of the composition, probably within the decade 
595-605, and the author's knowledge of warfare on the Danube 
frontier, which is clear from discussions of Avars and Slavs in Book 
xi, are of greater importance than a specific name. 
The Slavs were quite capable of coordinating military 
ventures with the Avars, and yet their movements and ambitions 
were also influenced by a fear of the Avars. They were forced to 
move south as much as encouraged to migrate by the Avars. Unlike 
the Avars they were seeking land inside the empire and not tribute, 
they were competing with the empire for agricultural resources, not 
political hegemony. In Slav society each community was little more 
than an extended family group independent from the next. The 
Slavic family groups could coalesce for military purposes but Roman 
diplomacy in peace-time was hampered by the lack of one 
recognised Slav leader with whom to deal. They were effective 
fighters, preferring to engage their enemy in woods to maximise 
their skills in close combat. Above all their society seems to have 
been flexible: they could live in swamps and woods away from 
Roman society, or they could adapt to that society, such as when they 
took over the corn-producing lands of Thessaly in the early seventh 
century. 
34 Wiita, 'Ethnika', p. 30-49, as cited by Dennis, Strategicon p. xvii. 
35 Theoph. p. 293. 
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Despite this less than coherent political structure the Slavs 
were successful in their invasion of Greece. They may have been 
militarily less powerful than the Avars but they were far more 
numerous, and the effects of their conquests were far more lasting. 
The main Slav invasions took place from 570 onwards when Tiberius 
II was defeated by the Avars. 36 Their raids were facilitated by the 
Romano-Persian war and would also have been encouraged by the 
Roman-sponsored Avar attack upon their homeland in 577. This was 
a period of Roman weakness, and if the Avars took full advantage in 
the northern Balkans then the Slavs did likewise further south. 
Coin-hoards suggest the extent of their ravaging: these have been 
found in Dalmatia, in what is now modern Bulgaria, and as far south 
as the Peloponnese. On the Saronic gulf there are two hoards from 
Corinth's port, Kenchreai, that can be dated to 578-580. Athens 
suffered more than one attack at this time, since three coin-hoards 
are dated by Metcalf to the reign of Tiberius, or possibly early in 
Maurice's reign, and it is suggested that the lower city was 
overrun. 37 
Whilst the extent and effect of the Avar invasions are 
reasonably clear in the sou rces, those of the Slavs in the Balkans and 
Greece are not. There is a paucity of source material for events in 
the Peloponnese from 572 onwards, which has led to modern authors 
making strong claims concerning the extent of Slav conquests and the 
involvement of the Avars. An examination of the sources will not 
only show up the extent and whereabouts of Slavic settlement but 
36 Evagrius, V. 11. 
37 Metcalf, 'The Slavonic Threat', p. 146-147. 
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also whether or not the Avars did anything more than provide the 
catalyst for this. Evagrius states that the Avars, "reduced Anchialus, 
Singidunum and all Hellas as well as other cities and fortresses, 
enslaving the inhabitants and laying everything waste with fire and 
the sword". 3 8 Allen believes that this is a conflation of Avar 
exploits, and that Evagrius has in part mistaken Slav raids for those 
of the Avars. 39 Menander on the other hand says, "With Hellas 
being plundered by the Slavs, and a succession of dangers was 
threatening there on every side", and only mentions the Avars in the 
context of Tiberius sending an embassy to their Chagan, intending to 
persuade him to attack the Slavs in Wallachia. 40 John of Ephesus 
also credits the Slavs with the invasion and settlement of Greece. 
"The invasion of an accursed people, the Slavs, who overran the 
whole of Greece and the country of the Thesssalonians and all 
Thrace... And even to this day they still encamp and dwell there, and 
live in peace in the Roman territories". 41 Charanis, who made a 
study of the usages of the word Hellas in the writings of Procopius 
and his successors up to and including Theophanes, has found that 
only Theophanes is imprecise in his use of the word. "To Procopius 
Hellas meant the regions of classical Greece, more especially the 
country south of Thermopylae, including, of course, the 
Peloponnesus". 42 This shows us the extent of the invasions. 43 
38 Evagrius, VI. 10. 
39 Allen, Evagrius, p. 253-254. 
40 Men. Prot. frg. 21. 
41 John of Ephesus, vi. 25. 
42 Charanis, 'Hellas', p. 164. 
43 Toynbee, Constantine Porphyrogenitus, p. 622-631, has used 
Vasmer's place-name evidence in Die Slaven in Griechenlannd to 
show the extent of Slav settlement in the Balkans. However, this 
settlement may only be relevant to the extent of permanent 
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"When Menander, Evagrius, and John of Ephesus 
speak of the devastations of Greece by the Avars 
and Slavs, it is of Greece proper, including the 
Peloponnesus that they speak" 44 
To decide whether it was the Avars, as well as the Slavs, 
that made these settlements we must have recourse to a 
supplementary source, The Chronicle of Monemvasia. This 
Chronicle was written in the Peloponnese after 806 when the 
Oecumenical Patriarch Tarasius died, since it mentions him as being 
no longer alive, and before 1082/1083 the year in which the see of 
Lacedaemon was raised to metropolitan status. There are only a 
hundred lines of primary text, but the different versions of this, and 
its origin and reliability have been much discussed and defended by 
Charanis. 45 The author says that Evagrius was one of his sources, 46 
and he may well have used Theophanes and Theophylact. The 
Chronicle provides unique information on events in the 
Peloponnese, although it would seem that it has confused the Avars 
with the Slavs, perhaps having been misled by Evagrius' description 
of the Avars' invasion of Thrace 47 According to the chronicler, the 
result of the invasion of the Peloponnese was that many inhabitants 
who escaped massacre left the mainland: the people of Patras fled to 
Rhegium, the Argives to the island of Orobe, the Corinthians to the 
settlement in the seventh century. 
44 Charanis, 'Hellas', p. 173. 
45 Charanis, 'Chronicle', p. 141-166, 'Question', p. 54-258 and 'Slavic 
Settlement', p. 91-103. 
46 'Chronicle', tr. Charanis lines 14-15. 
47 Evagrius, vi. 10. 
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island of Aegina, and the Lacedaemonians to Demena, whilst others 
chose the rocky peninsula of Monemvasia. However, the Chronicle 
raises controversial issues; not only does it say that it was the Avars 
who invaded the Peloponnese, it also claims that they held it for 218 
years beginning in 587/588* (the sixth year of Maurice's reign). It is 
possible to dispute both that the settlement was so complete and so 
permanent, and when this settlement took place. We know from 
archaeological evidence that both Corinth and Argos were subject to 
raids in the 580s, but Pope Gregory, from the evidence of a letter 
written in 591, believed that Bishop Anastasius of Corinth was not in 
an isolated exile on Aegina. Similarly, Patras does not seem to have 
been out of imperial control for as long as the Chronicle suggests, 
since there is an account in Constantine Porphyrogenitus of a Slav 
revolt and attack on Patras by Slavs living in the Peloponnese during 
the reign of Nicephorus 1.48 However, rather than impyling that the 
city had only recently been regained by the Romans, it would seem 
that the Slavs are acting out of character in assailing the city. 
Whitby believes that the chronicler may have combined the raiding 
tactics of the Slavs in the 580s with the fact that there were 
campaigns against the Slavs in Nicephorus' reign to assert that the 
Peloponnese had been out of Roman control throughout the 
intervening period. 49 
The dating of this permanent settlement has also excited 
controversy. Bon, Stratos, and Lemerle have stated that it took place 
only after the collapse of Roman opposition to the invaders in 602.50 
48 DA1, Chp. 49. 
49 Whitby, The Emperor Maurice, p. 126. 
50 Bon, Le Peloponnese, p. 54, Stratos, Byzantium I p. 66 and 119, 
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However, although it is difficult to credit the precision that Schreiner 
attributes to the chronicle, as he dates the founding of Monemvasia 
to 582/583,51 the process of settlement after 602 is more likely to 
be one of reinforcement rather than pioneering on the part of the 
Slavs. 52 The campaigns led by Priscus, Comentiolus, and Peter in 
the reign of Maurice had the objective of fighting the Slavs on their 
own territory, that is north of the Danube. This is not to say that 
there were no Slav settlements south of the Danube at this time. 
Maurice could well have left such settlements ý in the far south of the 
Balkans undisturbed in order to concentrate on removing them from 
Thrace and discouraging them from coming back. Maurice's first 
thought would have been to make Constantinople secure and to 
reassert the Roman frontier after the ravagings of recent years that 
had reached as far as the Long Walls; 53 the Peloponnese and other 
distant parts could be recovered more slowly. 
The value of the Chronicle of Monemvasia is similar to that 
of the Miracula S. Demetrii which focus on the saint's protection of 
his city, Thessalonica, in that both sources provide us with unique 
evidence of events in Greece. Lemerle has emphasised the point that 
were it not for these two sources we would have no information 
about the Peloponnese. 54 This is because the Constantinople- 
orientated writers, like the emperors and generals that campaigned 
from there, were primarily interested in the capital's hinterland. 
However, the evidence of the Chronicle of Monemvasia has been 
and Lemerle 'La Chronique', p. 35. 
51 Schreiner, 'Note', p. 471-475. 
52 Charanis, 'Ethnic Changes', p. 36-37. 
53 Evagrius VI. 10. 
54 Lemerle, 'La Chronique', p. 33. 
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valued differently by various scholars. Charanis believes that "the 
Chronicle of Monemvasia is absolutely trustworthy and constitutes 
one of the most precious sources on the Avar and Slav penetration of 
Greece during the reign of Maurice". 55 There is an opposite extreme 
to this credulous approach. Kyriakidhes has sought to shown that the 
Slav infiltration of Greece was no more than a peaceful movement 
that can be dated to the eighth century. 56 His argument is biased in 
the cause of Greek nationalism, attempting to disprove Fallermayer's 
theory that the native Greeks were wiped out by the arrival of the 
Slavs, so that modern Greeks have "not a single drop of pure Hellenic 
blood". 57 Neither of these extreme views should be taken seriously. 
The Chronicle's evidence, like that of archaeology, can be used if not 
too fine a point is made on the strength of it. Both types of evidence 
can complement each other, but because of the paucity of the 
sources, the corroboration gives us a theme rather than hard facts. 
We have evidence to suggest that the Peloponnese was repeatedly 
raided from 571 until 626, and that this led to emigration of the local 
inhabitants of some cities, whilst other cities were" left isolated but 
still Greek. 
In 602 the Romans had two wars to fight, ' as Chosroes 
invaded the Roman east on the pretence of defending the honour of 
his one-time benefactor, Maurice. Heraclius inherited both these 
wars from Phocas, and his military resources were not enough to 
55 Charanis, 'Chronicle' p. 163. 
56 Kyriakidhes, EAäpot p. 94, as cited in Toynbee, Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus p. 643. 
57 Fallmerayer, Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea wahrend des 
Mittelalters (Stuttgart, 1830), I, iii-xiv, as quoted by Vasiliev, 
History I p. 213-214. 
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allow him to pursue warfare on two fronts. As yet there was no 
evidence of a formal Avaro-Persian alliance, but each protagonist 
was in a position to take advantage of the misfortunes which the 
other might cause to befall the Romans in Europe as well as Asia. 
The first decade of Heraclius' reign saw him on the defensive. His 
diplomatic and military overtures towards the Persians were 
rebuffed, and in the west the Slavs increased their grip on Greece. 
Isidore of Seville says that in the fifth year of the reign of Heraclius 
the "Slavs took Greece from the Romans". 58 This is an exaggeration 
as cities like Thessalonica still held out, but the siege of that city may 
have been the reason for Isidore's statement. Thessalonica was 
besieged three times between 586 and c. 615. The first two sieges 
are not mentioned by any source other than the Miracula S. 
Demetrii. The first book of the Miracula was written by John the 
Archbishop of Thessalonica in the first decade of the reign of 
Heraclius. It is a collection of fifteen miracles that were performed 
by Demetrius for the city, all but two of which took place during the 
reigns of Maurice and Phocas. Both books illuminate the beliefs and 
society of Thessalonica, 59 but it is the Slavic threat that concerns us 
here. The first siege took place during the decade of Slav incursions 
in the Balkans of 578-588, and is described in miracles 13-15. A 
siege of Thessalonica would therefore fit in well with their actions 
and intentions, although Vryonis has argued for 597.60 It would 
also fit in with Avar ambitions in Moesia and would have served as a 
distraction to the already stretched Roman army. Despite the lack of 
defenders the siege only lasted a week: the praetorian prefect was 
58 Isidore of Seville, Chronicon, PL, 83, col. 1056. 
59 Cormack, Writing in Gold, Chp. 2. 
60 Vryonis, 'Evolution', p. 378-390. 
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absent in Greece, many of the notables were in Constantinople to 
register a protest against him, and many of the city's inhabitants 
were isolated outside the city walls because they had been 
harvesting. Demetrius' role in the repulse of the besiegers is 
enhanced through an act of personal heroism, as he spears the first 
attacker to scale the ramparts (120), while John stresses the 
complete confusion that the arrival of the Slavs engendered in the 
inhabitants (124). Another miracle records a Slav raid of 5,000 
fighters which relied upon the element of surprise for its success. A 
night attack was timed to coincide with the festival of St. Demetrius 
on 26 October, but the assault was beaten off by the inhabitants at 
daybreak. The date of this attack is unknown. Lemerle believes that 
it took place in 604, since this is one year when the the festival fell 
on a Monday, but Whitby has doubted this interpretation of § 102.61 
This is on the grounds that Lemerle has manipulated the text in 
order to produce this translation; "on the Monday of the festival", 
rather than, "on the second day following the festival". 6 2 
Furthermore, the translation suggested by Lemerle does not solve 
the problem as 26 October fell on a Monday in 582,593,599 and 
610 as well as 604. 
The third siege of Thessalonica is described in the second 
miracle of the second book of the Miracula. We have no means of 
dating this siege. Stratos argued for 626 as he beli eved that the 
Avars only made incursions this far south twice in the reign of 
Heraclius, in 623 and 626. However, an earlier date of 614/615 is 
compatible with the archaeological evidence, since coin finds become 
61 Whitby, Maurice, p. 119-120. 
62 The Greek reads irq seviEp% t Vepq Tfis EopTns a4vw IEas vuKTÖs. 
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scarce in the Peloponnese even on the Acrocorinth: this suggests that 
both minting at Thessalonica and patterns of coin distribution from 
this city as administrative capital of Illyricum had been disrupted. 
By this time the hinterland of Thessalonica was controlled by the 
Slavs (197), though the citizens still had some agricultural land 
outside the city walls (212). This siege was conducted by both 
Avars and Slavs, and the Chagan was present. The city's position 
once more is presented as hopeless in order to emphasise the power 
of St. Demetrius, and so the Slavs describe the city to the Chagan as 
being isolated and depopulated (197). 63 Once again the siege was 
successfully repulsed with the help of St. Demetrius, which is 
described in section 206-209. This is the only example we have of 
the Avars and Slavs acting in concert in the reign of Heraclius before 
the siege of Constantinople. It shows the ambiguous position and 
ambition of the Slavs. The Avars are consistent in their demands for 
tribute and territory, which they continually upgrade, in order to 
increase their political hegemony over ' their federated tribes and 
subsequently the empire itself, whilst the Slavs seek land on which 
to settle, in order to be free from Avar influence. However, it would 
seem that the Slavs were not in a position to achieve this 
independence without Avar aid. 
It was only in 619, when Sergius loaned him the Church 
plate, that Heraclius felt strong enough to attempt to take the fight to 
one of the empire's two aggressors. 64 At that point, he seems to 
have been determined to fight Persia. George of Pisidia wrote, 
"Persia is the source of all evil". 65 A war against the old enemy was 
63 Howard-Johnston, 'Urban Continuity', p. 245-246. 
64 Theoph. p. 303. 
100 
easier to justify, and indeed was a far more pressing concern than 
the barbarian invasions in the Balkans which the Romans had 
experienced before, and which they may have believed to have been 
containable and transient. So if Heraclius was adopting an aggressive 
attitude towards the Persians, his dealings with the Avars had to be 
far more conciliatory. 
It is the end of this diplomatic sequence that we will be 
interested in for the remainder of this chapter. Heraclius' only direct 
encounter with the Avar Chagan is an incident known, for the sake of 
convenience, as the "Avar Surprise", a moment of great historical 
debate and yet correspondingly little significance. Heraclius was 
seeking to conclude a treaty with the Avar Chagan in order to 
transfer his attentions to Asia Minor as he began campaigning 
against Persia. He must have felt that this treaty was of crucial 
importance to the furtherance of his eastern objectives because in 
623 he was prepared to meet the Chagan personally. Heraclius 
travelled with his full imperial retinue to Selymbria, on his way to 
the meeting place at Heracleia. However, the Chagan arrived at 
Heracleia three days before Heraclius and set up a trap for the 
emperor. It was only by chance that Heraclius' party was alert to the 
ambush and the emperor was forced to flee to the capital, while the 
Avars captured his baggage train as they pursued him as far as the 
Hebdomon. 
Despite being no more than a lucky escape for the emperor, 
the "Avar Surprise" is seminal to a study of the image of Heraclius 
before 626, as it is a rare example of personal and imperial 
65 G. P. Heraclias 11 107. 
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humiliation that is described at length, even in sources that are wont 
to gloss over such unfortunate occasions. However, it is first 
necessary to discuss the various dates proposed by ancient and 
modern authors. Only two of the ancient writers date the event. 
Theophanes places it under 619 and the Chronicon Paschale in 623. 
Nicephorus sandwiches it between the fall of Roman Egypt (619) and 
the outbreak of the Persian war (622), but he organised his work on 
the basis of Heraclius' reversals and successes, and so this 
arrangement may not have any chronological significance. However, 
modern scholarship has not left us with a clear-cut choice between 
619 and 623, as Baynes added 617 as another possibility. 66 He set 
out to repudiate Gerland's advocation of 623, which was based on the 
evidence of the Chronicon Paschale. 67 Baynes believed that the 
Chronicon Paschale had the day, date and month correct, that is 
Sunday, 5th June, but not the year, and for him 617 was the nearest 
year that fitted these criteria. Scholars have had a problem in 
accepting the date of the Chronicon Paschale because of the 
difficulties that it presents for the chronology of Heraclius' Persian 
campaigns. If 623 is to be accepted for the Avar incident then it is 
necessary. to explain Theophanes' date of 15 March 623 for Heraclius' 
second departure to the east, for which the Chronicon Paschale has 
25 March 624. This, however, may be explained by an error which 
occurs in Theophanes' dating of the later stages of the war, in that 
he places the battle of Nineveh in A. M. 6118 (A. D. 626) and not A. 
M. 6119 (A. D. 627). Once this error is corrected then it is possible to 
count back the campaign years to leave 624 as the year in which the 
66 Baynes, 'The Date', p. 110-128. 
67 Gerland, 'Feldzüge', p. 330-373. 
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initiative against the Persians was renewed. In turn, this suggests 
that Heraclius did not campaign against Persia in 623, and was thus 
free to be in Thrace. He would have had good reason to have been, 
for he had just begun preliminary manoeuvres against the Persians 
in what was likely to be a long struggle. He needed to secure his 
western front, and furthermore, the Avars had been restless and 
their Chagan was also eager to come to an agreement for he had 
suffered a Slavic revolt in his loosely-bound confederacy. This was 
instigated in about the year 623 by Samo, a Frankish trader, who had 
led a resistance movement in Bohemia and Moravia. 68 Although the 
breakaway state that Samo formed did not last beyond his death, the 
Moravian Slavs continued to remain independent from the Avars. 
The Chagan may have suspected Roman complicity in this revolt and 
desired either revenge, or a stabilisation of the situation. 
The dual nature of the Chagan's behaviour is apparent in all 
the sources for the "Surprise". 69 For example George of Pisidia 
describes him as, "having outwardly shaped his countenance as if for 
peace, while inwardly raging to surprise in battle". 70 However, their 
attitude towards Heraclius varies according to their approach to their 
subject. The contemporary Chronicon Paschale has the least amount 
of personal criticism of Heraclius. Indeed, its report does not detail 
the flight of the emperor, which is found in the other sources, but 
concentrates instead on the extent and degree of the Avars' 
plundering: " All whom they found outside the city from the west as 
far as the Golden Gate together also with the men and animals 
present, for whatever reason, in the suburbs". 7 1 This is a 
68 Obolensky, Byzantine Commenwealth p. 59. 
69 C. P. 713, Niceph. 10 and Theoph. p. 302. 
70 G. P. Bell. Av. 115. 
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completely different perspective from that of Nicephorus, who dwells 
on the precipitate nature of Heraclius' flight, which is described in 
degrading terms. 72 Here, though Heraclius is astute enough to sense 
the ambush and sufficiently collected to remove his trappings of 
office in order to escape detection, he still appears as a comic and 
pathetic figure. Nicephorus calls him "pitiable and needy", with his 
crown under his arm "basely" turning to flight towards his capital 
that he had left with such pomp. Speck has called such narrative 
"naive" and "novel-like", 73 but it makes Nicephorus' point. A dry 
reporting of the incident would not create the air of despondant 
failure that the historian sees as applicable to this stage of the reign. 
Theophanes takes a more balanced line than the other two sources. 
His account is firmly based on the work of George of Pisidia, 74 but 
leaves out the eulogising. The emperor's flight as well as the seizure 
of his baggage train are mentioned, as is the plundering of Thrace. 
But Theophanes ends his account with what must have seemed most 
significant to him, that the Avars had "unexpectedly cheated the 
hopes of peace". Heraclius is still seen as God-favoured and in the 
right. It was only the unChristian deceit of the Avars that led to the 
near disaster, so Theophanes is able to forgive the emperor. 
However, Theophanes has failed to consider that Heraclius ought not 
to have trusted the Avars. They had a reputation for treachery in 
the Roman historical tradition and we have seen many instances of 
the Chagan behaving deceitfully. Nonetheless, Theophanes' next 
entry has Heraclius again at the forefront of affairs, and this time the 
71 C. P. p. 713. 
72 Niceph. 10. 
73 Speck, Dossier p. 261-266. 
74 Chp. 9. 
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diplomatic manoeuverings are successful as a treaty with the 
"reformed" Chagan is made. The implication perhaps is that it is 
necessary to run the risk of failure in dealing with the faithless 
Avars in order to achieve peace. 
The personal nature of Heraclius' rule is important to 
Nicephorus who sees his misfortune as being a result of the sinful 
marriage that the emperor contracted with his cousin Martina. 
Heraclius had turned against divine law, and so God did not save him 
from pitiable and base behaviour. Personal criticisim of Heraclius is 
only justified in Nicephorus' moral terms. Heraclius could not 
conduct a war on two fronts, neither could he bring his army all the 
way back from Asia Minor in order to conclude a peace treaty that 
he believed could be sealed by a show of opulence. That is not to say 
that he was unprepared, for he had with him the factions and "a 
considerable throng of others". 75 Moreover, his general strategy 
was sound. Instead of inviting the Chagan into Constantinople, which 
would have shown the Avars the vulnerable and yet wealthy state 
Heraclius was leaving it in for the east, he chose Heracleia as the 
rendezvous point. Heraclius had calculated in advance that wealth 
and extravagance in the form of clothes and horse races would 
influence the Chagan. This was all in evidence, but what Heraclius 
did not foresee, until it was almost too late, was the Avar treachery, 
an attempt by one leader to capture another, not in the context of 
war but in negotiations for peace. The Chagan was not a figure to be 
trusted, and favourable ancient historians made a habit of excusing 
emperors for being deceived by him, without criticising them for not 
75 C. P. p. 712. 
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learning from the mistakes of their predecessors. 76 If Heraclius' 
surprise shows him to be naive, his flight does at least show him to 
be a man of action, even if it is evasive action. What is more 
illustrative of Romano-Avar affairs is the conclusion to the episode. 
The Avars did not attempt to besiege Constantinople until 626, and 
their aim in 623 was a peace treaty. That was all Heraclius wanted, 
though he may have hoped to buy it more cheaply than its eventual 
price. Nicephorus says 200,000 solidi a year and the surrender of 
hostages to the Avars including the illegitimate sons of Heraclius and 
Bonus, and Heraclius' nephew, Stephen. He had got what he had 
come for and was free to return to the east. The personal 
humiliation that he had suffered in the west was about to be 
transformed into massive acclamation for results in the east. 
Though the rest of Heraclius's reign was to be concerned 
with events in the East, he continued to weaken the threat to the 
empire from the Avar federation by undermining its authority over 
subject tribes. This took place both to the north-east of the Black 
Sea, and to the west amongst the Serbs and Croats. Our sources for 
these acts of diplomacy are very vague and incomplete, but they 
concern the establishment of independent tribes at the eastern and 
western fringes of territory previously controlled by the Avars. We 
must examine Heraclius' role in these events as the affairs of the 
Avars had long been a concern for the empire. Nicephorus uniquely 
preserves a description of the arrival in Constantinople of the leaders 
of a Hunnic tribe, who were there to be baptised. 77 Discussing this 
incident Runciman has made two assumptions that are not 
76 Men Prot. frg. 2. criticises Tiberius for being unprepared when 
Sirmium was demanded in 579. 
77 Niceph. 9. 
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substantiated by the sources. 78 He identifies the leader of the Huns 
in Nicephorus as Kubrat the Bulgar, who is mentioned in John of 
Nikiu as being in alliance with Heraclius' widow, Martina.? 9 
However, Mango notes in his commentary to Nicephorus' text that 
the names Kubratos and Organa are emmendations on the part of the 
translators of the Ethiopic text of John of Nikiu. 80 These Huns could 
equally well be the Khazar tribes settled near the Caucasus to whose 
land Heraclius withdrew in 625.81 The date of this visit to 
Constantinople is unknown: there is no proof for 619, a date which 
Runciman assumes, but which is merely based upon a marginal note 
of De Boor's. Later we learn from Nicephorus that Kubratos rebelled 
against the Avars and made his tribe independent. 82 This account is 
unique to Nicephorus who implies that although Kubratos was 
reigning near the Sea of Azov he rebelled against the Avars of whose 
influence that far east we have no other evidence for this part of the 
seventh century.. It may be that Roman diplomacy was at work here, 
but the sources do not allow any specific connections to be made. 
The use of the Serbs and Croats to undermine Avar power in 
the west is documented in the emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus' 
De Administrando Imperio which was composed between the years 
948 and 952. This was a manual for monarchy, and was addressed 
78 Runciman, A History of the First Bulgarian Empire, p. 13-16. 
79 John of Nikiu, CXX. 47. 
80 Mango, Commentary, p. 177-178. Organa was taken to be the 
chief of the Onogundurs, and Kuvrat to be his uncle, by Gy. 
Moravcsik, 'Byzantinische Mission', Proc. XJIIth Congress of 
Byzantine Studies, Oxford 1966 (London, 1967) p. 21. Mango points 
out that the Ethiopic text of John of Nikiu has Qeträdes and Kuernäka. 
81 Mango, Commentary, p. 178 and Theoph. p. 310. 
82 Theoph. p. 310. 
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to the emperor's son Romanus. The Serbs and Croats are held to be 
Sarmatian nomads from the Eurasian Steppe, 83 and the Serbs had 
been located by Pliny between the Volga, Caucasus, and the Sea of 
Azov. 84 When the Serbs and Croats were forced to move west by 
the arrival of various Hun tribes they must have split into two 
groups, one travelling south of the Carpathians, and one to the north 
of the Carpathians. According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the 
Croats who were living in Belo-Croatia, and acting on their own 
initiative, took the interior of Dalmatia from the Avars, and became 
the overlords of the Slavs who had moved there previously. 8 5 
These Croats were led by a family of five brothers and two sisters. 
The rest of the Croats stayed near Francia where they were subject 
to Otto, the king of Francia and Saxony. 
The role of Heraclius concerns his involvement with the 
migration of the Serbs and Croats into the Northern Balkans. 86 This 
must be dated after 626 for the process could not have started until 
after the siege of Constantinople in 626, as it was only then that the 
Romans regained the initiative in the west from the Avars, whose 
defeat had resulted in a loss of prestige for their Chagan and a 
consequent loosening of the federation. Heraclius was continually 
looking for allies in the west. He obtained a treaty with the Frankish 
king Dagobert around the same time that he enlisted the help of the 
Serbs and Croats. 87 Having defeated the Avars, they lived in 
83 Dvornik, Commentary, 61 ff, p. 115-116. 
84 Pliny, Historia Naturalis, Book vi, chp 2 (7), § 19. 
85 DAI, Chp. 30. 
86 DA1, Chp. 31 and 32. 
87 Fredegar, Chronicle, Book iv, 62. 
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accordance with their treaty with Heraclius. That they were his 
subjects has been doubted by Dvornik, who believes that Byzantine 
suzerainty only came with the expansion of the Frankish kingdom 
under Charlemagne. 88 However, Constantine Porphyrogenitus 
alludes to this Roman suzerainty earlier, when he states that during 
the reign of Michael (820-829) the Serbs and Croats refused to 
acknowledge this Byzantine supremacy. 89 There is no reason why 
the Serbs and the Croats in the seventh century should not have 
accepted this relationship. It must have been preferable to 
subjection to the Avars, for the Romans only asked that they defend 
the territory from the Avars, so the Serbs and Croats did not have to 
fight outside their newly won land. Because of this responsibility the 
Serbs and Croats did not have to pay tribute. They were doing the 
Romans a service, and indeed were in a position to ask for financial 
aid themselves. There is no evidence in Constantine Porphyrogenitus 
that the Romans ever thought of regaining the territory for 
themselves. Both the Serbs and the Croats agreed to be converted to 
Christianity, but there is no mention of a direct role of Heraclius in 
this conversion in DAI 30, only in DAI 31.90 In the latter chapter 
Heraclius is credited with the initiative of sending for priests from 
Rome. He brought these men to the Croats, and set them up in the 
hierarchy of archbishop, bishop, elders and deacons that was 
instrumental in the baptism of the Croats. This was possible because 
Heraclius had a good relationship with Pope Honorius who had 
helped him work out his compromise formula of monergism, and was 
88 Dvornik, Commentary, 30/78-88 p. 118. 
89 DA1, Chp. 29, line 58. 
90 According to Dvornik, Commentary, 30/61ff, p. 114, this double 
account is explained by two different sources; one located in Dalmatia 
and familiar with the Croat traditions and one source based on the 
records of the archives of the foreign ministry at Constantinople. 
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necessary because both parts of Illyricum were under the 
ecclesiastical juristiction of the See of Rome. 
Heraclius had turned the barbarian threat to the western 
part of his empire on its head by the end of his reign. Instead of 
having passively to accept the infiltration of Avars and Slavs into 
imperial lands, and having to answer Avar demands for tribute that 
became ever more taxing he was able to regain the initiative. The 
repulse of the siege of Constantinople was crucial in undermining the 
personal prestige of the Chagan, upon which the coherence of his 
federation hung. However, this was only the first step for the 
Romans towards regaining control of the Balkan peninsula. Heraclius 
went on to divide the Avar federation, so that it ceased to be a threat 
to his empire, and to construct alliances with splinter groups which 
could be won over to Christianity and in the longer term perhaps 
brought more fully within the control of the empire. Heraclius 
himself was never in a position to organise an offensive to reassert 
Roman control in the Balkans, and the only Balkan incident in which 
he was personally involved was the "Avar Surprise" of 623, a 
misfortune which did not contribute positively to his imperial 
reputation. It was to be left to Constans II to follow up this work by 
a military campaign against the Slavs in the Peloponnese. 
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Heraclius and the Persians. 
Heraclius' major problem in the first two decades of his 
reign was the threat of the Persian Empire to his own realm. This 
problem was inherited from Phocas and had associated with it 
difficulties over the economy and relations with the Monophysite 
Church. Heraclius' relationship with the Persians took a variety of 
forms; diplomatic, aggressive, and suppportive, and saw both the 
nadir and zenith of his reign. The geographical scope of this subject 
is vast: from Heraclius' capital at Constantinople to the mountains of 
Azerbaijan and south to Ctesiphon. This is reflected in the sources 
which, though all Christian, range from the eulogising George of 
Pisidia through the capital-orientated Chronicon Paschale, to the 
Chronicle of 1234, and include the Armenian historian, Sebeos. 
Despite this there are certain themes that emerge from each source. 
There is a discernible preoccupation with the cult of personality and 
how it affects leadership qualities and thus an army's success. This 
incorporates the piety of a general which in turn leads to events 
being depicted in a Christian versus pagan light. There are heavy 
religious overtones in all of the sources. Heraclius is seen in varying 
Christian roles from mere military victor, through pious commander, 
to a general of God, and the Persians by contrast become evil non- 
believers. These are not merely abstract themes. Heraclius saw his 
Christian role as a very real one, never more so than in the aftermath 
of his victory in 628, when he was able to restore the True Cross to 
Jerusalem, and celebrate not only the deliverance of his empire from 
the Persian menace, but also the triumph of Christianity that he 
himself wished to embody. Indeed he took another title, ßaatXeüs, to 
symbolise this new-found superiority. How Heraclius acted after he 
had defeated the Persians is as important to our examination of his 
image as his conduct during the war. After a discussion of his role as 
both general and Christian leader in war, w e must look beyond his 
victory to see what it meant for him and how it was portrayed by 
others. In order to put all this into context a brief outline of events 
will precede an examination of the imagery of Heraclius the general 
and Heraclius the Christian emperor. 
A summary of events can be broken down into three time 
bands. 1 The first is a catalogue of Roman defeats from the 
outbreak of hostilities in 602 until Heraclius' first campaign in 622. 
Then follow the successive years of campaigning that led to eventual 
success at the battle of Nineveh and Persian capitulation. Finally, 
Heraclius begins to build on his victory, supervising the succession to 
the Persian throne and negotiating the return of the True Cross. 
War broke out in 602 when Phocas' murder of Maurice gave 
Chosroes II the excuse to invade Roman territory on the pretext of 
avenging the emperor who had restored him to his throne. Phocas 
was in no position to respond effectively, as in 603 his most 
successful general, Narses, rebelled and looked to the Persians for 
support. Narses had refused to acknowledge Phocas as emperor, but 
fell to the cunning of Phocas' brother, Domentiolus. Theophanes 
noted the significance of his death for the struggle to come: 
"Since Narses had caused the Persians such great 
1 See Stratos, Byzantium I for a narrative account of this period 
and an examination of some of the controversial issues. 
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fear that Persian children shivered when they 
heard his name, the Romans were greatly 
distressed at his death, but the Persians joyfully 
exulted". 2 
Chosroes took his opportunity and pressed his advantage to the full. 
He captured Dara, and all of Mesopotamia and Syria, and by 610 he 
had crossed the Euphrates into Syria. 3 Heraclius was to suffer a 
defeat outside Antioch in the first year of his reign, but if things 
were dire in 610 they became catastrophic four years later when the 
Persains captured Jerusalem, its Patriarch and the True Cross. All of 
Syria and Palestine fell to the Persians, and in 616 Egypt too was 
attacked and completely lost by 619. The loss of Egypt was a far- 
reaching economic disaster, for that province was responsible for 
feeding the capital. 4 Morale in the city could not now have been 
any lower as its Holy City, and its food supply were lost to an enemy 
who was now across the Bosporus at Chalcedon. 5 Indeed, we' are 
told that Heraclius even considered moving the centre of his 
government back to Africa. 6 Chosroes was not satisfied merely to 
raid Roman territory, but success led him to aim at permanent 
conquest. This would explain why he did not content himself with 
the capture and plunder of eastern towns such as Dara and Apamea. 
This behaviour is in direct contrast to that of Chosroes I who 
captured Apamea twice (in 540 and 573) but did not attempt to 
retain control after he had exacted a substantial ransom. The 
2 Theoph. p. 293 
3 Theoph. p. 299. 
4 C. P. p 711, and Teall, 'Grain Supply', p. 87-141. 
5 Theoph. p. 301. 
6 Niceph. 8. 
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conquests that he had made by 610 would have gained enough 
disposable wealth to fulfill his royal duty of patronage and to 
strengthen his image as a successful general. In 506 peace had been 
made for this very end, when Kabades returned the Roman towns of 
Theodosiopolis and Amida which he had captured in exchange for 
money. However, Chosroes was in a stronger position by 610/611, 
since he had been able to take advantage of two separate moments 
of Roman usurpation and their resultant chaos. In doing so Chosroes 
may have developed greater ambitions than he had at first thought 
possible. Between 602 and 622 he had suffered few reversals: he 
may have been defeated outside Dara in 603/4 and in 611/612 the 
Persians were forced to flee from Caesarea but otherwise success was 
unbroken. It had not been an even fight, since without ever taking a 
positve part in the conflict, the Romans' best general, Narses, was 
executed for treason and from that point Chosroes' own generals had 
experienced little opposition to their designs. 
So when Heraclius was in a position to begin an eastern 
campaign his objective was clear cut, to remove the Persians from 
the parts of the empire that had been Roman under Maurice. 
Moreover, he was not campaigning along a border which only moved 
a hundred miles or so as Justinian had, rather Heraclius was fighting 
to keep the throne that he had won in 610 and which had been 
under threat ever since. The revolt of Phocas' brother, Comentiolus, 
had prevented Heraclius from taking the fight to the Persians in 610 
and throughout the first decade of his reign he had seen one 
province lost after another. In order to attempt to turn the tide 
Heraclius made a treaty with his western enemies, the Avars, and 
transferred his Thracian army to Asia Minor.? There he retrained 
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his troops before setting out on a short campaign that brought the 
first Roman victory over the Persains since 611/612. Oikonomides 
has dated this campaign to 622 using the evidence of George of 
Pisidia, material which Theophanes corrupted in the process of 
copying George. 8 From these two sources Oikonomides also 
postulated that the actual fighting was far less important than the 
training and organising of the Roman army, and that the greater part 
of Asia Minor was still held by the Romans at this time as Heraclius' 
army was dispersed when he tried to assemble it. 9 From 624 
Heraclius intensified his efforts all over the eastern borderlands, 
from Armenia to Syria, which led to a string of victories culminating 
in the battle of Nineveh that allowed him to pursue the fleeing 
Chosroes. Chosroes was then overthrown and killed by his eldest 
son, Siroes, who entered into diplomatic correspondence with 
Heraclius. Upon Siroes' death Shahbaraz occupied the vacant throne 
with the material aid of Heraclius who received the True Cross for his 
assistance. 
This narrative can be put into context by a synopsis of the 
relationship between the Romans and the Persians in the latter part 
of the sixth century. During the negotiations for peace in 561 Peter 
the Patrican stressed the value to both empires of a stable 
relationship: 
"While men are clearly prevailing over their 
7 Theoph. p. 3318-319. 
8 For the nature of the campaign see, Oikonomides, 'A Chronological 
Note', p. 1-9. 
9 Oikonomides, 'A Chronological Note', p. 8. 
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enemy, their courage is nurtured. But when it is 
obviously failing to destroy their opponents, 
they dissipate their own resources and 
consequently are conquered by those who ought 
not to defeat them". 10 
At this time the two states were intermittently either at war or in 
dispute over the provision of garrisons for the Caucasian passes. 11 
It was only in 590 when Chosroes II had his throne usurped by 
Vahram that Maurice was able to engineer a peace. This was 
achieved by aiding the reinstatement of Chosroes, who was 
thereafter too occuppied asserting his authority to restart the war. 12 
However, in 602 he had an opportunity to do just that, when his 
benefactor, Maurice, was murdered by Phocas. 13 Theophylact is 
perhaps echoing the sentiments of Heraclius when he criticises any 
breaking of an accord between Romans and Persians. He scolds 
Justin II for his aggression in 572: 
"The fifty-year agreement [5611 which had been 
concluded between Romans and Persians was 
destroyed and cut short by the folly of the king, 
and hence came the evil procession of Roman 
misfortunes". 14 
Theophylact also preserves Chosroes' letter to Maurice as an example 
10 Men. Prot. frg. 6.1 
11 Blockley, 'Subsidies and Diplomacy', p. 62-74. 
12 Th. Sim. iv. 10.8-v. 15.2. 
13 Th. Sim. viii. 15.7. 
14 71. Sim. iii. 9.5. 
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of how these two great states should interact. 
"For by these greatest powers the disobedient 
and bellicose tribes are winnowed and man's 
course is continually regulated and guided", 15 
A discussion of the image of Heraclius in the diplomacy and 
the campaigns now has a context. For him the first decade of his 
reign was predominantly a period of diplomacy after his brief 
appearance on the eastern front at Caesarea in 611. The sources are 
divided as to whether or not Heraclius sent an embassy to Chosroes 
immediately after he was crowned. 1234 and the eastern nexus say 
that Heraclius was in contact with Chosroes in the first year of his 
reign. 16 Heraclius saw himself as the legitimate heir of Maurice and 
tried to use this to secure Chosroes' goodwill, for Maurice had 
enabled Chosroes to regain his throne in 591. Michael the Syrian 
quotes Heraclius' ambassadors as saying "Phocas killed the emperor 
Maurice who was your friend, we have put him to death", and goes 
on to say, "he hoped by similar flattery to produce a 
reconciliation". 17 The extent of Heraclius' failure can be measured 
by Chosroes' behaviour. Instead of a peace treaty the Persians take 
Antioch and massacre its population. Chosroes did not see Heraclius 
as Maurice's heir. Indeed he turned Heraclius' argument on its head 
and claimed for Persia the right to intervene in Roman affairs on the 
basis of his own relationship with Maurice. Bar Hebraeus says that 
15 Th. Sim. iv. 11.3. 
16 1234 p. 226, Seert, p. 527, and Bar Hebraeus, IX. 94 (Wallis 
Budge p. 87). 
17 Michael the Syrian, XI. i (Chabot, p. 400). 
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when Chosroes heard of Maurice's death "he and his nobles put on 
black apparel, and they made a house for weeping in". 18 This may 
be Persian propaganda, but it still illustrates their view that a crime 
had been committed against them and that they were justified in 
acting against its perpetrator. Bar Hebraeus says that Chosroes 
concocted a plot in order to rule over the Romans, 19 and so it is not 
surprising that he rejected Heraclius' attempts at diplomacy. It was 
the Persian belief that the gifts that Heraclius sent to their court 
were in fact their property already, and that Heraclius was just as 
much a usurper as Phocas. Sebeos includes a letter from Chosroes to 
Heraclius which illustrates this attitude. "You call yourself master 
and king and you exhaust my treasure which you have your hands 
on.... you give me no rest". 20 The plot that he concocted, referred to 
in Bar Hebraeus, was to press the claim to the Roman empire on 
behalf of Maurice's son Theodosius, who was believed by some to 
have survived the slaughter of the imperial family that Phocas had 
ordered on his accession, since his head was not displayed alongside 
those of his family at the Hebdomon. Whether the story was 
authentic or not Chosroes believed that it had enough credibility to 
justify his aggressive approach to diplomacy. Just as it would have 
suited Chosroes' purpose to react positively to the story of 
Theodosius' escape, Theophylact, writing for the court of Heraclius, 
shows us how the story was played down as a myth. He preserves 
the story only in order to discredit it: he says that Theodosius 
escaped successfully with a companion, Constantine Lardys, and 
reached Nicaea, 21 but having described the murder of Maurice and 
18 Bar Hebraeus, IX. 93 (Wallis Budge p. 86). 
19 Bar Hebraeus, IX. 93 (Wallis Budge p. 86). 
20 Sebeos, Chp. 26. 
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his children, Theophylact continues the story by relating that a 
certain Alexander slew Theodosius and Lardys. Theophylact 
emphasises that this is the correct version of events, as he goes on to 
explain away the alternative version that Alexander killed a man 
who resembled Theodosius. Theodosius was said to have made his 
way to the land of the barbarians, that is Persia, where he died. 
Theophylact concludes "after laboriously investigating this matter" 
that: 
"This story re-echoed throughout the whole 
inhabited world, but it was some barbarian error 
that gave it birth". 22 
Theophylact ends his history on the same note. The strength of the 
unfounded rumour so worried Phocas that he had Alexander put to 
death, a fate which Theophylact thought was well-deserved because 
Alexander was a partner in the evil of Phocas' coup. 23 Theophylact 
is keen to play down the authenticity of the escape of Theodosius 
because of the importance of legitimacy to Heraclius, who was 
himself a usurper. 
The first diplomatic correspondence of the reign recorded by 
a Greek source is in 613-614, when Theophanes says an embassy 
went to Chosroes from Heraclius. 24 This may well be the second 
round of negotiations, in which case the Greek and Syriac sources are 
complementing each other. For Theophanes mentions a second 
21 Th. Sim. viii. 9.9-13. 
22 Th. Sim. viii. 13.5. 
23 Th. Sim. viii 15.8-9. 
24 Theoph. p. 300. 
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embassy from Heraclius in 616-617, which was rebuffed by 
Chosroes. 25 This second embassy of Theophanes may well be the 
one that is described in the Chronicon Paschale, which preserves a 
letter written by the Senate to Chosroes under the- year 615.26 The 
Senate, rather than Heraclius, may have written this letter for two 
reasons. Herrin suggests that they did so because Heraclius needed 
senatorial help and advice, 27 but Heraclius had solved the problem 
of Priscus' imperial aspirations without their assistance and must 
have believed in his own authority thereafter. It ' is more likely that 
the first round of negotiations had completely failed and the letter 
from the Senate was a means of achieving what Heraclius had earlier 
attempted. The Senate apologises for the failure of the earlier 
embassy: 
"On account of the disturbance prevailing in the 
two states and in addition because of the 
intestine strife, he did not have an opportunity 
to do what ought to have been done, to present 
by means of an embassy the honour that was 
owed to the superabundant might of your 
serenity". 28 
Superficially, this might seem to imply that there had been no prior 
diplomatic contact, but probability as well as the evidence of the 
eastern sources suggests otherwise. It is more likely that the Senate 
25 Theoph. p. 301. 
26 C. P. p. 707-710. 
27 Herrin, Formation p. 192. 
28 C. P. p. 708. 
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was desperately trying to gloss over a previous diplomatic reverse 
by presenting it as diplomatic impropriety in a crisis: Heraclius might 
have done something but he had not followed the correct protocol, 
what "was owed to the superabundant might of the Persian king". 
However, there is no doubt in the letter that the Senate views 
Heraclius as. the legitimate emperor, and its objective, like his, is a 
peace treaty: 
"We beg of your clemency to consider Heraclius 
our most pious emperor as a true son". 2 9 
This is the same approach that Chosroes had used to Maurice when in 
a precarious position himself in 590: 
"These words which I write, do I, Chosroes, 
address to you as if I were in your presence, I, 
Chosroes, your son and suppliant". 30 
Of course by the mid 610's Chosroes was in such a dominant 
position that it was not in his interests to consider a treaty, and 
Theophanes makes his attitude quite clear: 
"Chosroes sent the ambassadors away 
unsuccessful. He held no discussions with them, 
since he hoped totally to conquer the Roman 
Empire". 31 
29 C. P. p. 708. 
30 Th. Sim. iv. 11.11. 
31 Theoph. p. 300 for 613-614, and p. 301 for the reply in 617-618. 
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By 620 the situation was desperate for the Romans, who lost 
Ancyra that year, and Heraclius was forced to take a gamble. He 
removed his Thracian army to Asia Minor, and here he began the 
task of revitalising the morale and technique of his soldiers. 
According to George of Pisidia the troops were full of disorder. 32 In 
order to improve their fighting abilities and to try to give them some 
experience of combat Heraclius arranged mock battles between the 
detachments, which George described thus: 
"The simulation of battle showed swords 
saturated with much blood, and all was terrors, 
fear and confusion, and an inclination to 
slaughter without bloodshed". 33 
George goes. on to describe the very personal involvement of 
Heraclius with his army. He does not just devise training exercises 
for them but also encourages them with speeches: 
"And how with your word smiting in rhythmic 
tone so many races and variations of manifold 
Niceph. 7 says that these envoys were imprisoned in Persia where 
some perished. 
32 Theophanes points to the magnitude of Heraclius' problem when 
he relates an anecdote from 611/612: Heraclius had looked for 
experienced soldiers from Phocas' veterans and found only two. 
Trombley accepted Theophanes' dating, in a communication at the 
26th Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, which has been 
relocated by Whitby in a translation of the Chronicon Paschsale to 
626 p. 230, n. 73. 
33 G. P. Exp. Per. 11 140-145. 
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account the counsels and laws of command said 
that it was necessary for the power of the 
emperor to be present at the necessity of 
3 battle", 8 
Heraclius may have taken the command because he had already 
experienced both revolt (Comentiolus) and truculence (Priscus) from 
generals in the field. Furthermore Heraclius himself was an example 
of what a general might achieve against an insecure emperor. 39 By 
taking command Heraclius was preventing this form of threat to his 
authority. He must have believed that Bonus, Sergius, and his son, 
Heraclius Constantine, could handle affairs in the capital well enough 
to prevent the opportunity for a coup from arising there. Indeed he 
may have calculated that the position was so desperate that 
inactivity on his part, rather than absence from the capital, would 
have precipitated a revolt. 
The Greek sources leave us in no doubt as to what they 
thought of his generalship. Indeed, Heraclius has enjoyed a 
reputation for military strategy in both ancient and modern sources. 
He has been credited with the authorship of the Strategicon, a claim 
which Dennis dismisses in favour of Philippicus. 40 For George of 
Pisidia, Heraclius had a. reputation for military strategy that stood 
comparison with Scipio Africanus. 
38G. P. Exp. Per. 1 113 -116. 
39 See Kaegi, Military Unrest p. 120-154 for a full disscussion of 
the issue of disloyal generals in this period. 
40 Dennis, Strategicon p. xvi-xvii. 
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"0 Scipio, be silent; a law has been drafted that 
Scipios be called Heracleions. It is a decree of 
the people; now alone is it possible for slaves to 
make laws for their masters without danger. 
Ratify the law, master, with an edict; you have 
witnesses who do not have suspicion, you have 
innumerable arrows testifying for you, you have 
wounds as innate assistants, you have combats 
as eloquent advocates, you have combats as 
noble draftsmen, who draft the law in no 
spurious document, but in scarlet letters, as is 
fitting, for your blood will suffice for the 
scribes". 41 
Bury saw this as recognition that Heraclius' conquest of the Asiatic 
Sassanid empire surpassed the defeat of the "Asiatic" empire of 
Carthage by Scipio. 42 Shahid has questioned this interpretation, 
arguing that the passage does not refer to Scipio and his descendents 
at all but to 'scepters'. 43 Shahid comes to this conclusion by 
insisting that EKtrrtwvas should be spelt aKtITWvas as in two 
manuscripts of George's poem (codices VP), which allows hin to 
translate as "sceptres" not "Scipiones". This argument is shaky since 
capitalisation, or lack of it, in the manuscripts has little weight. 
Shahid also maintains that because George of Pisidia saw Heraclius as 
a paradigm of Christian piety and chivalry he would not have 
considered such a comparison with the pagan Scipio. 44 But this 
41 G. P. Herac. 97-110. 
42 Bury, HLRE II p. 244-245. 
43 Shahid, IIIETOE', p. 225-237. 
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should come as no surprise since there are numerous other 
comparisions in George between Heraclius and pagan myths and 
history, for example Orpheus (mentioned above). Furthermore, 
writing around the same time, Theophylact is prepared to compare 
Philippicus' strategy on the eastern front in 585 to that of Scipio: 4 5 
this may be another instance when Theophylact has presented his 
History of Maurice's reign in the terminology of the 620's. Shahid's 
dismissal of the Scipio reference is ingenious but unnecessary. Its 
underlying purpose was to substantiate his separate theories about 
kingship and the date when Heraclius formally adopted the royal 
title Ba a%X EuS, but his kingship theory is weakened rather than 
strengthened by the addition of this argument. 46 
The narrative of the years 622-628 is not one of warfare 
between the Romans and the Persians, but of a personal struggle 
between Heraclius and the various generals that Chosroes sends to 
oppose him. The Chronicon Paschale does not provide any detail on 
the campaigns until Heraclius is successful in 628, when it preserves 
Heraclius' victory dispatch. However, for George of Pisidia and 
Theophanes Heraclius is very much the warrior-king. This personal 
activity on campaign was not new to the Heraclian family. Heraclius' 
father was the only Roman general in Theophylact's narrative to take 
part in actual fighting: 
"Heraclius, the father of Heraclius the emperor, 
with exceptional courage won distinction for 
44 Shahid, 'HIETOE', p. 226. 
45 Th. Sim. i. 14.2-5. 
46 See further the appendix to this chapter below. 
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various deeds and was conspicuous through his 
glorious achievements with the spear". 47 
This is another possible example of contemporary touches appearing 
in Theophylact's work. Heraclius in George of Pisidia and 
Theophanes was both a calculating tactician and an action man from 
the outset: 
"Thus as a general you alone succeeded in a 
clever device and a clever pretence; and this 
complexity of purpose threw the barbarians the 
more into heedlessness" 48 
Theophanes follows George for this laudatory analysis of Heraclius' 
first victory over the Persians in 622, adding: "For before they had 
never thought to see Persian dust; now they had found and 
plundered their still-pitched tents. Who could have expected the 
invincible Persian race ever to show its back to the Romans? "4 9 
Thus, the nature of his achievement is all the greater because it was 
gained against all expectations. 
Heraclius returned to his capital that winter, but having 
made another treaty with the Avars in 623, he marched out again in 
624 for what was to be the final confrontation with Persia. Heraclius 
threatened Chosroes with a march on his own kingdom if he did not 
treat for peace and backed this up with direct action. A march 
47 Th. Sim. II vi 2. 
48 G. P. Exp. Per. 11 274-278. 
49 Theoph. p. 305. 
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through Persia led to the sack of Canzacon and Therbarmais, 50 and 
the capture of 50,000 Persians, before Heraclius decided to winter in 
Albania. 51 Here he freed the Persian prisoners from their bonds as 
an act of clemency and was acclaimed as the saviour of Persia. 
Theophanes presents his personality as being in direct contrast to 
that of his opponent, Sarablangas, whom he calls arrogant and 
conceited. 52 He is defeated in the most humiliating way, being 
killed by a sword in the back as Heraclius routs the Persians once 
more. 53 This humiliation of the Persian generals continues as the 
corpse of Shahin, who was defeated by Theodore in 626, was 
subjected to insults by Chosroes upon its return to Persia. 5 4 
Rhazates is the only Persian general to come out of the narrative 
with any distinction. He is introduced as being brave and warlike 
and his defeat is not due to any cowardice on his part, or even 
superior tactics on the part of Heraclius, but to God alone according to 
Theophanes, who maintains that at Nineveh, "No-one remembers 
such a battle taking place between Persians and Romans". 5 5 
Chosroes' performance is related with nothing but contempt by 
Theophanes. The comparison with Heraclius is marked. Chosroes 
does not move far from his base, his role is limited to appointing 
generals and collecting armies. While he is doing this Heraclius is 
pillaging his land. This is symbolised by the sack of Dastagerd. 
50 Therbarmais is in fact a metathesis in Theophanes for 
Berthamais, i. e. Beth Aramaye, or the region of Lower Mesopotamia 
near Ctesiphon. See the discussion in Hoffman, 'Auszüge aus 
syrischen Akten', p. 252, n. 1997. 
51, Theoph. p. 307-308. 
52 Theoph. p. 308. 
53 Theoph. p. 310. 
54 Theoph. p. 315. 
55 Theoph. p. 319. 
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Heraclius captures the spoils of war that were once Chosroes' and 
torches them to remind the Persians of what the Romans had once 
suffered, as the Persian emperor is in full flight. Theophanes 
disdainfully remarks that Chosroes who could not make five miles a 
day previously now flees at a rate of twenty-five, without his family 
and stays in the house of a humble farmer, so low has he sunk. 5 6 
This contrast between Heraclius who risked his life for his state, 
whilst Chosroes neglected his empire was, according to Nicephorus, 
one factor in the revolt of the Persian nobles. 57 Throughout the 
campaigns Heraclius is the heroic figure both in thought and deed. 
When the army fails to follow his advice it is outmanoeuvred as two 
Persian armies threaten to coalesce, and it is repentant in giving the 
initiative back to Heraclius. 58 This might be interpreted as an 
apology for Heraclius having made a tactical error, whereby the 
blame is transferred to his army and the eventual credit attached to 
the emperor. 59 It was an initiative that Heraclius was never to lose. 
When the Lazicans and Abasgians deserted the alliance that 
Nicephorus describes him forging on a personal basis, 60 he 
responded by attacking Shahbaraz unexpectedly and the Persian 
escaped naked. 61 His actions spoke as loudly as his words. When 
his army pursued the fleeing Persians in disregard of his orders he 
led a counter-attack to aid the ambushed men and struck down a 
giant of a man in the middle of a bridge. He was fighting in 
"superhuman" fashion and even Shahbaraz was impressed: 
56 Theoph. p. 323. 
57 Niceph. 15. 
58 Theoph. p. 309. 
59 Men. Rh. p. 373 linesl4-27. 
60 Niceph. 12. 
61 Theoph. p. 310. 
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"Look at the Caesar, Cosmas; see how boldly he 
stands in battle, struggling alone against such a 
multitude: like an anvil he spurns their 
62 blows". 
This was not the only noteworthy occasion of such bravery. At the 
battle of Nineveh Heraclius himself kills three Persians and is in the 
thick of the fray as his horse, Antelope, is wounded in the thigh. 6 3 
Indeed, Nicephorus has him remove the head of the dead 
Rhazates. M Victory was achieved through this physical and mental 
superiority, and Theophanes has Heraclius engineer the breakdown 
of the Persian hierarchy as he turns Shahbaraz against Chosroes by 
means of a forged letter. 65 This kind of military cunning and 
psychology had been evident before. Heraclius must have gained the 
respect of his army by marching with them and exposing himself to 
the same dangers that they faced. For George of Pisidia he was a 
soldier first and an emperor second: 
"For when holding his lance he is more fair than 
when he holds the sceptre of power; he bears 
this shield with dexterity, more gladly, as I see, 
than the diadem; and having quenched slaughter 
on our account, he arms again for slaughter on 
62 Theoph. p. 314. 
63 Theoph. p. 318 
64 Niceph. 14. 
65 Theoph. p. 323-324. 
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our account". 66 
Likewise he knew how to make the most of any gains that he made 
at the expense of Chosroes. His razing of towns and cities and 
countryside was designed to show the Persian emperor how 
impossible his position was and to persuade the Persian people that 
it was their own ruler and not their Roman enemy who was really 
responsible for the destruction, as he had failed to come to terms 
with their invader. 67 So, the Greek sources show Chosroes as a 
humiliated cowardly leader, in comparison with whom Heraclius' 
bravery and initiative are magnified. 
Yet Chosroes had not been inactive in the campaigning. 
Although we do not have any evidence for him bein g near the front 
after he was nearly lassooed in the vicinity of Dara, 6 8 he was 
consistently aggressive in his strategy. This led to the Persians 
reaching the Bosporus twice, and in 626 he was prepared to put 
three armies into the field in order to achieve the decisive victory. 
Chosroes should not be faulted for overstretching Persian resources 
in capturing both Armenia and Egypt because this had been 
accomplished by 618, whilst the outcome of the war was still in the 
balance in 626. The gravity of Heraclius' plight is illustrated by a 
dream of his recounted in the Chronicle of Seert, in which Chosroes 
seems indestructible on his elephant. 69 Chosroes did not fail his 
people, he was simply up against a more ambitious and determined 
66 G. P. Exp. Per. 111111-118. 
67 Theoph. p. 324. 
68 Guidi Chp. 10. 
69 Seert, p. 541. 
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state, which at the onset of the campaigning had nothing to lose, and 
which at the end of the war had everything to gain. 
The Syriac nexus of sources shows a different perspective. 
The Chronicle of 1234 describes the rapacity of the Persians as it 
must have seemed to local people in the east, rather than as insulting 
comparison with Heraclius' behaviour: 
"Chosroes became harsh, arrogant and 
overbearing as a result of his victories. Who is 
there now to lament, as Jeremiah would have 
done, the distress and loss of life that people 
suffered at this time? Who can count the tragic 
deportations, the pillagings and depradations, 
the cruel requisitions, the harsh taxations? How 
many blocks of stone slabs and pillars of marble 
and pedestals of gold and silver from the 
churches were carried off to Persia? "70 
Chosroes is the villain purely because of his actions, not in order to 
exaggerate Heraclius' merits and achievements. Indeed, the Syriac 
sources explain the Roman victory by a different means from the 
Greek traditions. For them the turning point of the war was the plot 
of Chosroes against Shahbaraz which took place in 626, when 
Shahbaraz and Kardigaran were besieging Constantinople. The city, 
according to Michael the Syrian, was without hope when the siege 
was abruptly lifted. 71 Michael explains that this reprieve was due 
70 1234 p. 230. 
71 Michael the Syrian, XI. iii (Chabot, p. 408-410). 
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to Persian division. Chosroes ordered Kardigaran to send him the 
head of Shahbaraz, because the general had been boasting of his own 
achievements to the detriment of Chosroes. This directive was 
intercepted by the Romans and Heraclius showed the letter to 
Shahbaraz who changed its wording so that three hundred notables 
were to be killed along with the general. The army was enraged by 
Chosroes' behaviour and disavowed its allegiance to him. Shahbaraz 
made peace with Heraclius who was then free to attack Persia 
without his capital being threatened. Much the same story is told by 
Theophanes but he dates it later, to 627, at the end of the war and 
does not cite it as a reason for the collapse of the siege of 
Constantinople. Theophanes attributes the forging of the letter not to 
Heraclius but to his son, Heraclius Constantine. 72 Nicephorus puts 
this incident in 624, and places a different emphasis on it. In 
Nicephorus, Heraclius alters the letter in order to keep Shahbaraz at 
Chalcedon. Nicephorus' version of Chosroes' dispatch to his northern 
army does not make any mention of executing Shahbaraz. Indeed, 
Chosroes attempts to recall Shahbaraz in order to aid the defence of 
Persia: Chosroes is still relying on Shahbaraz not sentencing him to 
death. 73 The Chronicle of Seert provides another reason for a 
dispute between Chosroes and Shahbaraz, attributing the quarrel to 
the behaviour of Yazdin Chosroes' finance minister, who insulted the 
daughter of Shahbaraz; 74 the religious and political significance of 
the affair is discussed below. What was important for Heraclius at 
the time was that Chosroes had lost a talented general and a whole 
army just when Heraclius was about to go onto the offensive, and at 
72 Theoph. p. 323-324. 
73 Niceph. 12. 
74 Seert, p. 540-541. 
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the point when the Persians had been in sight of Constantinople 
under siege. Chosroes had sought to break the stalemate of five 
years campaigning by using three armies against Heraclius. Now 
Heraclius had the initiative and after the battle of Nineveh the result 
was never in doubt. Chosroes had no more loyal generals, and no 
more troops for himself to command. The price he was to pay for his 
failure to defend his kingdom was removal and execution by his 
disaffected son, Siroes. 
This signalled Heraclius' triumph, which the Greek sources 
saw as a triumph for Christianity, and indeed religion had formed an 
integral part of Romano-Persian relations, as they were depicted by 
these sources. Like the military affairs there were two chronological 
divisions, the period up to the first campaign of 622 and then the 
years of campaigning until victory in 628. Diplomacy, the fall of 
Jerusalem and Heraclius' preparations for war and his training of his 
troops are the main issues in the first period. The second period is 
exclusively concerned with his campaigning. An examination of 
George of Pisidia and Theophanes will show how the religious vein 
ran all the way through Heraclius' campaigns, and this can be 
supplemented by the Chronicon Paschale which provides extra 
details on preparations before the campaigns and the concluding 
diplomacy. An alternative Christian view was advanced by Michael 
the Syrian/1234, whose Monophysite beliefs prevented them from 
depicting Heraclius as the champion of Christianity, and instead they 
are quick to castigate the emperor for an incestuous marriage to 
Martina and a persecution of the Monophysites, two issues that 
Heraclius was to address in the aftermath of his victory. 
134 
Theophanes follows George of Pisidia for much of his 
information and imagery on Heraclius' early campaigns but he also 
includes some details on earlier events. The capture of Jerusalem is 
described in drier, more factual tones than the account in the 
Chronicon Paschale. Theophanes records the number of dead, "some 
say 90,000", and the capture of the Patriarch Zachariah and the True 
Cross, 75 whereas the Chronicon Paschale has a more emotional 
description of the loss of the Holy City and the efforts that the Church 
went to in Constantinople to raise morale, by the introduction of new 
liturgies to celebrate relics still in Roman possession. 76 The 
Christian-pagan confrontation is also apparent in the diplomatic 
correspondence of the time. Theophanes writes that Chosroes 
refused to treat with Heraclius: 
"I will have no mercy on you until you renounce 
Him who was crucified and worship the sun". 77 
The Chronicon Paschale also records a similar religious emphasis in 
diplomatic exchanges, this time in the Senate's letter to. Chosroes: 
"securing for us the peace which is pleasing to 
God and appropriate to your peace-loving 
Might". 78 
75 Theoph. p. 301. 
76 C. P. p. 705, see Whitby tr. n. 440. 
77 Theoph. p. 301. 
78 C. P. p. 709. 
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Heraclius' preparations for a lengthy campaign were bound up with 
religion. We have already seen in an earlier chapter that the 
emperor was short of money. Heraclius had also to be dissuaded by 
Sergius from returning to Africa, according to Nicephorus. 79 This 
close relationship with the Patriarch solved his most pressing non- 
military problem, the treasury's lack of resources. Sergius lent the 
emperor the church plate in Constantinople in order to finance his 
Persian campaign. 8° This is not used by the historians to illustrate 
Heraclius' Christian standing, and instead it is held up as an example 
of his dire financial straits, and the desperate situation for the 
empire as a whole. It was, however, also an illustration of the close 
relationship that Heraclius enjoyed with his Patriarch, which enabled 
the emperor to leave his capital to Sergius' ad ministration, 81 and 
allowed the Patriarch the opportunity to solve the ecclesiastical 
division in the empire. 82 The use of Church funds to finance a 
campaign is the first in a series of examples of the idea that 
Heraclius' war was in the form of a proto-crusade. This is a 
combination of the ancient imagery of Constantine who defeats his 
pagan opponents and reunites the empire through the efficacy of 
God, and the Medieval notion of God's soldiers restoring the Holy 
Land and in particular Jerusalem, to its rightful owners, the 
Christians. 
Christianity is at the forefront of preparations as Heraclius 
celebrates Easter before departing for Asia Minor. 83 He took with 
79 Niceph. 8. 
80 Theoph. p. 303. 
81 See Chp 7. 
82 See Chp 5. 
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him the Camulian image, which was a portrait of Christ that had been 
brought to the capital in 574,84 which might suggest a change of 
emphasis from his earlier adoption of icons of the Theotokos on his 
ships when he arrived in the capital in 610,85 since the Theotokos 
was of special relevance to Constantinople, whilst Heraclius was 
preparing to avenge the loss of Christ's Cross. Such exploitation of an 
icon of Christ marked the culmination of the growth of image 
worship that had been developing since the reign of Justin 11.86 
Philippicus and Priscus had adopted such an icon for military 
purposes (victory in battle and restoring calm to a mutinous army) 
when they used the acheiropoietos image in 586 and 588 
respectively. 87 George of Pisidia leaves us in no doubt as to the 
Christian nature of Heraclius' task: 
"In the likeness of Moses you campaign against 
the second Pharoah, if one would not err in 
calling 'second' he who is truly first in sin". 88 
George justifies the war and its consequent carnage by a biblical 
quotation, "Blessed is he who has dashed to the ground the children 
of Persia and beaten them upon the rocks". 89 This message is 
repeated by Heraclius to his troops as he tries to add Christian zeal to 
accompany their newly forged fighting skills. George says that 
83 Theoph. p. 302-303. 
84 G. P. Exp. Per. 1 139-151 and, Ced. p. 685 for the image's arrival 
in Constantinople. 
85 Theoph. p. 298. 
86 Kitzinger, 'Images', p. 97-98. 
87 Th. Sim. ii. 3.4 and, iii. 1.11. 
88 G. P. Exp. Per. 1 136-139. 
89 G. P. Exp. Per. 11 114-116, from Ps. 136.9. 
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Heraclius " knew how to master the enemy easily, training your 
army in piety". 90 Theophanes quotes the following Christian 
approach to motivation: 
"Brothers and children, you see that God's 
enemies have overrun our land, laid waste our 
cities, burned our altars, and filled the tables of 
sacrifice with bloody murders. They take great 
pleasure in defiling our churches, which should 
not suffer". 91 
The Christian message is equally strong during the actual 
warfare, for, according to George, whilst the Persians "held fire in 
awe, but you, master, held aloft the wood". 92 The Persian religion is 
clearly inferior, as the elements that they worship ironically cost 
them military advantages. 93 The moon prevented them from 
surprising the Romans and "stealing victory", causing Shahbaraz to 
"curse the moon that he had formerly worshipped because it did not 
set until the night was done", 94 and the sun blinded them during the 
major battle of 622: 
"still more did it sting them to look at the sun, 
90 G. P. Exp. Per. 11 202-203. 
91 Theoph. p 304-304. 
92 G. P. Exp. Per 11 252. 
93 See Th. Sim. iii. 14. for the general Justinian's disparaging 
remarks about the Persians' religion, which may be another 
contemporary resonance in Theophylact. 
94 Theoph. p. 305. Shahbaraz was in fact a Christian but it was 
inappropriate for George to mention this fact, which may in any case 
not have been known to the Romans. 
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which they worship as the god of Persia, 
confronting them in the alignment of battle". 95 
Nature prevailed against the Persians later as well, when hail fell in 
the face of the army of Shahin as he was d efeated by Theodore in 
626.96 Heraclius' personal piety is illustrated by his speeches to his 
troops at crucial points in the campaigns. He exhorts them to follow 
his example of fighting for Christ to defeat the pagan oppressors of 
Christians, a str uggle that God supports even though they may think 
it hopeless: 
"Brothers, let us keep in mind the fear of God 
and struggle to avenge insults to Him. Let us 
nobly oppose our enemies, who have done 
terrible things to Christians". 97 
"Brothers, do not be troubled by your enemies' 
numbers for, God willing, one will chase 
thousands". 98 
"Brothers, you know that no-one wants to ally 
with us except God and She who bore Him 
without semen. This is so He can reveal His 
power, since salvation does not lie in masses of 
men or arms. Rather He sends down His aid to 
those who believe in His mercy". 99 
95 G. P. Exp Per. 11 302. 
96 Theoph. p. 315. 
97 Theoph. p. 307. 
98 Theoph. p. 310, from Deut. 32: 20. 
99 Theoph. p. 317. 
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In saving his empire Heraclius is a servant of God, to whose labours 
the emperor's are compared in the Hexaemeron, and the comparison 
is given a classical resonance with an allusion to the labours of 
Heracles, an obvious mythical prototype for Heraclius. 100 Theophanes 
borrows this parallel when he sums up the emperor's campaigning, 
from a passage that links God's creation of the world with Heraclius' 
creation of secure peace: 
"In six years the emperor had overthrown 
Persia; in the seventh he returned to 
Constantinople with great joy, and in that year 
performed a, mystic celebration". 101 
In the aftermath of victory Christianity was still at the 
forefront of events. 102 In Persia it was a divisive influnce which 
aided Heraclius' statesmanship, whilst in the newly reconquered 
provinces it hindered his attempts at stabilisation. Heraclius was 
party to the Persian plot which saw the overthrow of Chosroes, 
whose successor, Siroes, was depicted by the Chronicle of Seert as a 
crypto-Christian. According to that account, after a barren eight 
years Siroes' wife was blessed with children by St. Babai of 
Nisibis. 103 He was not only a just ruler remitting taxes for three 
100 See also, G. P. Her. I. 65-79, and Her. II. 5-33. 
101 G. P. Hexaemeron 1425-1578, Theoph. p. 327. See Olster, 'Date', 
p. 159-172 for the latest analysis of that poem. 
102 Spain Alexander, 'Plates', has argued that the plates found in 
Cyprus that depict events in the early life of David from I. Samuel 
16-18, date to the year 628. Spain Alexander goes on to draw 
parallels between both sovereigns, such as their need to legitimise 
their rule, and their youthful vigour. 
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years, but he was also a secret believer in Christianity, who wore a 
crucifix after having being influenced by his mother, Marie, allegedly 
a daughter of Maurice who is only mentioned by the Syriac 
chroniclers. 104 Upon deposing his father, whom he treated like a 
criminal, Siroes immediately curried favour with Heraclius. Chosroes 
was kept in his own "house of darkness" and starved, whilst Siroes 
sent his enemies to insult him, and slew his children in front of him. 
Siroes wrote to Heraclius to make peace. The letter is partially 
preserved in the Chronicon Paschale and Oikonomides has 
attempted to reconstruct part of Heraclius' reply. 105 Heraclius was 
appeased, and indeed his campaign justified, by an apology by Siroes 
on behalf of the Persian people. This blamed Chosroes for all the 
suffering of the last two decades and even saw Siroes invoke the 
unique God in his appeal to Heraclius, unlike his father who had 
scorned the deity of the Christians. 106 
"From Chosroes Roman soil has suffered many 
evils, and because of the king's ingratitude you 
may not believe me [Siroes]". 107 
"Through the protection of God, we have by good 
fortune been adorned with the great diadem" 108 
103 Seert p. 551-552. 
104 Bar Hebraeus, IX. 92 says that Christianity spread throughout 
Persia due to the marriage of Marie to Chosroes, (Wallis Budge p. 85). 
For Marie as a daughter of Maurice see, Eutychius, Annals P. G. CXI, 
1083. 
105 C. P. p. 735-736 and Oikonomides, 'Correspondence' , p. 269-281. 106 Oikonomides, 'Correspondence', p. 272. 
107 Theoph. p. 328. 
108 C. P. p. 735. 
141 
Siroes' address to Heraclius as his brother and his use of Christian 
vocabulary is similar to the approach of Chosroes II to Maurice from 
an equally weak position in 590, Chosroes' appeal is treated at length 
in Theophylact, and provides another example that the impact of 
events of the 620s had on his narration of Maurice's reign. 109 
Heraclius would have demanded more proof than a letter of Siroes' 
Christian stance. Siroes allowed the Nestorian church in Persia to 
elect a catholicos after a period of years without a formal leader, 
and the Chronicle ofGuidi says that at this time there was "peace 
and tranquility for all Christians". 110 The Chronicle ofSeert adds 
"may God sanctify his soul", when he died after a reign of six or eight 
months. 111 
It was on his death that Heraclius' ambitions concerning the 
relationship of the two states became clearer. Though this was 
primarily on a political level the influence of Christianity was 
pervasive. During the plotting against Chosroes Heraclius had 
moved his army north to Canzacon where he spent the early months 
of 628, cut off by heavy snowfalls in the Zagros mountains from 
events in lower Mesopotamia. Though happy to acknowledge the 
Persian monarchy he saw himself as superior to it, calling Siroes 
"son". 112 He intervened more directly in the Persian succession after 
the death of Siroes despite having returned to the Roman empire by 
now. 113 For even if Siroes was a crypto-Christian, acceptable to 
109 T. Sim. iv. 11.1-11. Whitby, Maurice p. 297. 
110 Giudi, Chp. 29. 
111 Seert, p. 555. 
112 Niceph. 15. 
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Heraclius, the religious affiliation of his son was unclear, and in any 
case he may have been too young to be judged reliable for a position 
that was made most unstable by the recent military defeat. There 
was also a need for Heraclius to dislodge the Persian general 
Shahbaraz, now virtually an independent warlord, from his strong 
position in Egypt and Palestine. The emperor saw the opportunity to 
resolve the problems both of regaining control over Roman territory 
and of placing a strong but friendly ruler on the Persian throne by 
encouraging Shahbaraz to act and providing him with military 
support according to the Chronicle of Seert and Sebeos. 114 Heraclius 
had defeated Shahbaraz when the emperor had first begun his 
campaigns against the Persians in 622, and in 626 Theophanes tells 
us that Shahbaraz admired the emperor's courage in combat. 1 15 
Later in that year Shahbaraz advanced to Chalcedon where Mango 
believes a profound change in his actions took place, partly through 
the intervention of Heraclius who thwarted Chosroes' attempt to kill 
the Persian commander. 116 Whenever Shahbaraz decided to change 
sides it was not until the end of the war that the two generals met, at 
Arabissos in Cappadocia, where they "built a Church of Irene and 
decided that the Euphrates was to be the frontier". 117 Heraclius went 
on to provide Shahbaraz with an army under the general David. 118 
Whether or not Heraclius was in a position to "give" Shahbaraz the 
113 Niceph. 17. 
114 Seert, p. 556 and Sebeos Chp. 28. 
115 Theoph. p. 314. 
116 Mango, 'Deux Etudes', p. 106-107, and the discussion in Chp. 5 
below. 
117 Sebeos, 88. 
118 Seert, p. 556, on the relationship between Heraclius and 
Shahbaraz see Mango, 'Deux Etudes', p. 105-118. 
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throne, he was certainly able to influence Persian politics to the 
extent that Shahbaraz had little difficulty in removing the incumbent 
Ardashir, the young son of Siroes, and, having done so, to promise to 
return the True Cross. Heraclius asked for no more than a return to 
the frontiers of Maurice's reign. 119 Mango sees this relationship in 
terms of a reconciliation between Rome and Persia that had strong 
Christian overtones. For only if Heraclius was dealing with a fellow 
Christian can Mango understand why Shahbaraz did not return the 
provinces that he was occupying until July 629, one year after the 
end of the war against Persia, unless Shahbaraz was governing them 
as a quasi-representative of the emperor, and why Heraclius did not 
demand the return to Rome of Nisibis, settling instead for the 
frontiers of the reign of Maurice. 120 However, Heraclius' grip on 
Persian affairs- was not as tight as the ease of Shahbaraz's coup may 
have suggested. For within forty days he had been murdered by his 
fellow Persians and a woman, Boran, was on the throne. Persian 
politics were so unstable that Heraclius did not honour his pledge to 
support Shahbaraz's son, 121 whom Mango also believes to have been 
a Christian. The evidence for this, potentially Christian, ruling 
dynasty in Persia comes from Nicephorus, who has an account of 
Heraclius honouring Shahbaraz's son Nicetas with the rank of 
patrician and marrying his second son from his marriage to Martina 
to Shahbaraz's daughter Nike. The link with the house of Heraclius is 
intensified by the adoption by Shahbaraz's family of the Roman 
names Nike and Nicetas (victory) which were closely associated with 
that family. 122 Boran was the first woman to reign in Persia, and 
119 Niceph. 17. 
120 Mango, 'Deux Etudes', p. 111-112. 
121 Sebeos, 88-89. 
122 Mango, 'Deux Etudes', p. 105, and Niceph. 17. 
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Heraclius was quite happy to conclude peace with her, after receiving 
an embassy of Nestorian bishops who seemed amenable to imperial 
attempts to reunite the Roman and Persian churches. He had failed 
to place a Christian on the throne of Persia, in much the same way as 
Maurice had, when, in 591 he sent Domitian of Melitene and Gregory 
of Antioch to accompany Chosroes during his stay in Roman territory; 
by 592 Domitian acknowledged his failure to achieve anything 
lasting in correspondence with Pope Gregory, 123 
Within his empire Heraclius found Christianity to be an 
obstacle, since the Monophysite/Chalcedonian split had been 
accentuated by the loss of the eastern provinces to Persia. Heraclius' 
efforts to resolve this conflict are discused in another chapter, 124 but 
before Heraclius could bring together these divergent Christological 
opinions he first had to increase his Christian standing in the eyes of 
all his subjects. This was because his second marriage was to 
Martina, his niece, and was thus judged to be incestuous by 
Monophysites and Chalcedonians alike. That Heraclius was prepared 
to go through with such a marriage has led Mango to speculate that 
he may have been of northern-Mesopotamian descent. Heraclius was 
certainly not opposed to the idea of such marriages for he arranged a 
similar one between his son Constantine and the daughter of his 
cousin Nicetas, Gregoria. 125 There is further controversy 
surrounding the date of the marriage, which is ý not recorded by the 
Chronicon Paschale that otherwise consistently records details of 
imperial events in the capital. - Theophanes places the marriage in 
123 Gregory, Register iii. 62. 
124 Chp. 7. 
125 Niceph. 17 and Mango, 'Deux Etudes' p. 114. 
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615, but Mango has questioned the accuracy of Theophanes' dating of 
both the marriage and the birth of Martina's son Heracleonas. 126 The 
choice of 613/614 or 628 for the date of the marriage is not 
important for the image of Heaclius after the end of the Persian war, 
for his marriage was only part of that image during the victory 
celebrations. 127 It is possble to introduce a compromise theory. 
Heraclius may have married Martina in 613/4, or certainly before he 
left for the Eastern front with Martina by his side in 622, but the 
couple may not have had any offspring until the end of the war. This 
might explain the silence of the Chronicon Paschale; the author, 
probably a member of the Constantinopolitan clergy, may well have 
shared official ecclesiastical disapproval of the marriage but found it 
possible to ignore the relationship as long as there were no children 
as tangible proof of the sin. It is only after the end of the war that 
the sources are scathing about the marriage, when Martina produced 
a series of offspring. If the evidence of Theophanes is interpreted as 
a collation of notices involving the imperial family whose common 
denominator was the marrige to Martina, then this explains why the 
chronicler has also inaccurately dated the birth of her children. 
Heraclius already had an heir before 629, Heraclius Constantine, from 
his previous marriage to Eudocia. His marriage to Martina was most 
probaly frowned upon by the Patriarch Sergius, since in Nicephorus' 
account Sergius had tried to persaude Heraclius not to go through 
with the marriage, but the emperor had insisted and the Patriarch 
reluctantly performed the ceremony. 128 Indeed, the fact that the 
Chronicon Paschale only mentions Martina once, in the context of 
126 Mango Commentary, p. 179-180. 
127 Speck, Dossier p. 35 ff. dates the marriage to 622. 
128 Niceph. 11. 
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Heraclius' departure for the east, may be illustrative of popular 
feeling about the marriage at the time. 129 However, this feeling 
would have been exacerbated in 629 when Heracleonas was born. 
The birth of a son to Matina created a problem for the succession 
that was only solved by civil strife after Heraclius' death. 130 Since it 
was the offspring of the marriage to Martina, rather than the 
marriage to Martina itself, that caused this instability it may be that 
the sources only started to criticise the union when it began to create 
a succession crisis. Nicephorus blames the marriage for the problems 
at the end of Heraclius' reign and the eastern chroniclers, who do not 
mention Martina until Heraclius is victorious in 628, also adopt this 
line, though they are obviously independent Nicephorus. 131 
The means by which Heraclius sought to reconcile his 
subjects to the union has also caused controversy amongst modern 
scholars. The Restoration of the True Cross has been pinpointed by 
Ferber as being a significant event in the balance of Theophanes' 
account of Heraclius' reign. 132 Ferber believes that in the first part of 
Theophanes' account of the reign, that is up until 629, Theophanes is 
positive in his judgement of Heraclius. During this period Heraclius is 
portrayed as the ideal Emperor by Theophanes because he is piously 
orthodox and he is associated with the Theotokos during the period 
of his invincibility. Ferber argues that the restoration of the True 
Cross is the final Christian triumph for Theophanes because this is 
the last event in which the emperor behaves as an orthodox 
129 C. P. p. 714. 
130 Theoph. p. 341-432 and Niceph. 28. 
131 Niceph. 28 and Bar Hebraeus, X. 100 (Wallis Budge p. 93), 1234 
p. 233, and Michael the Syrian, XI, iii (Chabot, p. 410). 
132 Ferber, 'Theophanes', p. 32-42. 
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believer. 133 He mentions the return from Persia of the Cross in the 
year 627, that is two years earlier than other writers. 1 34 
Theophanes details Heraclius' triumphant return to Constantinople in 
the year 628, and in 629 he describes the restoration of the Cross to 
Jerusalem. 135 From this point onwards Theophanes does not make a 
positive reference to Heraclius, who is now seen as the initiator of 
the Monothelite heresy, which is blamed for the Roman defeats at 
the hands of the Arabs. However, there are problems with Ferber's 
argument, and Theophanes may not have knowingly "set up a 
dichotomy" for his account of the reign of Heraclius, as Ferber 
asserts. 136 It is true that Theophanes was using different sources 
for the periods 610-629 and 629-641, but that is not synonymous a 
positive/negative divide in his account since Theophanes in fact had 
nothing positive to write about Heraclius from the time when he 
ascended the throne to the point where he defeated the Persians for 
the first time (610-622). The disparity in his account is partly 
explicable by his contrasting source material for the years 622-629 
and 629-641: Theophanes was using Greek sources, including George 
of Pisidia, until 629 when, in the absence of a decent Greek narrative 
of the early Islamic conquests, he began to use an Eastern source that 
Conrad has postulated may have been Theophilus of Edessa. 137 This 
Eastern source was not favourable to Heraclius, because of the 
133 Ferber, 'Theophanes', p. 37. 
134 Theoph. p. 327. On the date of the Restoration see Mango, 
Commentary p. 185. 
135 Theoph. p. 327-329. 
136 Ferber, 'Theophanes', p. 39. 
137 Conrad, 'Arwäd', p. 322-340. Note the paucity of information on 
these events in Nicephorus (Niceph. 18,20,23 and 26), who did not 
have access to the eastern source. 
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emperor's complete failure to defend the provinces. Theophanes was 
not sympathetic to the emperor as much because of his failure to 
hold on to the Eastern provinces as his religious policy, and most of 
what Theophanes narrates after the Arab invasions have begun is 
concise: the Romans experienced a fresh round of catastrophic 
military failures and there was little opportunity to laud the 
emperor. It is too simplistic to say that Theophanes split Heraclius's 
reign into two parts because the emperor lapsed into what 
Theophanes believed to be heresy after 629. 
Heraclius was aware of the problem caused by his 
relationship with Martina and combined his attempt to solve it with 
another political gesture, 138 which was also heavy with Christian 
imagery. Heraclius demonstrated the extent of his victory, to both 
Persian and Roman alike, by ceremonially restoring the relic of the 
True Cross to Jerusalem. 139 He performed the ceremony with 
Martina at his side to legitimise their union once more in both the 
eyes of God, and his subjects. In order to show that relations 
between Persia and Constantinople were peaceful the Cross was 
depicted as having been returned intact, though this was merely a 
propaganda exercise to show that the Persians had not abused the 
relic. 140 
138 For the restoration as a political gesture, see Mango, 'Deux 
Etudes', p. 113-115. 
139 On the restoration of the Cross, see Frolow, 'La Vraie Croix', p. 
88-105, esp. p. 99. 
140 A hint of this conciliatory attitude to the Persians is contained 
in Nicephorus' account of Heraclius' reaction to the news of the death 
of Chosroes: "Even though he had inflicted innumerable woes upon 
Romans and Persians, I would have hastened, were he to have 
survived, to restore him to his own kingship, complete though my 
victory over him may have been". Niceph. 15. 
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Antiochus Strategus says that the Christians captured from 
Jerusalem were forced to defile the Cross by trampling on it one by 
one, 141 and only contradicts himself at the end of his account when, 
like Nicephorus, he maintains that the casket was unbroken. 142 This 
is evidence to support the new political propaganda in the aftermath 
of Heraclius' victory. In 614 the Persians were the defilers of the 
Holy Places and Heraclius the defender of Christianity. In 629 
Heraclius was the victor who had built a Christian world that might 
embrace Persia, not just the defender of his Christian realm, and so 
the Persians were no longer portrayed as the enemies of the faith: 
indeed, they were even seen to have preserved the casket intact, and 
in doing so have displayed their respect for the new order that 
Heraclius' military victories and Christian piety had secured. 
Heraclius' subjects were left in no doubt that it was through his 
military endeavours and Christian piety that this had been 
achieved. 143 Above all, the act was a microcosm of the performance 
that Heraclius had been giving over the previous six years; he was 
the victorious general who had avenged earlier defeats and regained 
lost possessions, and at the same time he was the embodiment of a 
Christian emperor in the image of Constantine, whose mother had 
originally discovered the fragments of the Cross. Heraclius was not 
simply celebrating his victory over the Persians but invoking images 
of earlier Christian glory: 
"Appear, Constantine, again to Rome, applaud 
141 Conybeare, 'Antiochus', p. 511. 
142 Conybeare, 'Antiochus', p. 516 and Niceph. 18. 
143 G. P. Rest. Crucis 5-15. 
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your son, for how after receiving it in confusion, 
he has again shown that your substance is 
saved". 144 
The best indication that we have of how Heraclius saw his 
own achievement is a victory dispatch preserved in the Ch ro nicon 
Paschale, 145 which was recited in the capital in 628. This blamed 
Chosroes and not Persia for the war, and Heraclius represented the 
death of Chosroes, whom he compared to Judas Iscariot, as one of his 
principal triumphs despite the fact that it was engineered from 
within the Persain court. Heraclius saw this as a victory for 
Christians everywhere, presumably including Siroes, when he wrote: 
"And let all we Christians praising and glorifying, 
give thanks to the one God, rejoicing with great 
joy in His holy name. For fallen is the arrogant 
Chosroes, opponent of God". 146 
This note of Christian triumph was taken up in another 
contemporary text, the History of Theophylact, which included a 
speech put into the mouth of Bishop Domitian to celebrate the Roman 
recovery of the frontier city of Martyropolis. 147 Heraclius' appeal to 
all Christians to celebrate the victory is an instance of the emperor in 
his role as proto-crusader. This Christian image is consistent with 
the way in which Heraclius was presented in both the Heraclias 1 
144 G. P. Rest. Crucis 49-52. 
145 C. P. p. 727-734 and Oikonomides, 'Correspondence', p. 269-281. 
146 C. P. p. 728. 
147 Th. Sim. iv. 16. and, Whitby, Maurice p. 334-335. 
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and II, which can be elucidated by an examination of the historical 
characters used by George to extol the virtues of his hero. We have 
noted the use of this device of amplificatio in the panegyric blue- 
print of Menander Rhetor. 148 George put this into practice by a 
syncrisis, where Heraclius is compared to Hercules, Noah, Elias, 
Alexander, and Timotheus. Though Hercules, Noah and Elias are not 
military commanders George uses them to extol Heraclius' other 
virtues. He has completed his labours for the empire and so he is 
greater than Hercules, "among mortals one man is with justification 
Hercules the deliverer of the world". 149 Noah began a new era in the 
history of the world after 'troubled times and he did so with the help 
of God. So, in comparison ' with Heraclius' achievement, the emperor is 
"The Noah of the new universe has found as an ark his own heart, 
and after storing up his entire nature inside, has sent it into the 
armed ranks, preserved from Chosroes' flood". 150 The religious 
theme is maintained when Heraclius' military achievement is 
praised. Heraclius "imitating Elias of old and making the deserts 
your haunt, you were nourished not on food ... but on cares; 
for of 
military treatises there was no work which you did not pursue in 
your studious reflections". 151 
It is not just Heraclius' military skills that are praised in 
comparison with the pair of Alexander the Great and Timotheus. 
They are both Greek commanders one of whom was a general the 
other an admiral, and both of whom were operating in the same part 
148 See Chp 1. 
149 G. P. Herac. 1 69-7 1. 
150 G. P. Herac. 1 84-88. 
151 G. P. Herac. 11 133-137. 
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of the world as Heraclius. However, Heraclius is superior as a person, 
he built his army up to be organised, well trained and brave, 
whereas Alexander inherited his from his father. Heraclius had to 
battle against fortune whilst Tyche smiled on Timotheus' endeavours: 
"Timotheus sleeping amidst battles, then Fortune handing over the 
cities on this side and on that". 152 These comparisons serve to 
summarise the virtues of Heraclius that George wants to extol. He is 
compared with biblical figures to illustrate his piety and the manner 
in which he has served God, whilst his military skills that are always 
in evidence, are complemented by the aid of God, which raises him 
above his pagan predecessors, thanks to that piety. The achievement 
of Heraclius is never underestimated. He changed the world that his 
subjects lived in and it was maybe due to this feeling of a Roman 
political renaissance that Heraclius felt the need to adopt a new title 
that illustrated not only his newly won hegemony but also its 
sponsor, Trt6Tos Ev XpiaTQ pacatXeüc, 153 Shahid has argued that in' 629, 
March 21, Heraclius formally adopted this new title for his imperial 
position, a title that was intended to look both to the past and the 
future for its significance. 154 
Heraclius was at the centre of all the celebrations to mark 
his victory. Even though he was absent for the reading of his victory 
dispatch in the capital, the narrative shows him to be at the centre of 
events in the East. 155 He was a hero to his people even if he was not 
152 G. P. Herac. 1 133-135 
153 This may be a break from the image of Constantine, for though 
Constantine was associated with the Cross and the triumph of 
Christianity, Heraclius is not compared to him in this work. 
154 See further the appendix to this chapter. 
155 C. P. p. 727-734. 
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amongst them. He had masterminded and inspired the series of 
campaigns that had led to the decisive defeat of his empire's 
bitterest rival. This was not achieved by a single campaign, nor by 
one individual. George of Pisidia's point that Heraclius laboured for 
six years is not mere bibilical allusion. Though he had been 
campaigning since 622 Heraclius did not accomplish anything of 
moment until 627, because as late as 626 he was on the point of 
losing his capital to the Avars, so that there were several years of 
hard labour. The escalation of success culminating at the battle of 
Nineveh is a testimony to his personal endeavour and involvement in 
all aspects of the war. He was influential in the training of his newly 
collected forces, and though the campaign of 622 achieved little in 
terms of regaining territory, it was a morale-boosting trial run for a 
series of expeditions that kept the Persians out-manoeuvred for long 
periods of time. Heraclius took the Romans onto the offensive for the 
first time in twenty years, and in doing so he was putting his 
reputation and, by association, his throne on the line. It was a 
considerable personal achievement that was rewarded by popular 
acclaim in Constantinople. 156 He appointed able lieutenants, Sergius 
and Bonus in the capital, and his brother Theodore in Asia Minor. 
For such delegation and the numerous instances of initiative and 
courage Heraclius deserved credit. He was the moving force behind 
the Roman offensive and in the final analysis he must be seen as the 
ultimate victor despite the victories of others elsewhere. He was 
more than just a military commander, since after the victory he had 
the statesmanship to see that it was time for a period of accord 
between Romans and Persians. He may have failed to take this to 
the extreme of securing a Christian monarch for Persia but it must be 
156 Theoph. p. 328. 
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acknowledged that he had the foresight to make the attempt and 
then accept a compromise that looked likely to stabilise the situation. 
That his policies had no time in which to come to fruition was due to 
the speed of the Muslim invasions, rather than his own tardiness. 
Heraclius' victory instigated a policy of conciliation and unification 
which, since he had won the throne. in 610, he had earlier been 
unable to implement. There was no vicious revenge on his former 
enemies: 157 he was looking forwards rather than backwards when 
his achievements were brought to naught by the rise of a new nation, 
with fresh aggression, the Arabs. 
Appendix. 
Heraclius' adoption of the title (3a Xe S at the end of his 
Persian campaigns, ignored by our sources, has been much discussed 
by modern historians following its discovery by Brehier. Brehier 
believed that the document signified the actual date of the first 
offical assumption of the title. 158 Bury upheld the belief that 
Heraclius was, the first offical paatXeü s, but he stated that the reason 
for this was the fact that Heaclius had defeated Chosroes. As the 
157 Th. Sim. v. 15 has an eschatological prophecy of a period of 
prolonged peace: another notice in Theophylact with contemporary 
relevance. 
158 Brehier, 'Le' protocole imperial', p. 177-182 and 'L' origine', 
p. 172-173. And with a subtle change of emphasis in Les 
Institutions de I' Empire Byzantine. 
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Persian ruler was the only monarch to whom the Romans were 
prepared to accord the title of king, then it was only with the defeat 
of Persia that Heraclius was in a position to assume that position 
uniquely. 159 Ostrogorsky explained the adoption of the title as a 
result of the Hellenisation of the Byzantine state and argued that it 
was a simplification of the imperial title. 160 The same view had 
already been mooted by Stein, 161 but Ostrogorsky swapped the 
sequence of the two factors around. This is the opposite view to that 
of Bury, since Bury had looked to Sassanid Persia for the origins of 
the title, whereas Ostrogorsky preferred to attribute it to 
Hellenisation within the empire. 162 Both of these arguments have 
been criticised by Shahid. 163 Refuting Bury, he has pointed out the 
Persian monarchy did not disappear in 629 and that Persia did not 
become a vassal state: it was still an independent monarchy even if 
it was exhausted. Shahid invokes John Lydus to disprove 
Ostrogorsky's opinion that the title was a simplification of the other, 
Roman, titles, such as Imperator, caesar and augustus. 164 Shahid 
goes on to argue that the title is related to the war between the 
Romans and the Persians, to the Armenian background of Heraclius, 
and, most importantly for this chapter, to the date 629. The peace 
that Heraclius achieved by his victories was comparable to that of 
159 Bury, 'Constitutions', p. 99-125. 
160 Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State p. 89. 
161 Stein, 'History', p. 353. 
162 Chrysos, 'The Title BAEIAEY E', p. 31-75, made a study of the 
evidence for imperial titles collected from offical documents. He too 
concluded that the adoption of the title was symbolic of the 
Hellenism of the seventh century. 
163 Shahid, 'Iranian Factor', p. 295-302 
164 Shahid, 'Iranian Factor ', p. 301, and John Lydus De 
Magistratibus I, sec. 4. 
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Genesis and the title paatXeü s was appropriate for such a comparison. 
Because Shahid, following Diehl, 165 believes Heraclius was an 
Armenian, and because the emperor resided in Armenia frequently 
from 624-629, the Armenian tradition of kingship was supposedly 
an element in the adoption of the title paa . XEÜS. Shahid believes that 
the Romano-Persian war which ended in 628 was the last of a 
quartet of wars which led to Roman constitutional change, the first 
three being the Second Punic War, The Civil Wars and the military 
crisis of the second century A. D. It was a combination of the 
successful conclusion of the war with the progression towards 
absolutism and the Christianisation of the dignity of the imperial 
office that now allowed Heraclius to assume the title of p aatx eü S . 
166 
However, such speculations are unprovable and it is more 
constructive to focus on the Christian element in the new title, and 
the words nwaroS Ev Xpwrcp which could not have been associated with 
either of the old Roman titles, Caesar or Augustus. 
165 Diehl, L' Afrique Byzantine p. 517. 
166 Shahid, 'Iranian Factor', p. 312-313. 
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The Mother of all Sieges. 
The chronological midpoint of Heraclius' reign, the 626 siege 
of Constantinople, brings together many of the themes that we have 
examined in earlier chapters. It was the ultimate Avar challenge to 
Byzantium and the nearest the Persians came to the capital. But it 
was more than just an episode in Byzantine military history. The 
siege saw the escalation in importance of the cult of the Theotokos 
which had been growing since the mid-sixth century, l and which 
was seminal to the defence of the' city in terms of morale. It was also 
an important event in the reign of Heraclius but one at which the 
emperor himself was not present. 2 This absence allows us to ask 
questions pertinent to his whole reign on. the individual culpability 
or responsibilty of the emperor for actions and results. A review of 
the sources describing the siege gives us a further insight into what 
contemporaries saw as the role of the emperor. 3 
The siege must be considered in an empire-wide context. It 
was not solely a drama that concerned the capital, but was part of a 
broader struggle to free the Eastern and Western territories that had 
been over-run by Persians and Avars respectively. It came about 
not only through their acquisitiveness but also as a response to the 
new initiative of Heraclius, which were aggressive militarily in the 
East and diplomatically in the West. The siege was not the result of 
1 Cameron, 'Theotokos', p. 79-108. 
2 Heraclius was also not present at the battle of the Yarmuk which 
resulted in the loss of Syria to the Arabs, and was the greatest defeat 
of his reign. 
3 Barisic, 'Le siege', p. 371-395, for aa narrative of events using 
the sources discussed in this chapter, and Speck, Bellum Avaricum. 
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many years of Byzantine backpeddling which had now reached all 
the way back to the Bosporus, but a sign that it was ready and able 
to reassert itself even if that meant leaving its capital Emperor-less 
and vulnerable. 
The ancient authors leave us in no doubt as to why the siege 
was unsuccessful. George of Pisidia opens his Bellum Avaricum: 
"if any of the painters wishes to show the 
trophies of battle let him range in front of She 
who bore Him without seed and depict her 
image, for She alone knows how to conquer 
nature, first in childbirth then in battle". 
The Chronicon Paschale says that the Avars were defeated "at God's 
command, through the intercession of our Lady The Mother of God, in 
a single instant calamity at sea came to him" 4 Theophanes writes 
that victory was achieved "by God's power and the intercession of his 
immaculate Virgin Mother". 5, This intercession may even have 
been accepted as physical rather than just a matter of faith, since 
Cedrenus reports the Virgin fighting on the battlements, 6 whilst 
the Chronicon Paschale has the Chagan say "I see a woman in 
stately dress rushing about on the wall alone". This martial 
assistance is featured in Theodore Syncellus' sermon which was 
probably delivered on August 7 to commemorate the first 
anniversary of the success. Theodore was a colleague of George of 
4 C. P. p. 725. 
5 Theoph. p. 316. 
6 Ced. p. 328.23 - 329.18. 
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Pisidia, a presbyter of S. Sophia and syncellus of the Patriarch 
Sergius. His account of the siege is complete and although it is 
couched firmly in terms of religious rhetoric it gives us a most vivid 
description of events. The Theotokos is responsible for the sinking 
the Slav fleet at Blachernae (p. 311.17-35), as she is in George of 
Pisidia, 7 while the language is similar to that used by Theophanes 
in his descriptions of battles in the Persian campaigns. 8 This 
dedication to the Virgin was not new nor was it to be short-lived. It 
led to a new preface to the Akathistos hymn "I your city 
commemorate the victory festival". 
This devotion to the Virgin had been growing ever since her 
cult had been recognised at the Council of Ephesus, and by the 
middle of the sixth century there were many churches in her honour 
in Constantinople although there are few references in 
contemporary literature to corroborate this. Corippus, in his 
panegyric to the new emperor Justin II in 566, introduced a mention 
of the Virgin, into the prayer of Sophia on behalf of her husband, 
though he does not go so far as to credit the Virgin with the 
protection of Constantinople since elsewhere he says that the city 
was guarded by God. 9 The reign of Justin II saw a continuation of 
the association of the Virgin, with the imperial family. Leo I and his 
family had honoured her at Blachernae and Justinian did so at S. 
Sophia. 10 Justin II continued this trait at Blachernae and 
7 G. P. Bell. Av. 450 - 455. 
8 Theoph. p. 314. 
9 Corippus, II 50 - 70. For the early history of the cult of the 
Theotokos and especially the impact on it of the writings of Corippus, 
see Cameron, 'Theotokos', p. 82-86. 
10 Paul Sil. Ecphrasis. lines 802-4 (From a translation by Mary 
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Chalcopratea. In his reign she also appears on a bronze weight (but 
only on coinage after the defeat of Iconoclasm), and on seals in the 
reign of Maurice, who initiated the Feast of the Assumption of the 
Virgin on 15 August, and was participating in the Candlemass 
procession in 602 at the time of a food riot. 11 
The Emperors sought to incorporate their imperial role into 
the religious life of the city, not as a capitulation to popular demand 
but as a way of adding strength to their imperial position. Imperial 
ceremony became more complex and more religiously-orientated. 
They encouraged and institutionalised the cult of the Theotokos 
which conveyed a sense of divine aid, 12 and Heraclius was to exploit 
this to the full. Even before the siege the Virgin had been prominent 
in events of his reign. Theophanes tells us that in 610 he sailed into 
the harbour of Constantinople with "icons of the Mother of God" as 
well as reliquaries on his ships. 13 At another significant juncture, 
when he had been surprised by the Avars who threatened 
Blachernae briefly in 623; the Virgin's Robe was removed to S. 
Sophia for safe keeping. The deposition ceremony is described by a 
contemporary anonymous author who shows the Emperor fully 
involved in the, liturgical life of the capital. Heraclius prays as a 
private citizen on his escape from the Avars then walks alongside the 
Patriarch to deposit the Robe at Blachernae. 
"Then the worthy patriarch, again taking as his 
Whitby). 
11 Theoph. p. 265. 
12 Cameron, 'Elites', p. 3-35, and Theotokos' p. 79-108. 
13 Theoph. p. 298. 
161 
assistant our most pious emperor, again filled all 
the sacred place with greater care. He restored 
all the treasure contained therein, and 
appointing a fixed, or rather a named holy day, 
on which he nobly decided to restore the holy 
treasure to its own place, he called together in a 
lofty decree all the the assembly of patriarchs, 
the clergy and the laity, men and women and 
those holding offices and ranks, and all who 
lived in private life. 'Here, priests and people, ' 
he said, ' see the greatness of Christ our God. 
Come and see the treasure till now hidden; here, 
prostrate yourselves before the most holy gift 
which the Theotokos has given the city for its 
safety". 14 
It is no suprise then, when Theophanes tells us that Heraclius took 
the Camuliana image with him to the East but left his family and 
capital to the care of the Virgin. 15 
Cameron writes that the siege of 626 "marked one of the 
most complete moments of unity ever realised in Constantinople". 16 
Heraclius was constantly in the minds of the people and was 
represented to them by Sergius. There was an intimate connection 
between Emperor, Patriarch and people all under the protection of 
the Virgin, which cemented the late sixth - century ideal of 
14 Cameron, 'Robe', p. 599-600. 
15 Theoph. p 303. See also G. P. Exp. Per. 1 140-150. 
16 Cameron, 'Elites', p. 6. 
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government. The Emperor was seen as an intercessionary between 
his people and God, but in order to do this effectively he is presented 
as familiar with the other important intercessionary, the Virgin. As 
Theodore Syncellus writes: 
"For the Lord himself will fight for us and the 
Virgin Mother of God will be the defender of the 
city". 17 
Her role is a very real one for the populace. Sergius tells the Avars 
that her image over the Golden Gate means that "A woman the 
Mother of God will quell all your boldness and boasting with one 
command for she is truly the mother of him who drowned Pharoah 
with all his army in the Red Sea", 18 an anticipatory analogy with the 
naval battle in the Golden Horn. He then adapts the prophet 
Isaiah(Isaiah XXXVII. 35) "I will defend this city for me and my 
servant David", "For our emperor is a new David". 19 Heraclius may 
have been absent from the capital but through his link with the 
Virgin he remains the prominent individual in the minds of the 
people, at least as much as Sergius or Bonus. He is at the centre of 
the religious and political loyalties of his people. George of Pisidia 
does not exclude Sergius from an important role in the invocation of 
the Virgin, "by giving and dispensing much on every side you first 
persauded her and she immediately persuaded the Son, and almost 
before the trial pronounced a judgement of victory for us". 20 
17 Anon. Mai, p. 427 (trans. Cameron, 'Elites', p. 20). 
18 Anon. Mai, p. 427 (trans. Cameron, 'Elites', p. 20). 
19 Anon. Mai, p. 437 (trans. Cameron, 'Elites', p. 21). 
20 G. P. Bell. Per. 375. 
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If Heraclius was not out of mind he was certainly out of 
sight. His absence has been given various explanations. Amantos 
maintains that he was unable to reach Constantinople in time, but 
this is unconvincing as the reinforcements that Heraclius sent back 
from the East experienced no such difficulties. Bury, Pernice and 
Lambros' view that he was unwilling to give up all he had won in the 
past four years of campaigning against the Persians was dismissed 
by Stratos on the grounds that Heraclius had won back only 
Byzantine Armenia, 21 but Stratos' objection misses the point. 
Heraclius did not return to the city because there was equally 
important fighting to be done elsewhere, and he was unwilling to 
risk being shut up in the city in whose defences and defenders he 
had faith. Indeed to have done so would have demonstrated success 
for the Persian strategy. This issue of the emperor's absence is 
presented in various ways in the ancient sources. His absent 
protection may be stressed, or his success in having able 
subordinates, or the whole issue may be minimalised by a 
concentration on the eastern theatre where Heraclius was directly 
involved. George of Pisidia describes his actions thus: 
"In truth the most acute nature of our Lord did 
not neglect, though absent, to be present at our 
toils, but to such a degree was he near our cares 
as he was meantime distant from the area" (B e Il. 
Av. 245). "He inflamed us by the carrying of 
letters" "sent out a multitude of an army and 
was neglectful of safety on his own part"(296). 
21 Stratos, Byzantium I p. 175. 
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Heraclius' absence is not not so marked in George of Pisidia 
or George the Monk. George of Pisidia ends the Bellum Avaricum 
with Heraclius in the East. 
" after enlisting fiery-bright allies (the Khazars) 
he ranged them against the barbarians of 
darkness in order that he might show the Tigris 
and the Istrian Strait bloodied as before was the 
stream of the Nile". 22 
George is linking the two great victories of the Persian campaigns - at 
Nineveh on the Tigris over the Persians and in the Bosporus over the 
Avars - the one achieved by Heraclius in person, the other by proxy, 
but both equally credited to the emperor and his guardianship of the 
new children of Israel by the allusion to Exodus. George the Monk 
begins his own brief section on the siege with Heraclius' 
reconciliation with the Avars and his advance East; the siege of 
Constantinople is then mentioned, while the next paragraph returns 
to describe Heraclius' great eastern campaigns. So he is at the centre 
of the story with the siege a (retrospective) side issue to the main 
glory. No personality gains a mention during the siege, we learn only 
that the citizens were troubled. Once more Heraclius is the flagbearer 
for his people carrying the fight to the enemy as a Christian, and 
building on glories of the recent past. 
Theophanes also describes Heraclius' actions as having a 
22 G. P. Bell. Av. lines 525-530. 
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constructive purpose. The emperor not only divides his army to 
ensure the defence of his capital but also to facilitate the full 
implementation of his overall strategy. His brother is sent to 
intercept Shahin and achieved a victory whose significance is 
confirmed by Theophanes stating that Shahin's corpse was subjected 
to indignities on Chosroes' orders upon its arrival in Persia. 23 In 
the meantime Heraclius himself marches to Lazica with the rest of 
the army to conclude a treaty with the Khazars, which will enable 
him to make further attacks upon the Persians. 24 Heraclius was 
engaged in an empire-wide struggle, as has already been 
emphasised, and hence required able assistants to achieve his 
various objectives. 25 This strategy was accepted by the inhabitants 
of the capital, at least according to George of Pisidia. 
"it was necessity I think that so great a master 
should have such great servants for necessity 
who on learning the dispatch of wise counsels 
showed forth his words as deeds". 26 
Accounts of the siege illustrate the significance of religious 
and imperial imagery to Heraclius, yet in the first instance it was a 
military threat, one which might cast doubt on the strategy and 
diplomacy of Heraclius that had allowed the Avars considerable 
leeway in the West in order to give the emperor the oppurtunity to 
23 Theoph. p. 315. 
24 Theoph. p. 315. 
25 Indeed, in Leo the Grammarian's presentation of the siege there 
is no mention of the Theotokos, and Bonus and Sergius are presented 
as leaders as the people were in their time of despair. 
26 For the contribution of Sergius see G. P. Bell. Av. 140-165 and 
370-390, especially 380-390. 
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confront the Persians in the East. By 622, for his first Persian 
campagian, Heraclius had moved the majority of his Thracian forces 
to the East, so that he had to rely on Avar integrity and the strength 
of his land defences to protect what was left of the western Empire. 
The treachery of the Chagan is dwelt upon in all the sources that 
describe the Avar Surprise of 623 and the siege. This attitude has 
the effect of transferring the emphasis of their accounts away from 
Heraclius' improvidence and focusing it instead on the unscrupulous 
nature of the Avar commander. Heraclius' aim was to concentrate 
his forces on the defeat of the Persian threat, but in 626 the 
propensity of the Avars to surprise him was again realised and 
Constantinople faced a war on two fronts just as it had before the 
Avaro-Roman treaty of 623. The Avar Chagan mobilised, his 
confederation of tribes including Slavs, Huns and Bulgars, 27 and 
after an unsuccessful attempt to take Thessalonica the Avar 
vanguard, numbering 30,000 men, arrived before the capital on 29 
June, 28 to be followed by the Chagan a month later with the "whole 
of his horde". 29 This was the greatest immediate threat to the city, 
but not the only one. According to the Chronicon Paschale 
Shahbaraz was awaiting the Chagan, and George of Pisidia and 
Theophanes endorse this preconceived alliance. 30 
This has been disputed by Barisic and Mango for different 
reasons. 31 Barisic believes that the arrival of Shahbaraz at 
27 G. P. Bell. Av. 200. 
28 C. P. p. 717. 
29 C. P. p. 719. 
30 C. P. p. 716, G. P. Bell. Av. 195, and Theoph. p. 316. 
31 Barisic, 'Le Siege', p. 390-391, and Mango, 'Deux Etudes', p. 107. 
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Chalcedon was only a diversion which was to paralyse Heraclius' 
offensive in Armenia and to show to the Constantinopolitans that 
that offensive was of no importance. He had with him no siege 
engines or fleet, so he could not take part in the siege. The Avars on 
the other hand were attracted by the opulence of the capital, with 
greed as their motivation since they were not satisfied by the wordly 
goods and treasures which they had received from the peace of 623. 
Barisic sees 626 as the synchronisation of two separate actions and 
not a military alliance. The Persian army was symbolic, no more 
than spectators. Mango also believes that the Persians were not 
there to fight, but offers a different explanation. He believes that 
Shahbaraz had already been turned against Chosroes II by the 
Roman diplomacy that Theophanes relates later. 32 However, in 626 
Shahbaraz was clearly seen by the Romans as a leading figure of 
opposition. He had burnt Chalcedon and its suburbs and sent envoys 
to the Chagan to deflate Roman morale; these had exchanged insults 
with George the Patrician and the Romans had later seen fit to 
mutilate them. It has also been argued that the earliest point for the 
betrayal of Chosroes by Shahbaraz to have been initiated would have 
been the return of the Roman army from the East under Theodore. 33 
Also neither Barisic nor Mango explains why the Avar vanguard 
made almost immediately for Sycae to light fires that would signal 
their arrival to the Persians if the latter had no idea that they were 
to be arriving at all. 34 Furthermore neither takes into account the 
significance of the Bosporus as a barrier to Persian aggression: the 
Persians had no fleet and all available craft would probably have 
been removed from the eastern shore by fleeing refugees or the 
32 Theoph. p. 324. 
33 Whitby, tr. Chronicon Paschale, p. 177 n. 471. 
34 C. P. p. 718. 
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Roman navy. The Avars realised this problem and lost many men 
trying to solve it by ferrying the Persians across in the Slav 
monoxyla. 
The aims of the besiegers were clear cut. In all earlier 
dealings with the Romans the Chagan had been happy with material 
concessions which never went as far as Constantinople. Now it was 
Constantinople, the spiritual and administrative centre of the Empire 
that he demanded. He wanted to dominate all of Thrace, he had 
already tried to take Thessalonica, and now he wanted the' citizens of 
Constantinople to leave for Persian-controlled Asia with only a shirt 
and a cloak. 35 The Chagan seems to have had no doubts as to the 
inevitabilty of his victory, and the Persian position is emphasised by 
the silk shirts of their envoys whilst the terms offered to the 
Romans concern one shirt and a cloak. The Persian emissaries say 
that no Roman relieving army will arrive, and the Chagan echoes this 
belief in the desperate position of the Romans by asserting that they 
can only escape if "you can become fish and depart by sea or birds 
and ascend to the sky". 36 The Romans on the other hand were 
desperate for a peaceful end to the siege. They readily complied 
with more than one demand to victual the Chagan, and the 
deputation that they sent to him contained the three Patricans 
George, Theodosius and Athanasius, and Theodore the syncellus of 
Sergius the Patriarch (one of the narrators of the siege). However, 
35 C. P. p. 721-722. 
36 C. P. p. 721. The nomadic nature of the Chagans phrase is very 
similar to that of the Turkish Khagan when he talks about Avar 
fugitives (Men. Prot., frg. 4.2,4-7). " They are not birds that can take 
to the sky to escape the swords of the Turks, nor are they fish that 
they can take to the water and hide in the depths of the sea". 
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they were equally determined not to surrender 
"we will never relinquish the city for we came 
out to you in the expectation of discussing 
something material". 37 
In the psychology of warfare Sergius is the equal of the Chagan, 
whose attempt to intimidate the population by a display of force on 
29 July is met by a religious parade organised by Sergius, 3 8 
although the Chagan was an impulsive violent and brutal man when 
the Persian emissaries are caught by "the efficacy of God" one of 
them is instantly beheaded one is mutilated and returned to the 
Chagan while another is executed later in front of his own people. 
The Romans can match the brutality of the barbarians, especially 
when it is calculated to have a dramatic psychological impact. 
That their plight was serious but not yet desperate can be 
seen in the response of the notables to the return of Athanasius from 
a diplomatic mission to the Chagan before the siege had begun. 39 
After he had given his report on the Avar's preparations for war 
Athanasius was accused of being in fear of the Chagan and of being 
prepared to conciliate him, an attitude which he defended: 
"these had been his instructions from the most 
37 C. P. p. 722. 
38C. P. p. 716. 
39 Contra Barisic, 'Le siege', p. 378, who believes that Athanasius 
was sent only after the. Avars had arrived at Constantinople. 
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glorious officals at the time when he was 
dispatched on embassy, therafter he had not 
learnt that the defences had been strengthened 
and that an army was present here" 40 
This strengthening of the defences was the work of the Patrician 
Bonus and the Patriarch Sergius who had been left in joint command 
of the city. They were, however, guided in their actions by Heraclius' 
missives which he sent with a detachment of his army, and -which 
instructed them to provision the city, repair the walls and overhaul 
the fleet. The Romans were preparing for a defensive strategy which 
would rely on the strength of their walls and the superiority of their 
fleet, to keep the Avar land forces at bay and to prevent an Avaro- 
Persian co-ordinated land and sea attack. 
The initial Avar tactic was to pound the walls, concentrating 
their forces on the short (1 km) section between the Pempton Gate 
and the Polyandrion Gate. 41 Their siege engines were obviously 
greatly feared by the Romans for the Chronicon Paschale preserves 
a story of a sailor who earned a personal reward from Bonus for 
utilising a mast and sail in such a way as to inconvenience the 
besiegers seriously. 42 After the last round of negotiations with the 
four Roman ambassadors the Avars tried to make use of the 
potential of the Persians. Their attempt to ferry them across the 
Bosporus was an unmitigated disaster. The Persians lost 4,000 
40 C. P. p. 718. 
41 Barisic, 'Le siege', p. 380, and Theodore Syncellus p. 937-938. 
For a map of the walls of the city see Tsangadas, Fortifications Maps 
I-IV, and p. 80-106 for a discussion of the siege. 
42 C. P. p. 720. 
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men, 43 and the Avars were forced to begin the final land assault 
with only the resources available to them on the Western shore. Due 
to a lacuna in the text of the Chronicon Paschale details of their 
preparations are unknown to us but it seems that Bonus was not so 
ignorant. 44 In the opinion of Theodore Syncellus the Chagan's 
objective for the assault of the 11 July was to breach the walls of the 
city with his land army while the canoes massed in the Bay of Keras 
allowed him access to the city itself. 45 It was not to be. Bonus stole 
the initiative by lighting the flares that the Slavs took to be the 
Chagan's signal to begin the attack. The mobility of the Slav canoes 
was restricted by their being roped together in order to present a 
firmer front to the heavier Roman vessels, and as a consequence 
many were sunk by a combination of the intrinsic superiority of the 
Roman ships and a gale. 46 The battle soon became a rout, so that 
although the Avars managed to capture the church at Blachernae on 
the 6 August they were in no position to maintain the siege. The 
heavy losses to the Slavs persuaded them to withdraw, a decision 
which must have been encouraged when the Chagan ordered the 
slaying of Slav fugitives from the naval battle and the Romans 
displayed decapitated Slav corpses from their ramparts. 
The Slavs' retreat signalled not only the end of the siege but 
also the end of the Avar threat to Heraclius. The Chagan blamed his 
retreat on a lack of provisions and vowed to return. 47 Barisic 
43 Sebeos, Chp. 26. 
44 The account breaks off just before the description of this first 
naval engagement. 
45 Barisic, 'Le siege', p. 386. 
46 Niceph. 14. 
47 C. P. p. 725. 
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accepts that the Chagan may have arrived at the capital too soon to 
have made adequate preparations for the feeding of his men, 48 but 
Stratos is quick to refute this theory on the grounds that the Avar 
army could have been fed from Thrace, though he also says that the 
Avars did not have any organised supply system. 49 Stratos believes 
that the Avars withdrew because of the proximity of the Roman 
relieving army. Although the Chronicon Paschale does preserve the 
remark of Bonus to the Chagan that Theodore is coming and that he 
will speak to him on his own territory there is no evidence for a 
pusuit of the Avars and according to Nicephorus it is not until later 
that decade that the hostages which the Chagan had recieved in 623 
were returned. 50 The Chagan had a large number of men in the 
field concentrated into a very localised area the resources of which 
are likely to have been harvested in advance by the besieged. 
Indeed some harvesting may have been going on when the Avars 
arrived. 51 It is not inconceivable that famine and disease were not 
far from the minds of those in the Avar camp, and with every day 
the army of Theodore would have been getting closer whose arrival 
would have swung the advantage in favour of the Romans. However, 
the crucial factor in the immediate nature of the Avar retreat was 
the attitude of the Slavs to the defeat of 7 August. They had 
suffered heavy losses and seen their countrymen inhumanely 
treated by the Chagan. 52 This reduced their morale to such a state 
that disorderly withdrawal seemed the best policy for survival. The 
48 Barisic, 'Le siege', p. 392. 
49 Stratos, Byzantium I p. 193. 
50 Niceph. 21. 
51 As there had been at Thessalonikia, Miriacula S. Demietrii secs. 
198-199. 
52 For an opinion of the personality of the Chagan see Theodore 
Syncellus, Anon. Mai p. 5 and p. 10. 
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Chagan now had to deal with the fragmentation of what had always 
been a loosely knit federation of subject tribes. If dispirited Slavs 
compelled him to retreat from Constantinople, discontented tribes 
further north made sure he never came back. The rebellion of the 
Moravian Slavs was now encouraged by the Franks to weaken their 
powerful neighbours. In Chapter 3 we discussed the effect that the 
rebellion of Samo may have had on the mind of the Chagan, and the 
Romans themselves were active diplomatically in attempting to 
induce the Serbs and Croats to move against the Avars. 53 According 
to Constantine Porphrogenitus in the De Administrando Imperio 
Heraclius invited the Croats into the Balkans and settled them 
between the Drava and the Adriatic when they defeated the Avars. 
A little later the Serbs also sought Roman protection and were settled 
east of Croatia. Both peoples were converted to Christianity by 
missionaries sent from Rome at Heraclius' request. 54 However, it is 
difficult to regard this story as authentic since Heraclius was 
militarily occupied in the east for the remainder of his reign and 
there is every chance that the Serbs and Croats were able to take 
advantage of this and of the vulnerability of the Avars after 626 to 
claim land for themselves. Heraclius can more justifiably claim the 
credit for the diplomacy that saw the emergence of the Onogur Huns 
in the North Caucacus. An embassy of Huns to the Constantinopolitan 
court is documented in Nicephorus, who also reveals that they were 
successful against the Avars later in the reign. 55 
Military reverse, shattered morale and long range diplomacy 
53 Obolensky, Byzantine Commenwealth p. 59-60. 
54 DA1, Chp. 31 and 32. 
55 Niceph. 9 and 22. 
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were combining to weaken the power and prestige of the Avar 
Chagan, whereas the absent Heraclius could be accorded credit for 
these and eastern successes. The significance of what had happened 
in Constantinople had an empire-wide effect. Heraclius had 
answered critics of his decision to take personal command of the 
campaigning army, and had seen his faith in his strategy, and the 
defences of his capital, justified. The Chagan on the other hand now 
had to fight for his own political power-base, having failed to capture 
Constantinople. Barisic sees the whole episode as the triumph of 
weaker civilisation over stronger force. 56 It was more an example 
of a militarily disadvantaged city being reinforced by imagery and 
icons whose origins were firmly rooted in Late Roman history, and in 
which its emperor and population believed. Roman ideology and 
iconography, through their figurehead Heraclius, had been vindicated 
in their three essential senses; religion, politics and warfare. 
Heraclius' image could only benefit from this as he went on to 
consolidate and then supplement it in his final campaigns against 
Persia. His association with the Virgin and the effect of his 
dispatches from the east had strengthened Heraclius' personal image. 
The weakening of Avar power in the west was paralleled in the east 
as the emperor engineered the political divorce of Chosroes from his 
leading general Shahbaraz. Shahbaraz's defection and the 
subsequent neutralisation of his army allowed Heraclius to 
consolidate and then augment his achievements during the final 
yusofhiswag stlbsn 
56 Barisic, 'Le siege', p. 394. 
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Heraclius and the Churches. 
Heraclius' return of the True Cross to Jerusalem in 628/629 
was the climax of his Persian campaign and a turning point of his 
reign. For the significance of the restoration should not be seen only 
in military terms. The cross had been taken from Jerusalem after its 
capture by the Persians in 615, and its return underlined the 
decisiveness of the Emperor's victory. However, in religious terms 
Heraclius' victory only returned him to square one in the imperial 
effort to reconcile the various Churches of Eastern Christendom. 
Heraclius had portrayed himself as the leader of Christendom during 
his campaigns for religious propaganda as much as to lift morale, but 
was now taking the earliest opportunity to heal the kind of rift that 
had involved Emperors since the Arian and Donatist disputes of 
Constantine's reign. This chapter will proceed bearing in mind the 
fact that Heraclius was facing an old problem and his solution must 
be compared with the earlier imperial attempts of Zeno, Justinian, 
Justin II and Maurice. This chapter will avoid a detailed discussion 
of the Arab invasions because I believe that Heraclius' religious 
problem was merely exacerbated by these, as it was between 610- 
629 when the Persians occupied much of the Eastern Empire. The 
Arabs will be seen as an external force in the dispute, not initiators 
but beneficiaries of a religous conflict which began before their 
invasion of 632. The dispute concerned the different beliefs of the 
Monophysites and the Chalcedonians, but it was not between them. 
Heraclius' attempts to find a common creed acceptable to all his 
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Christian subjects provoked the opposition of leading Chalcedonian 
clerics. It was their refusal to bow to imperial directives that began 
an argument that the Monophysites did not see the need to enter. 
The Monophysite historians The Chronicle of 1234, Michael the 
Syrian, John of Nikiu, and Sebeos, and the Nestorian texts the 
Chronicle of Guidi and the Chronicle of Seert do not mention it. The 
Monophysite interest in the religious affairs of Heraclius' reign 
concerns his personal life - they considered his second marriage to 
Martina to be incestuous - and allege that he persecuted them. 
Before we consider Heraclius' policy and reactions to it, it may be 
useful to summarise earlier Emperors' similar attempts, to illustrate 
some of the general problems Heraclius faced in his search for a 
solution, before moving on to the specifics of his case. 
We have already mentioned the controversies of 
Constantine's reign, the Donatists and Arians, which were dealt with 
by an imperially convened church council whose decisions were 
backed up by imperial legislation. 1 The Council of Chalcedon (451) 
in the reign of Marcian which tackled the Nestorian dispute had 
decreed that Christ was consubstantial with both God and Man, and 
had two natures that were not confused or divided. This council also 
exiled Dioscorus, the main influence on the Monophysite synod of 
Ephesus (449). The Emperor Zeno tried a compromise policy, using 
an imperial decree, in his Henotikon in 482.2 The problem now 
was not Arians, or Nestorians, but Monophysites whose cause had 
been aided by the coup of Basiliscus (475) who issued a decree 
1 See Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius p. 224-244. 
2 See Chadwick, Church, for a general narrative of Church 
history. 
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against the Council of Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo which was the 
basis of that council's decisions. However, this policy was not 
popular in Constantinople, and was opposed by the Patriarch Acacius. 
Basiliscus, realising his error, tried to retract by issuing the Anti - 
Encyclical but this did not end the problem. It simply bought him 
time which was to no avail as Zeno reoccupied the capital. Zeno then 
implemented a new policy for bringing peace to a divided Church. 
His advisers were from each side of the quarrel, the Patriarch of 
Constantinople and Peter Mongus the assistant to Timothy Aelurus, 
the Monophysite Patriarch of Alexandria. Compromise was the order 
of the day. Zeno hoped that by ignoring but not contradicting 
Chalcedon, the Monophysites and Chalcedonians would agree to 
differ, and that a common acceptance of the Councils of Nicaea and 
Constantinople would suffice to bind the two together. The 
Henotikon (481) was a letter from Zeno to the Church of Egypt. 3 It 
condemned by anathema Nestorius and Eutyches, it stressed the 
acceptability of doctrines formulated by Nicaea and Constantinople 
and anathematised anybody who made doctrinal innovations "at 
Chalcedon or elsewhere". 4 It was not a success. The mention of 
Chalcedon seemed to allow Monophysites the licence to denounce 
that council and the Tome of Leo, and whilst it conciliated the 
moderates amongst them it did nothing to reconcile the extremists. 
All this was achieved at the cost of a schism with Rome. Both 
Basiliscus and Zeno had asserted the right of the Emperor to dictate 
to the Church on matters of doctrine. This was a power the Pope 
himself had not yet assumed, and Pope Simplicius excommunicated 
Acacius and Peter Mongus (now Patriarch of Alexandria). 
3 Chadwick, Church, p. 205-208. 
4 Bury, HLRE I p. 430. 
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The reign of Justinian saw another attempt to reconcile 
Monophysites with Chalcedonians. He was an Emperor who "took his 
responsibilities as head of the Church more seriously than any 
emperor had hitherto done, and asserted his authority in its internal 
affairs more constantly and systematically... ". 5 Procopius says that 
he was determined "to close all the roads which lead to error and to 
place religion on the firm foundations of a single faith". 6 
Persecution was the first means to achieving this. Heretics, 
especially the Montanists of Phrygia and the Manichees were 
deprived of some rights of citizenship and the Jews and Samaritans 
too were discriminated against. Paganism was finally extinguished in 
Justinian's reign through a series of inquisitions at Constantinople, 
and the profession of orthodoxy being made compulsory for public 
teaching. According to Maas, Justinian was acting on political and 
ideological principles.? Justinian believed in the uniformity of 
worship. He was prepared to persecute not only pagans, but 
heretics and homosexuals. In doing so Justinian was seeking to avoid 
the wrath of God that he thought he would invoke if he did not 
rigorously enforce the law. Maas links the three purges of the reign 
with relevant events. The first purge in 529 was made to ensure 
that the rest of the reign was a success. The second purge was 
conducted after the plague of 542, and was an attempt to purify the 
empire and in doing so restore God's favour to it. The final purge of 
561 was a response to political instability, both in the capital, and in 
5 Bury, HLRE II p. 360. 
6 Procopius, Buildings i 1. 
7 Maas, John Lydus p. 73-82. See also Chuvin, Last Pagans p. 
113-148. 
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Thrace, where the Huns were raiding. Justinian was also prepared 
to exploit the charge of "paganism" for political ends. Maas uses 
Phocas as an example of a highly distinguished civil-servant who was 
a victim of the purges of 529 and 545-6 because he did not meet 
Justinian's requirements for his absolutist government. 
The Monophysite problem was more complex. Zeno's 
attempt at reconciliation had led to a schism with Rome. This had 
been healed during the reign of Justin I when Pope Hormisdas had 
succeeded in holding a synod in Constantinople where all 
Monophysite bishops were expelled from their sees and the names of 
Zeno, Acacius and Anastasius amongst others, were removed from 
the diptychs of the Church. All that was left for Justin I to do was to 
carry out a general persecution of Monophysite believers, which led 
to the expulsion of more than fifty bishops including Severus of 
Antioch. Justinian decided against a continuation of this policy and 
in 529 recalled Monophysite bishops from exile. Yet a conference at 
Constantinople in 531 yielded no results, nor did his attempt to unite 
the Church via the doctrine of the Theopaschite formula that God 
suffered for mankind, and which, dealing as it did with the Holy 
Trinity, touched, but did not tackle, the main bone of contention 
between Monophysites and Chalcedonians, whether or not Christ was 
of one or two Natures. After a persecution conducted by Ephrem of 
Antioch, which was as unsuccessful as that of Justin I, Justinian 
looked for a compromise solution. This time he sought to unite 
Monophysites and Chalcedonians against a common enemy, 
Nestorianism and one of its leading proponents, Theodore of 
Mopsuestia (d. 428). In 543-544 Justinian drew up an edict which 
condemned Theodore, Ibas of Edessa and Theodoret of Cyrrhus, the 
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separate authors of treatises which for the sake of convenience 
became known as the Three Chapters; the latter two bishops had in 
fact been cleared of heretical tendencies at Chalcedon. In acting 
against these individuals Justinian was removing a serious 
Monophysite objection to Chalcedon, for Chalcedonians would no 
longer seem to countenance Theodore who was in disagreement with 
their great thinker Cyril. The four eastern patriarchs signed the edict 
but the procrastinating Pope Vigilius had to be removed to 
Constantinople forcibly in 545 to condemn the Three Chapters (548), 
having convened a council to discuss the issue. Justinian continued 
to dictate to the Church. In 551 he issued a statement of True Faith 
and in 553 he summoned an Oecumenical Council to Constantinople. 
However, he was to be opposed. The established doctrine of 
the Western Church was being called into question and the western 
bishops were not about to meekly accept an alteration to it. Balkan 
bishops denounced Justinian's scheme in 550 as being against the 
faith. The African bishops attended Constantinople in order to 
combat the imperial plan. There were no Italian bishops save from 
Milan and Rome, and none from further west. Vigilius had to issue a 
document of support for the Oecumenical Council even though he had 
not been in attendance, having remained under house arrest. 
Justinian's achievement was minimal. In the west the papacy was 
out of communion with Milan for nearly twenty years and in Africa 
Justinian's religious policy was unpopular and resented. In the east 
the Monophysites were unimpressed by the condemnation of the 
Three Chapters and so the main objective of the council was not 
achieved. Indeed a council of the Syriac church of Persia in 554 
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added new life to the Nestorian outlook of that church. Justinian had 
only been successful in his attempts to force Patriarchal and Papal 
ratification for a policy whose impotence can only be evaluated by 
what it meant to the church at large and not to a group of coerced 
ecclesiastics. The Fifth Oecumenical Council broke new ground in 
that the question that it pronounced upon was one which had been 
artificially created. 8 It is more important for its political 
implications than its result, since Justinian had successfully made a 
claim to the theological guidance of the church. Zeno had looked in 
this direction but he had only sought to suppress controversy, not to 
take a new step in formulating doctrine. 
Justin II continued to look for a non-coercive solution to 
bring about reconciliation. 9 He and his wife Sophia (like Justinian's 
Theodora before her) were sympathetic to the Monophysite cause, 
though, as Cameron points out, this information comes from a 
Monophysite source, Michael the Syrian. 10 Corippus included part 
of the creed that Justin II had decreed should become part of the 
liturgy, in his poem to celebrate the emperor's assumption of the 
consulate. 11 Nevertheless, in 566 a three-way conference met to try 
and find a permanent Christological middle ground. It was made up 
of Tritheists, conventional Monophysites and Chalcedonians. A 
reconciliation was achieved between the two groups of Monophyites 
and they themselves put forward proposals for comprise; "out of two 
natures one", Cyril's Twelve Anathemas to be canonised, the 
8 Herrin, Formation p. 116-127. 
9 See Cameron, 'Early Religious Policies', p. 51-67. 
10 Cameron, 'Early Religious Policies', p. 52-53. 
11 Corippus, In laudem lustini Bk. IV lines 290-311. 
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acceptance of Zeno's Henotikon and the restoration of Severus of 
Antioch to the diptychs. In return they were prepared to drop the 
current Patriarch of Antioch, Paul, and accept Anastasius. 12 In 
order to accommodate these demands Justin II removed the 
discussions away from the Chalcedonian stronghold of Constantinople 
to the East. However, the extremist monks present at the assembly 
in the convent of Mar Zakai upset this premise for discussion by a 
riot, demanding a complete rejection of Chalcedon, not merely the 
aspects of it that could be implied from the Henotikon, and a 
complete rejection of the Tome of Leo. The chaotic end to the 
conference did not weaken Justin II's resolve. 13 A series of 
discussions were held at Constantinople in 569-570, and their result, 
the Henotikon of Justin II, did not. condemn Chalcedon explictly, but 
it still proved acceptable to most Monophysite moderates. However, 
Justin II's attitude had changed and he began a persecution of the 
Monophysites that is chronicled in John of Ephesus, but not in any of 
the Chalcedonian sources. 14 Unfortunately for Heraclius this policy 
was continued by Justin II's successors. 
John of Ephesus writes that this persecution continued into 
the reign of Tiberius, although the emperor was constrained to issue 
an edict of toleration in order to maintain his alliance with the 
Monophysite Ghassanid Arabs. 15 Maurice was to continue a strict 
Chalcedonian policy in his own reign, when the population of Syria 
was persecuted under the aegis of Domitian, bishop of Miletene. 1 6 
12 Evagrius V. 4. 
13 Allen, Evagrius p. 22-25. 
14 John of Ephesus ii. 5-7. 
15 John of Ephesus iii. 15-16 on the persecution , and iv. 42 on the 
edict. 
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Another anti-Monphysite incident concerning the bridge at 
Ctesiphon, not only lost the Byzantines their vital alliance with the 
Ghassanid Arabs, which was crucial to the security of the Empire, but 
also the trust of the local people who not only benefited from their 
military presence which kept at bay Lakhmid raids but who also 
identified with their religious cause. Maurice was to have made an 
attack upon the Persians with Ghassanid aid but was prevented from 
doing so by the bridge over the Tigris being down. Maurice blamed 
his allies and had their their leader al-Mundhir exiled to Sicily. 17 
These actions left the Monophysite historian John of Nikiu in no 
doubt that the heresy of the Emperor Maurice "was responsible for 
every evil in his reign". 18 
The reign of Phocas did nothing to close this widening rift. 
The campaigns of Chosroes II and the religious policy that followed 
in their wake only strengthened the Monophysite cause. 
Monophysites did not actively aid the Persians as the Jews and 
Samaritans did but they did benefit from their victories. Chosroes 
made it his policy to replace Chalcedonian bishops with Monophysite 
ones. The Monophysites and Nestorians were given the status of a 
majority religion in their own spheres of influence. 
So, if Heraclius' triumphant arrival in Constantinope in 610 
was not representative of the political realities of the time, for we 
have seen in an earlier chapter how precarious his military position 
was both internally and externally when he ascended the throne, his 
16 1234 p. 218. 
17 John of Ephesus iii. 40-41. 
18 John of Nikiu, Cl. 5. 
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religious problems were no less great. However, he could not even 
begin to formulate a solution to these until he had extinguished the 
military threat to both his eastern and western borders. Until then 
his relationship with the Church would have to be made secondary to 
his military endeavours. The two were not, however, entirely 
separate preoccupations. The panegyrics of George of Pisidia always 
strive to show Heraclius the soldier as a Christian warrior defending 
the Faith. "In likeness of Moses you campaign against the second 
Pharoah". 19 In Theophanes the cause of Christianity is never far 
away, either in the diplomatic exchanges or for inspiration before a 
battle. "I will have no mercy upon you until you renounce He who 
was crucified and worship the sun" threatens Chosroes. 20 Heraclius 
on the other hand exhorts his troops with a description of the Persian 
atrocities: "They take great pleasure in defiling our churches which 
should not suffer". 21 The link between military campaigning and 
religion was not solely one of propaganda and morale-boosting since 
there was a far more material angle to the relationship. Heraclius 
had ascended the throne only to find himself very short of money, as 
an anecdotal story of lost treasure in Nicephorus reflects. 22 With 
the military pressure on his eastern border increasing annually he is 
said by Nicephorus to have considered a move back to Africa, only to 
be dissuaded from this by Sergius, the Patriarch of Constantinople. 
Sergius had already shown himself to be a shrewd judge of character 
when in 612 he made every objection and yet still blessed the 
marriage of Heraclius and Martina which, in common with much of 
the Empire, he deemed to be incestuous. Sergius was to illustrate his 
19 G. P. Exp. Per. 135. 
20 Theoph. p. 301. 
21 Theoph. p. 304. 
22 Niceph. 8. 
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confidence in Heralius' fitness to rule by his offer in 619 to loan the 
state the church plate in order that it might supplement its 
dwindling resources in an attempt to boost the war effort. This extra 
source of bullion seems to have been the spur that Heraclius needed 
to switch from diplomacy to all-out attack in the East. 23 The church 
treasure was made available only as a loan and there was an 
express obligation to repay it once the war was over. The Patriarch's 
involvement was to go even further, for when Heraclius departed for 
the east he left Sergius and the Patrician Bonus in dual charge of the 
city. 24 The role the city of Constantinople played in the Persian 
campaigns and the importance of new liturgies in that role will be 
discussed in a separate chapter concerned with the siege of 626. 
What we are interested in here is the relationship between Heraclius 
and Sergius that is crucial for developments in the 630's, the date 
which we can establish as the beginning of a concerted religious 
policy by the emperor. Until that point Heraclius' interest in the 
church was confined to Asia Minor and expressed by acts of personal 
devotion rather than statesmanship. 
His victory in 629 was to change his approach, but this 
change was not a sudden one which can be put down to personal 
devotion. It was a political as well as a religious gesture. Heraclius 
in 629 was able for the first time to rule over a fully restored 
empire. However, this in itself threw up new problems which he had 
not had to face in the first nineteen years of his reign, since until 629 
Heraclius had only dealt with the Chalcedonian church. This was a 
result of the Persian invasions whose extent meant that the main 
23 Theoph. p. 303, Niceph 11-12. 
24 Theoph. p. 303. 
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centres of Monophysite belief were out of Byzantine control. We 
have already seen how Chosroes II adopted a policy of encouraging 
the Monophysite church, which gave that church renewed vigour for 
it now controlled all the sees under Persian rule save those formerly 
held by the Nestorian Church. Whilst Heraclius could not allow this 
state of affairs to continue once he had regained control of the 
provinces, being under pressure from the Chalcedonians of Asia 
Minor, he would also be aware of the delicate nature of the situation. 
Monophysite or not, the provincials were the subjects his proto- 
crusade had come to save. In the poems of George of Pisidia we have 
no Chalcedonian rhetoric, only staunchly Christian themes. It seems 
that from the very beginning of Heraclius' relations with the Eastern 
Christians he was in no mood to ride roughshod over them. This is, 
however, at variance with a Monophysite source, the Chronicle of 
Michael the Syrian. In his narration of the relationship between 
Heraclius and the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch, Athanasius, 
Michael maintains that after Heraclius had sent a confession of faith 
to Athanasius he met the prelate at Hierapolis. Their discussions 
came to naught whereupon Heraclius grew frustrated and ordered 
the persecution of the Monophysites. 25 This attitude would appear 
to be out of step with Heraclius' attitude to the religious problems of 
his time. If he resorted to force almost instantaneously why do we 
have the Psephos and the Ecthesis from later in the decade, 
documents which caused determined opposition from Sophronius, a 
hard-line Chalcedonian. Furthermore the see of Antioch 
(Chalcedonian Church) was left vacant until 639. Unless an 
agreement had been reached, or no solution seemed possible, 
25 Michael the Syrian, XI. iii (Chabot, p. 412). 
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Heraclius would have filled it. What seems more likely is that 
discussions were under way that were terminated by the death of 
Athanasius in 631, and not by an inflexible stance by either party. 
That Heraclius left the Patriarchate of Antioch open for so long is 
testimony to his determination to create a unified Church in his 
Empire. 
However, in his dealings with the Jews Heraclius was far less 
diplomatic. The Chronicle of 1234 has one example and Theophanes 
another of the emperor showing magnaminity towards the people 
who had taken part in the slaughter of the Christians of Jerusalem in 
614. Heraclius prevented his brother Theodore from massacring the 
Jewish inhabitants of Edessa, 26 and then progressed to Tiberias 
where he is said by Theophanes to have converted the Jew Benjamin 
to Christianity. 27 However, Theophanes is not telling the full story. 
The Doctrina Jacobi tells of a persecution of the Jews that involved 
their forced conversion to Christianity. 28 This makes sense of 
Theophanes' remark that Heraclius "warned" (he was presumably 
threatened with physical violence) Benjamin before he converted 
him. Dagron believes that this is an example of an individual forced 
conversion before the collective one began. Indeed Eutychius says 
that Heraclius massacred all the Jews that he could find in Jerusalem 
and Galilee. 29 The extent of the forced baptisms is not known, 
Michael the Syrian only says that the Jews fled the edict all over the 
empire. 30 Evidence of the persecution in general comes from the 
26 1234 p. 235-236. 
27 Theoph. p. 329. 
28 Dagron, 'Juifs', p. 28. 
29. Eutychius, Annales, p. 107-109. 
30 Michael the Syrian, XI, iv (Chabot, p. 414). 
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poem of Qilir which, composed from a Jewish perspective, was 
written between the reconquest of Heraclius and the Arab invasions. 
The head of the Jewish community in Palestine is murdered by a 
Persian general but then Heraclius arrives and begins a persecution 
and a programme of forced baptisms. 31 As we hear of no pro- 
Jewish sentiment from the Monophysite writers that were normally 
quick to criticise Heraclius we may assume that his policy was only 
resented amongst the Jewish community. Heraclius may have found 
it easy to cow that sector of the population with coercion but more 
subtle methods were necessary if he was to find a lasting solution to 
the Christian divisions within his empire. 
In 629 he used what had been the only unifying force in the 
East for the last twenty-seven years, war against the Persians, to 
make an impression on the minds of Chalcedonians and 
Monophysites alike. The Christian struggle versus Persia ended in 
628 and since Heraclius had placed himself at the forefront of it to a 
very personal degree his prestige was very high. Heraclius must 
have believed that if he could unify the Christians in the Empire to 
fight the Persians he could use his personality to do the same in the 
search for a united Church. For Heraclius then, the restoration of the 
Holy Cross was not only a means of celebrating the end of a war but 
also of signifying to his Monophysite subjects a new approach of 
conciliation and assimilation by the Emperor. The capture of 
Jerusalem and the loss of the True Cross to the Persians in 615 had 
been a disaster for all the Christian communities of the Empire, so 
that in celebrating its restoration Heraclius was symbolising by his 
31 Dagron, 'Juifs', p. 27. 
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success the benifits of a united Church and his own suitabilty for the 
task of creating one. The restoration also had a personal significance 
for Heraclius, since he was aware that his marrige in 612 to Martina 
was considered incestuous by both Monophysites and Chalcedonians 
alike. The restoration took place with Martina at his side in order to 
demonstrate the Christian legitimacy of the marriage. This did not 
stop Monophysites criticising the marriage, but it must have gone 
some way to develop its credibilty in the minds of his sceptical 
32 subjects. 
So in 629 Heraclius was a suitable emperor to attempt a 
policy of religious unification, having personal prestige and the sound 
advice of Sergius who was himself highly acclaimed by the 
population of Constantinople for his role in the siege. That someone 
so aptly suited to the task managed to spark off a long running 
dispute is an indication of the strength of feeling of the extremists 
with whom it was always necessary to deal if the proposed solutions 
were to have any validity whatsoever. Zeno had managed to 
convince the moderate Monophysites of the value of his policy. 
Heraclius was to experience something of the same but in his case 
the opposition came from Chalcedonian extremists, as it had done in 
the reign of Justinian. Heraclius could not afford to ignore the 
Monophysite Church for it was in a commanding position in his 
newly reconquered territories. The only Patriarchs of Antioch and 
Alexandria were Monophysite, as was the Catholicus of Armenia. 
Fortunately Sergius was not a narrow thinker. Indeed he was a 
Syrian of Monophysite parentage. 
32 See Chp. 4. 
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The policy that he and Heralius worked out over a period of 
time was a positive notion, not a condemnation of an earlier theology 
which the Fifth Oecumenical Council had been. Heraclius' tactic was to 
superimpose a new creed which was acceptable to both churches 
because it did not condemn the beliefs of either but instead added to 
their theology. The first of these new creeds was monergism, which 
was the doctrine of one energy in Christ. This doctrine avoided any 
discussion of His nature, for if it could be commonly accepted that 
Christ had one energy then Heraclius would have circumvented the 
need to debate the issue of Christ's nature to establish a common 
creed. It had convinced ecclesiastics before 630; Paul The One-Eyed, 
the leader of the "headless" Armenian Monophysites in Cyprus (623), 
Cyrus of Lazica in 626, and in 625 the Catholicus of Armenia; this led 
to a synod at Theodosiopolis in 633 that ended in union with 
Constantinople being agreed. Further steps seemed to have been 
taken in Egypt in 633 when the bishop of Phasis, Cyrus, who was the 
leader of a group of moderate Monophysites (Theodosians) won his 
flock over to monenergism with the help of a (forged) patristic 
florilegium attributed to the sixth century Patriarch Menas. Union 
was celebrated in June of 633. 
However, this time the opposition was, to come from the 
Chalcedonians. It was led by Sophronius who was at the outset of 
the dispute one of the last of the monks who practiced xeniteia 
(wandering). 33 He was a native of Damascus but had a deep feeling 
of gratitude towards the Church of Egypt whose saints Cyrus and 
John had cured his ophthalmia. Nevertheless he was a staunch 
33 See von Schönborn, Sophrone, and Chadwick, 'Sophronius', p. 
41-74 for a discussion of his career. 
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Chalcedonian in an area where it had few supporters. When John the 
Almsgiver arrived in Alexandria from Cyprus in c. 604 he supposedly 
found only seven Chalcedonian churches. 34 Sophronius was present 
in Alexandria when the union between the Theodosians and 
Constantinople was made. He was disconcerted at this compromise 
and went to Constantinople to plead his case before Sergius. This 
defence of a strict Chalcedonian position attracted considerable 
popular support in the capital and Sergius felt compelled to issue a 
new formulation that stressed the unity of the word (logos) as the 
force responsible for directing both the spiritual and human natures 
of Christ, and forbade debate over his energies or energy. 
This brief document is known as the Psephos and also 
included the theory of Monothelitism, that is Christ's one will. This 
was a doctrine that could also be acceptable to Monophysites. 
Sergius was not abandoning Monenergism, but after the opposition of 
Sophronius, he must have felt it necessary to extend areas of 
compromise in order to embrace more Monophysites with a theory 
that was also acceptable to Chalcedonians. He was now attempting to 
resolve the problem created by the Gospel stories of the Gethsamene 
prayer. As Jesus said "Not My will but Thine will be done" there 
might seem to be a difference between his human and the divine will 
of God. Sergius offered the same interpretation of this prayer as St. 
Athanasius and John Chrysostom, that Jesus manifested an 
instinctive movement of his body in a moment of weakness which 
created opposition between human desire and his divine will. Thus 
Sergius could claim that Jesus had only one will which was in line 
34 Baynes, Three Byzantine Saints, Life of John Chp. 5. 
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with the hypostatic unity of his person. The whole incident was held 
up as evidence of the one divine will in the Trinity. 
Sergius circulated this formulation to all the eastern 
patriarchs and to the Pope, Honorius I (625-638), with a letter 
describing the union achieved at Alexandria. By respecting the 
Chalcedonian wording in "two natures" and by supporting the idea of 
Christ's single energy taken from the writings of the Pseudo- 
Dionysius Sergius got general acceptance for his Psephos. The Pope 
stated his agreement for the need to end discussion and also his 
belief in Christ's one will. Maximus the Confessor also praised 
Sergius and Sophronius was satisfied by the withdrawal of the 
Alexandrian statement on Monenergism. The vacant see of 
Jerusalem was filled by Sophronius who almost immediately created 
division after his recent acquiescence in the argument. In a letter 
announcing his election he issued a dogmatic statement outlining the 
weakness of the Monothelite arguement. It was not sent to Antioch 
or to Alexandria for Sophronius was not a man interested in 
compromise, and he had already seen the stubborn nature of the 
Egyptians. "The Egyptians are not a race to change their minds". 35 
The Patriarch of Antioch was a Monophysite and Sophronius, unlike 
Sergius, had no wish to involve the Monophysites in what he saw as 
a purely Chalcedonian dispute. Honorius was bound by his statement 
on Christ's one will and so with no other church leader on his side 
Sophronius could either keep silent or open a new schism, which 
would effectively further retard steps to unify the Christian church. 
He did not remain silent, but instead tried to get the whole issue 
discussed at a church synod. However, he must have realised that 
35 In Sophronius, 'Laudatio SS. Cyri et Joannis', p. 3573B. 
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his own influence was not enough to convene a sufficient number of 
bishops for he wrote to Arcadius, bishop of Cyprus, asking him to 
organise the gathering. 36 This met in the mid-630's under the cover 
of discussing the Trisagion -a doxology which subordinated the Son 
and the Spirit to the Father, 37 a cornerstone of Monophysite belief - 
but Sophronius' Chalcedonian views were debated. Sophronius was 
far from carrying the day. The forty-six bishops present could not 
decide and referred matters to Heraclius. Sophronius realised that 
he was not going to make any headway in the east and so sent his 
envoy Stephen of Dora to Rome. Honorius was still immovable in his 
belief in Christ's one will, whilst Heraclius and Sergius were not 
inactive. 
" They added a further elaboration to the Psephos, an 
imperial edict issued in 638 by Heraclius. This Ecthesis was thus to 
be observed by all Byzantine subjects Monophysite and Chalcedonian 
alike, and rather than answering Sophronius' criticism of the 
Psephos the new document rebuffed him by ignoring him. Heraclius 
and Sergius chose instead to produce a general compromise for 
Christians rather than a precise definition of faith for Chalcedonians. 
The compromise was, however, a failure because it did not go far 
enough in what it said, only in what it wanted to achieve. It was a 
brief three page definition in which too little was said and too much 
was left out. There was inevitable opposition from Sophronius and 
the Papacy was equally unimpressed, although monks such as the 
abbot of the monastery of Philippicus, were Chalcedonian supporters 
of the Ecthesis. Indeed that abbot, Pyrrhus was to become Patriarch 
36 Albert and Von Schonborn, 'La Leitre de Sophrone', p. 189-243. 
37 Frend, Monophysite p. 167-168. 
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of Constantinople when Sergius died in 638. 
The Ecthesis was a new definition of Christ's one will, 
based on the hypostatic union of Father and Son and was an 
elaboration on the Psephos as a development of Monothelitism. But 
now Sergius had a new opponent. Maximus the Confessor had 
welcomed the Psephos in 633-634, but he had since reconsidered 
Monothelite theology. 38 Sophronius had compiled a list of six 
hundred citations against it and Maximus too criticised Sergius' 
analysis of the Gethsamene prayer. Sergius had denied Christ's 
human will and so reduced his saving role in the redemption of 
mankind. Maximus preferred to stress the full humanity of Christ, 
and who therefore possessed a human will: but his human will did 
not operate in opposition to his divine will, even if the two wills were 
distinct they would always cooperate. Maximus only began to argue 
his point after the death of Sergius, that is in the 640's when a 
growing number of Monophysites were causing consternation in the 
west having fled there as refugees from the Arab invasions. 39 The 
African and Italian churchs were unsure and unwilling to assimilate 
them, seeing them as heretics, and reluctant to compromise their 
position further. Honorius also died in 638, without formulating a 
response to the Ecthesis and whilst Imperial forces controlled the 
Lateran Palace to ensure the election of a compliant sucessor, 
Maximus' defiance in Africa was illustrative of the weakness of the 
Ecthesis as a unifying edict. The new Pope John IV condemned it 
out of hand and Heraclius died before he could attempt to revitalise a 
flagging position. 
38 Brock, 'Maximus The Confessor', p. 317. 
39 See Haldon, 'Maximus', p. 87-91 on the end of his career. 
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What we have seen so far is the refusal to compromise of a 
few hardline Chalcedonians. It makes similar reading to Justinian's 
problems surrounding the Fifth Oecumenical Council. Neither he nor 
Heraclius were allowed to toy with the tenets of the Chalcedonian 
faith. The opposition to Heraclius like that for Justinian was from 
high-ranking prelates, including the Papacy, but the boundaries of 
the dispute went further than the minds of a handful of learned men. 
It is now necessary to expand the limits of our perspective and take 
in what exactly the dispute meant to the people whose lives 
Heraclius was trying to enhance, the provincials of the east. Their 
participation in and reaction to the dispute is important for an 
evaluation of its significance before we try to take on board the 
implications of the Arab invasions with which the dispute is often 
closely linked. 
Throughout the dispute there is no mention of any 
Monophysite prelates' involvement in the argument. It is true that 
the Tome of Union (633) came out of a synod attended by Coptic, 
Theodosian and Julianist bishops but that was only the signal for the 
beginning of Chalcedonian opposition. The reaction of the Coptic 
church was symbolised by its patriarch Benjamin. Before the defeat 
of the Persians he had, with their support, dominated the Christian 
communities of Egypt. However when Heraclius appointed Cyrus as 
Patriarch of Alexandria in 631 Benjamin's position was effectively 
undermined. Not only had he been passed over in the candidature 
for patriarch but Cyrus was a Chalcedonian with a role that united 
both Imperial administration and religious policy. Benjamin was left 
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in no doubt as to his future role and retired' to the desert 
monasteries. There was no attempt to take from him his purely 
Monophysite title, it was simply made obsolete by the renewed 
dominance of a Chalcedonian church led by Cyrus. The dispute 
between Chalcedonians could only have a negative effect on the 
church of Egypt. This was a region where division and separation 
were never far away. During the invasions of both Nicetas and the 
Persians we have examples in John of Nikiu of varying stances of 
political support. The most important comment on the Arab 
invasions comes from John, when he mentions the behaviour of 
Cyrus towards the Arabs. This is only in the context of local 
resistance to the invasions and has nothing to do with Cyrus' position 
as head of the Chalcedonian church in Egypt. 40 Cyrus was trying to 
buy peace and the people would have none of it (CXX. 26) and, 
indeed, John only mentions two Coptic defectors to the Arab cause 
and also recounts their speedy return to the Byzantine side (CXIV. 6- 
7,9-11). He does not say the Arabs fought against the Chalcedonians 
but instead that they warred "against the Christians" (CXV. 1). John 
gives us no reason for asserting that the Copts welcomed the arrival 
of the ' Arabs as a matter of religious particularism, he does state that 
half the inhabitants of Lower Egypt rushed to join the Muslims (CIX) 
but not because they were or were not Copts, and itis more likely 
that Cyrus' harsh administration had more to do with local 
dissatisfaction and reluctant resistance, than his Chalcedonian beliefs. 
The other Monophysite stronghold of Syria was equally 
40 Frend, Monophysite, p. 349 -353 for the view that the 
appointment of Cyrus was "a far-reaching and ultimately disastrous 
decision". 
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unaffected by the Monenergist/Monothelete dispute. The Syriac 
chroniclers do not dwell on it even if they mention it. Neither 1234 
nor Michael the Syrian, nor the chroniclers outside the empire, the 
Guidi Chronicle and the Chronicle of Seert mention the Monothelete 
dispute. This may be because they had only a broad conception of 
Chalcedonians and any disagreement between them did not stop the 
Monophysites being inveterate enemies of the "orthodox faith". 
Indeed this would explain Michael's assertion that following an 
argument between Heraclius and Isaiah the metropolitan of Edessa, 
the emperor began a persecution of the Monophysites. 41 As this is 
Michael's (misguided) line of argument it would not make sense for 
him to include details of a dispute that concerned exactly how far 
Heraclius could go in compromising with the very people that 
Michael would claim he is persecuting. Bar Hebraeus is only 
concerned with the Arab invasions when narrating the events of 
Heraclius' reign. Religion is only mentioned when he relates 
Heraclius' knowledge and opinion of Islam, that it was "an early 
cloudy dawn". The marriage of Heraclius and Martina is presented as 
a trangression of the law, but Bar Hebraeus does not mention the 
restoration of the Cross, only the inevitability of Arab victory 
directly after his comment on the Imperial marriage. This marriage 
which is dated to 613/614 is mentioned by other chroniclers when 
they discuss the events of 629-630. The greatest significance of the 
silence of Monophysite authors is that it underlines Heraclius' lack of 
success in achieving any widespread unification - the people whom 
he was attempting to conciliate preserved no mention of his 
initiative. 
41 1234 p. 236, and Michael the Syrian, XI. iii (Chabot, p. 408) for a 
similar version. 
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By advancing a creed that all Monophysites could embrace 
Heraclius would have attracted attention if he had been successful. 
As it was he could not even get his compromise past Chalcedonian 
opposition. It is true that Heraclius may have only attracted such 
opposition because of the extent to which he was prepared to go to 
find a permanent common ground between the two churches, but 
equally such opposition could be inspired by the slightest alteration 
to Chalcedonian belief. Theophanes voiced Chalcedonian fears when 
he says of the Monophysites: 
"when the party of Severus read it [the Ecthesis] 
they dragged the reputation of the Catholic 
Church through the taverns and bathhouses 
saying "The Chalcedonians formerly were pro- 
Nestorian then they turned toward the truth, 
joining us in the one nature of Christ through his 
one energy". 42 
Nicephorus does not mention the religious problems of the reign in 
terms of a divided Chalcedonian church. He is content to blame 
Heraclius' incestuous marriage for the ills that befell the empire. 43 
The Chronicon Paschale only mentions Martina once, and that is in a 
notice of who acompanied Heraclius on his campaign of 624.44 This 
implies that this Constantinopolitan source did not approve of the 
42 Theoph. p. 330. 
43 Niceph. 11. 
44 C. P. p. 714. 
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marriage, for it otherwise would have given its usual amount of 
attention to an event concerning the imperial family in the capital. 45 
This is nor surprising as the Chronicon Paschale's text ends in 628 
and so would have no occasion to refer to Heraclius' efforts at 
doctrinal compromise. 
Heraclius' need for a successful compromise is often 
exaggerated by the effect on the Empire of the Arab invasions. His 
policy of religious reunification was well underway by 636 and the 
Battle of the Yarmuk. The invasions of the Arabs were no more than 
an additional harrassment to a policy that was itself beset with 
problems from the outset. A tradition of beligerence in opposition to 
Imperial attempts at reconciliation made Heraclius' initiative 
unlikely to succeed. Theophanes with hindsight can only say about 
the Ecthesis "thinking he was doing something great he 
promulgated the edict" (p. 330). The need to pay back the Church so 
soon after the final military victory prevented Heraclius from 
making concessions to the provincials he had just liberated from 
Persian rule, and so negated the high personal prestige that he had 
accrued over the past six years. The Arab invasions destroyed any 
hope of the Ecthesis achieving any more than the Psephos. 
Heraclius himself admitted that Syria was lost in 636. The church 
that he left behind there would no more follow his religious lead 
than it could his political directives. That is the importance of the 
Arab invasions. They were a hindrance to the success of Heraclius' 
religious policy but they did not instigate it, nor were they the cause 
of its failure. 
45 For example the death of Eudocia, C. P. p. 702-703. 
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"A CLOUDY DAWN. "' 
The Arab invasions which saw the loss of Syria, Palestine 
and Mesopotamia during Heraclius' reign, and the whole of Egypt 
shortly after his death, brought to nought all attempts to reunify the 
empire. The sweeping nature . of the conquests questions 
his 
statesmanship after the Persian campaigns, as the provinces that he 
had recently won back quickly fell from his grasp once more. That 
the Romans went from a position of dominance to one of retreat in 
such a short space of time would seem to indict the actions of 
Heraclius. Stratos wrote that had Heraclius died in 630 "he would 
have been regarded as one of the greatest leaders of history" but 
"alas for him, for Byzantium and Hellenism he survived", 
2 
with the 
implication that a different ruler could have done better. The Arab 
conquests are often discussed as a distinct historical phenomenon, 
opinions about why they began, and why they succeeded being 
based on an Arabian view that looks outwards, north and east. A 
brief chronological outline of events will provide us with a historical 
washing line upon which we can hang an analysis of the sources that 
to varying degrees play the part of Heraclius' dirty washing. 
3 
The first Arab incursions of the reign were in 611-612 
according to Theophanes. 
4 The next attested confrontation 
between them and the Romans came in 629 when the Romans 
I Bar Hebraeus X. 96 (Wallis-Budge, p. 90). 
2 Stratos, Byzantium I p. 352. 
3 The most recent discussion of the Arab invasions is by Kaegi, 
Invasions. 
4 Theoph. p. 300. 
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repulsed a raid at Mu'ta. 
5 Ma'ab was the first city to fall to the 
Arabs and the Romans suffered their first defeat in 634, when the 
governor of Caeserea, Sergius, was defeated and killed at Dathin near 
Gaza. The battle of Adjnadayn in July 634 was a crushing defeat for 
the Romans, and that Christmas Christians were unable to travel to 
Bethlehem from Jerusalem. After another defeat at the battle of 
Fahl, Damascus was besieged, and despite Heraclius sending 
reinforcements in an attempt to break the siege and a victory by 
Vaanes both that city and Emesa eventually fell. The battle of the 
Yarmuk in 636 was the decisive Romano-Arab confrontation of 
Heraclius' reign and the Romans' defeat signalled their loss not only 
of Damascus but of the whole of Syria and Palestine. Jerusalem and 
Gaza were captured in 637, and that year a truce was agreed in 
Egypt. By 638 all of Syria had been lost apart from Northern 
Mesopotamia, which was taken for Islam in 639/640 by lad. Fresh 
from their victories the Arabs were free to pursue two distinct 
courses, the stabilisation of the newly won territory, and the 
conquest of Egypt. Whilst the Caliph Umar was busy in his new 
domains conducting a census, his general Amr was attempting to add 
to them at further expense to the Roman empire. 
6 The invasion of 
Egypt began in 639 according to Arab sources. 
7 Pelusium fell in 
640 and Babylon just after the death of Heraclius in 641, by the end 
of which year Alexandria was the last bastion of Roman rule in Egypt 
and that too was under siege. 
The sources fall into three main categories; the Chalcedonian 
S Theoph. p. 335. 
6 Theoph. p. 341. 
7 Theoph. p. 338 says that it began before the Yarmuk, in 635. 
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tradition of Theophanes and Nicephorus, the Monophysite tradition 
of the Chronicle of 1234 and the Arab historians Baladhuri (d. 890) 
and al-Tabari (d. 920), none of whom are contemporary. It is 
possible to add to these the Coptic writer John of Nikiu who was 
contemporary with the conquest of Egypt and various ecclesiastical 
works, including the sermons of Sophronius, the Patriarch of 
Jerusalem. The sources will be examined in order to gain an 
impression of Romano-Arab relations prior to the conquests. This 
will allow us to see exactly how much Heraclius may have known 
about the nature of . his opponents and their ambitions, the necessary 
criteria upon which to judge his culpability for what was to follow. 
This culpability depends upon his reaction to the invasions, how far 
he was responsible for the defeats that saw him lose all the 
provinces that a decade ago he had won back from the Persians. 
Before we analyse the events it is necessary to examine the 
sources. Although Theophanes has already been discussed in the 
context of his writings on the Persian campaigns and the doctrinal 
dispute, his treatment of the Arab invasions requires a special 
investigation. This is because Theophanes can be shown to be using 
a non-Greek source and this raises different problems from those in 
other sections of his narrative, so that this example of intercultural 
transmission merits a brief review. Conrad has shown that this 
source had a detailed knowledge of the Arabs and their religion, 
which is reflected in the work of Theophanes, but is not present 
8 
inthe history of Nicephorus. Theophanes' knowledge of Islam is 
8 Conrad , 'Theophanes', and more specifically in 'Arwäd'. See also 
the earlier postulations of Brooks, 'Sources', p. 578-587. 
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evidenced by his reproduction of the genealogy of the Arab tribes 
when he describes the ancestry of Mohammed. 
9 Conrad also states 
that this account participates in the "most prominent fictions" of the 
Islamic tradition. 
10 Further evidence of Theophanes' knowledge of 
Arab attitudes is to be found in his account of the battle of Mu'ta. 
Ii 
Here Theophanes states that the Arabs planned to make their raid 
"on the day of their idolatrous sacrifice". If the raid depends upon 
the element of surprise for its success then the "idolatrous sacrifice" 
must have been being carried out by the Christian Arabs of the 
village, which would account for them being off guard. Conrad 
asserts that Theophanes would not use "idolatrous" to describe 
Monophysite Arabs, and so explains its appearance by the fact that 
Theophanes was careless in the editing of his material. This 
carelessness is a mistake that Theophanes also makes later in his 
chronicle; when he calls the emperor Leo III "pious" despite the fact 
that Leo was the first iconoclast emperor, and that Theophanes was 
vehemently opposed to that doctrine. 
12 
Conrad describes how this transmission of information took 
place. 
13 Syria was the region where Melkite (i. e. Chalcedonian 
Christians under Arab rule) authors used languages other than Greek 
in their work. The Pseudo-Methodios of the late seventh century 
wrote in Syriac although his tone was Melkite. Theophilus of Edessa 
was a bilingual Maronite historian, Bar Hebraeus says he made an 
eloquent translation of the Iliad and the Odyssey into Syriac. 
9 Theoph. p. 333. 
10 Conrad, 'Theophanes', p. 14-15. 
11 Conrad, 'Theophanes', p. 21-26. 
12 Theoph. p. 396. 
13 Conrad, 'Theophanes', p. 30-44 and 'Arwäd' p. 322-348. 
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Further evidence of this bilingualism in the Near East is provided by 
an extant fragment of Psalms from a bible that was written in 
Arabic, though in Greek letters, and by the career of Stephen of 
Ramla (late ninth century) which shows the emergence of Arabic 
speaking clergy. 
14 In Syria people were multi-lingual and texts 
might well be hybrid, or derived from sources in more than one 
language, so that the constraints of linguistic tradition were removed: 
hence it is inappropriate to talk of a specifically eastern or western 
source tradition for material of Syrian origin by the time of 
Theophanes. Theophanes could not have relied on the Greek 
historical tradition for his information because there is no evidence 
of Arabic material in Nicephorus, and sources- such as Cedrenus and 
Leo the Grammarian who do have Arabic material also depend upon 
Theophanes. On the other hand the material used by Theophanes 
has close parallels with the Syriac tradition, and this has recently 
been investigated by Conrad: for example, the Chronicle of 1234 has 
a more detailed, but related, genealogical account of Mohammed's 
ancestry than Theophanes, 
15 
and Conrad give examples of 
Theophanes' use of Syriac vocabulary in his description of internal 
Islamic history. 16 If Arab accounts became part of Syriac historical 
literature by the eighth-century, then Theophanes could borrow 
from a source that was able to use both Arab and Greek narratives. 
Conrad goes on to postulate that Theophilus of Edessa may have been 
Theophanes' source, but also stresses the the need for a fuller 
examination of all the literature that pertains to the text of his 
14 Conrad, 'Theophanes', p. 32-33. 
15 1234 p. 227-230. 
16 Conrad, 'Theophanes', p. 38. 
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chronicle. 
The later extant Syriac sources also pose a historiographical 
problem, which stems from the fact that the work of Dionysius of 
Tel-Mahre, the earliest and most reliable of the Syriac historians 
dependent on Theophilus, is not extant. However, much of his work 
has been preserved by other chronicles. Michael the Syrian tells us 
that Dionysius wrote a history of the period 582-842 AD, one part of 
which was devoted to the Church and one to the World. Although 
the history of Michael the Syrian (Jacobite Patriarch, 1166-1199) 
was written before the Chronicle of 1234, it is the latter that more 
closely retains the narrative structure of Dionysius. All three authors 
were Monophysite, and in Michael's abridged version of Dionysius' 
introduction to his history he warns the reader of the fraudulent 
presentation of events by the Chalcedonian historian, Theophilus of 
Edessa. 17 
The Arab sources are also not without problems of 
historiography. Modern historians appear to be taking one of two 
stances. Kaegi is prepared to use all the Arabic sources available to 
broaden the view we have of the invasions, and to bear out some of 
the more obscure points. 
18 This is to ignore completely the work of 
Crone concerning the historical veracity of the Islamic tradition 
which describes the life and career of Mohammed. 
19 Crone argues 
17 For the examination of the image of Heraclius we shall refer to 
the Chronicle of 1234. Michael the Syrian will only be quoted if he 
preserves material not found in 1234; these passages are either an 
example of Michael's Monophysite views, or an account from 
Dionysius that 1234 has chosen to omit. 
18 For example his discussion in Invasions Chp. 1. 
19 Crone, Meccan Trade p. 203-230. 
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that the sources for the life of Mohammed are unreliable as history, 
and are more concerned with preserving an account of the inception 
and spread of the Muslim faith. This examination can afford to 
implement a compromise. The early Arab sources can be used 
because this study is concerned with the image of an emperor and 
not with the verification of chronology. So, even if we accept Crone's 
point that all Arab historical writing is flawed because it is about 
religion and not events, we can still use the sources to give us an idea 
of how the Arabs saw their opponents. In doing so we still must be 
careful in our selection of source material. It is important to use the 
more contemporaneous material available, for not to do so would be 
to use historians who merely borrow from early authors and 
embellish their accounts with anecdotal or confused evidence. The 
Arab historians used in this chapter are Baladhuri (d. 890) and 
Tabari (d. 920). Though Tabari is concise on the conquests, 
Baladhuri's is a fuller account of the Arab invasions that is divided 
up by geographical regions. This was done because the author was 
interested in the fiscal state of the conquered lands, and this could 
vary from city to city depending on the precise nature of Arab 
capture - whether the invading Arabs were welcomed at the onset or 
compelled to mount an attack on a city that might negotiate a 
surrender or be vanquished by a violent assault. Hence details of the 
conquest were relevant to Baladhuri. 
The Arab campaigns of 634 had their beginnings in the 
plundering raids of 632, and the more organised incursions which 
followed these razzia were merely an extension in terms of scope 
and size of earlier Romano-Arab confrontations. Their motivation 
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has been ascribed to various factors which are a subject of modern 
historical controversy and do not concern us here. However, the 
withdraw! of the rogia to Arab tribes beyond the Roman border is 
cited as a cause by both Theophanes and Nicephorus, 
20 
namely that 
the Arabs formerly in receipt of these subsidies would now have to 
look elsewhere for their livelihood and would naturally turn to 
raiding Roman territory which they knew to be prosperous. In order 
to do so they would need aid - presumably because Heraclius had 
correctly judged them to be incapable of widespread destruction on 
their own - and so looked to their southern counterparts for an 
alliance. 
Heraclius' relationship with the Arabs in, and on the margins 
of his empire took two distinct forms after the defeat of the Persians, 
and had its roots in the past relationship between emperors and the 
tribesmen. In 523 and 527 the Romans had suffered at the hands of 
Mundhir, ruler of the Lakhmid tribe who were clients of the Persian 
king. He had devastated territory around Apamea and Emesa in 523. 
Justin I sent an embassy to secure a peace and release of prisoners at 
the conference of Ramlah. This treaty was not observed for long, 
since in 527 Mundhir raided as far as Antioch. Justinian's response 
was to combat this insecurity on his eastern border by the 
recruitment of an equally disruptive client, the Ghassanid tribe. That 
Justinian made Harith supreme phylarch is evidence that the tribe, 
or at least part of it, had a close connection with the Roman 
administration before this date. The tightening of this relationship 
also brought Romano-Persian aggression further to the fore. 
20 Theoph. p. 336 and Niceph. 20. 
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Mundhir was immediately involved in campaigning. Procopius twice 
accuses him of cowardice. In 531 Harith is alleged to have deserted 
his post at the battle of Callinicum, and in 541 during the campaign 
in Armenia. However Shahid has found fault with Procopius' 
allegations: 
21 Harith had already shown his loyalty by helping to 
quell the Samaritan revolt of 529,22 and at the battle of Callinicum 
Malalas says that it was the Phrygians that began the flight. 
23 The 
Endless Peace, which was agreed upon in 532, only lasted until 539. 
It was broken by a dipute over the Strata territory between the 
Ghassanids and the Lakhmids. 
24 The Roman envoy, Sumnus, offered 
Mundhir terms that were incompatible with his relationship with the 
Persian court, and which led to a renewal of full-scale hostilities, 
culminating in the fall of Antioch in 540. The Romans obtained peace 
only through the payment of 500 pounds of gold to the Persians 
which was to provide for the garrisoning of another unstable border, 
the passes on the Caucasus. 25 An interim arrangement was made in 
545. Chosroes I received 500 pounds of gold from Edessa and 400 
pounds of gold per year from the Roman government for the upkeep 
of the Caucasus garrisons. The reign continued to be unstable. In 
554 Mundhir was killed by Harith, and although the Romans and the 
Persians signed a five year truce at Dara in 556, the first major 
attempt to stabilise the area permanently, and to define the 
relationships in and around it, was made in the Fifty Year Treaty of 
561. This was the first Romano-Persian treaty to specifically include 
their client kings and the wider problems they were capable of 
21 Shahid, 'Procopius and Arethas', p. 39-67. 
22 Malalas, p. 445-447. 
23 Malalas, p. 464. 
24 Procopius, Wars ii. I. 1-11, and Th. Sim. viii. I 1-8. 
25 Procopius, Wars ii. I. 5-14. 
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embroiling the states in. From Menander we learn that "the Saracen 
allies of each state should abide (they also) by the treaty, and that 
neither those of the Persians should arm themselves against the 
Romans, nor those of the Romans against the Persians". 
26 
The treaty was broken in 572 by Justin II, who was as keen 
to demonstrate Roman might in the East as he was in the West. 2 7 
His attitude was hardened further by a revolt against Persian rule in 
Persarmenia and the offer of an alliance from the Turkish Chagan. 2 8 
His aggressive attitude saw the beginnings of a process by which the 
recently established relationship between the Romans and their Arab 
client kings was slowly dissolved. However, Justin II had misjudged 
the value of his relationship with the Ghassanids. He refused to 
continue the payments to them because Justinian had made the 
payments of his own free will and so they had ended on his death. 2 9 
By way of response, Mundhir allowed the Persians safe passage 
through his territory to attack the Romans, and he himself withdrew 
from the war (573). 30 John of Ephesus, unlike Procopius, is not 
biased against the Ghassanids. Indeed, he attempted to absolve 
Mundhir and put the blame on Justin II. Mundhir is portrayed as a 
Christian conciliator in the doctrinal dispute between Paul and 
Jacob. 31 Justin II was reconciled with Mundhir 575. The Romano- 
Ghassanid relationship continued until 581 when Maurice led an 
26 Men. Prot. frg. 6.1. 
27 Men. Prot. frg. 12.5. See above Chapter 1. 
28 Men. Prot. frg. 13.5. 
29 John of Ephesus vi. 3-4. 
30 John of Ephesus vi. 4. 
31 John of Ephesus iv. 21 and iv. 39. 
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expedition with Mundhir against the Persians. Here a second 
breakdown of relations occurred as Mundhir was made the scapegoat 
for a Roman failure. 32 The bridge over the Tigris at Ctesiphon was 
down and Maurice was forced to retreat, whilst the Persians raided 
as far as Callinicum on the Euphrates. Mundhir was arrested even 
though he had attacked the Lakhmids. 33 Whitby sees the reason for 
the failure of Maurice's expedition not in the terms of Mundhir's 
actions but as a result of Maurice pursuing an overreaching strategy 
that led to the empire being left vulnerable in Upper 
Mesopotamia. 34 The arrest and exile of Mundhir to Sicily meant the 
breakdown of the Ghassanid federation. The fifteen tribes that had 
constituted it either' deserted to the Persians or followed Numan, the 
son of Mundhir, in an anti-Roman revolt. However, Numan was 
arrested in due course, and there were Saracens in the Roman army 
at Solachon in 586, which reveals that some allies remained loyal. 
Heraclius' victories over the Persians did not restore the situation of 
Maurice's reign. There was no longer a balance of power to be 
maintained between two Arab tribes, Roman relations with the 
Arabs no longer revolved around the Ghassanid/Lakhmid conflict. 
Instead the threat to his authority came from the south, from Arabia 
and tribes with which the Empire had had only occasional contact 
and the sources for Heraclius' reign reflect this new state of affairs. 
Before the Arab campaigns of 634 Heraclius had been given 
no reason to view the Arabs in Arabia as a threat to his empire. He 
may well have been keen to reestablish relations with the 
32 John of Ephesus A. 16 
33 John of Ephesus A. 18. 
34 Whitby, Maurice p. 274. 
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Ghassanids as part of his attempt to restore Roman authority in the 
provinces that had been under- Persian rule for over a decade. 
Although he may have been paying the rogae to the tribes on his 
southern border earlier in his reign, as Theophanes implies, by 634 
he would have had enough confidence in his new military strength 
and diplomatic arrangements to be able to redirect these payments, 
as a concentrated sum, to the Ghassanids. This policy would have 
benefitted both parties. The Ghassanids could once more be used by 
a Roman emperor as a police force on the eastern margins of the 
empire. This would allow Heraclius to reassert his authority in 
regions that were either directly or indirectly controlled by the 
Ghassanids. Receiving a regular payment from the Romans would 
give the Ghassanids status, and the opportunity to influence other 
tribes by distributing Roman bounty, which in turn would allow 
them to be more effective in their their role as preservers of the 
newly regained Roman territories. If the arrangement suited both 
parties it was not in the interests of the Arab tribes that were 
directly excluded from the Roman client system. Heraclius would 
have presumed that these tribes would be brought under the sway 
of the newly restored Ghassanid influence, and so he would have no 
reason to pay them any rogae. Whether or not the southern tribes 
cited by Theophanes as having become disaffected by the new 
arrangements had been receiving the rogae at the start of the 
seventh-century, they would not have been after c. 629, and so they 
would have had every opportunity and motivation to invite their 
more southerly neighbours northwards to ravage the empire that 
had alienated them. This is not to say that the Arabs of Arabia 
would not have moved north without the incitement which 
Theophanes describes. Mohammed himself was familiar with 
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Palestine and, moreover, the military success of the Arabs 
throughout the reign of Heraclius suggests that the Arabs who may 
have formerly received stipends for the protection of the southern 
frontier would have been no match for the invaders. Theophanes 
and Nicephorus were looking for a reason to explain why the Arabs 
invaded at the particular time that they did, and why they were so 
successful when they did so. Both writers see the reason from the 
Roman point of view and ignore any factors that' may have motivated 
the Arabs to move north. These motivational factors have been 
discussed by various modern scholars, but for the purpose of an 
investigation into the image of a Roman emperor it is sufficient to 
examine only those factors that are advanced by the writers 
describing his actions. The social, economic and political climates of 
the newly formed Muslim state did not concern Heraclius before 634 
and will not detain us here. We can afford to relegate a synopsis of 
the modern views, which rely on a speech of Abu Bakr from 
Baladhuri, to a footnote. 35 
35 The speech of Abu Bakr in Baladhuri (tr. Hitti p. 165), on the eve 
of their campaign, points toward Arab greed. Abu Bakr talks of "the 
obtainable booty from the Greeks" and so "people actuated by greed 
as well as those actuated by the hope of divine remuneration 
hastened to Abu Bakr from all quarters". However, this speech also 
introduces other motivational factors that have been stressed by 
both Becker and Donner. Becker saw greed as an important 
motivator (C. M. H. II. xi. ). "Hunger and avarice, not religion, are the 
compelling forces, but religion supplies the essential unity and 
central power". Donner's is a more sophisticated analysis (Islamic 
Conquests). Whilst he acknowledges the importance of plunder and 
religious fanaticism, he looks for a factor to explain the grand nature 
of the enterprise. For Donner religion and greed were personal 
motivations that were channelled by the Arab elite to energise a 
powerful force for their own ends. He believes that the new political 
hierarchy, which Mohammed's teachings and political career had 
established, saw their continued preeminence as dependent upon a 
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The development of the Arabs in Arabia into, a nation state 
happened in a relatively short period of time. On the surface the 
"Muslim" raids of 632 were no different from the Arab raids that the 
empire had been suffering for centuries, so that Heraclius cannot be 
held responsible for not realising that by 632 political development 
in Arabia had shifted the emphasis of the Arab raids. It is unlikely 
that Heraclius knew of the teachings and political machinations of 
Mohammed, and there is only anecdotal evidence from later writers 
to suggest the opposite. The Arab historian, al-Asakir, writes about a 
gift from Heraclius being robbed on route to Medina (I. 417-420), 
and that Heraclius met Arab merchants to inform himself of events 
in Arabia (I. 471-472), whilst Bar Hebraeus has a story concerning 
Heraclius' perception of the entire situation. Heraclius, having 
listened to the opinions of bishops and priests concerning the nature 
of the Muslim people, described them as "an early cloudy dawn in 
which there is no absolute darkness and yet it lacketh the light 
which is perfect and clear". 36 That is to say that they are remote 
from darkness as they worship only one God and are not idolators, 
and yet as they are not Christians they do not have perfect light. 
None of these stories are to be found in any of the Greek sources; 
these are not interested in the Arabs, let alone worried about their 
ambitions until 634. Whether or not Heraclius knew of Mohammed's 
aspirations he would have seen little danger to his empire which was 
vindication of their new regime, that is Arab success. The southern 
borderlands of the Roman empire were a convenient and familiar 
sphere in which to indulge this quest for plunder and its political 
reward, power. As Donner writes, Islam gave the Arabs a political 
structure and its justification was conquest. 
36 Bar Hebraeus, X. 96 (Wallis-Budge, p. 90). 
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newly restored to its former boundaries after the defeat of its old 
Persian adversary. 
That Heraclius was ignorant of such developments is not 
surprising, Hitti has said that only a "lunatic" in the first third of the 
seventh century would have predicted the speed and scope of the 
Arab conquests. 37 In 634 Heraclius was recently returned from a 
series of campaigns that had brought about the decisive defeat of the 
Persian empire, which not ten years earlier had threatened to absorb 
his throne. The repercussions of the Avar defeat at the siege of 
Constantinople had reduced their threat, whilst an Arab raid into 
Roman territory had been defeated at Mu'ta, so that all his borders 
seemed secure. Heraclius could therfore concentrate on problems, 
the most pressing of which was the reunification of the Churches. A 
settlement of this problem would allow him to establish order in the 
newly regained provinces. In such a secure position Heraclius cannot 
be accused of being short-sighted in his dealings with the Arabs. The 
problem for Heraclius was that he was working on the basis of 
criteria that were not permanent. Had he been reigning thirty years 
earlier there would have been little to criticise in his approach to 
government, following his victories over his external enemies. Now, 
however, times had changed, because Mohammed and his successors 
were changing them. Yet there was no point where Heraclius could 
have identified a significant change in the status quo which would 
have allowed him to react accordingly. We should not ask why 
Heraclius did not realise that the 632 incursion was anything more 
than the irritation that such events normally were, but instead we 
must concentrate on how effective his response was once it became 
37 Hitti, A History of the Arabs p. 142. 
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apparent that there was a new threat to his empire. Criticism of 
Heraclius cannot begin with the early aims and objectives of the 
Muslims, for that was when the nascent nature of the problem was 
only evolving slowly. We must start at the point when the empire 
realised that it had a problem. 
In order to defend Syria and Palestine Heraclius had to do 
two things. He had to maintain the defence of the fortified cities and 
towns in order to control the surrounding countryside, and he must 
put an army in the field to limit the destruction of the life-blood of 
these centres, the agricultural land. 38 Heraclius' tactics were exactly 
that. It is difficult to determine the manpower available to each side, 
and both Greek and Arab sources are prone to exaggerate the 
strength in numbers of the opposition. Theophanes says that there 
were two Roman contingents each of 40,000 men at the Yarmuk. 39 
Kaegi has estimated that Heraclius had 20-30,000 men available to 
fight in the field, the rest of the empire's army being on garrison 
duty. 40 He also paints a gloomy picture of the size of the garrisons 
in the east. Caesarea was the largest garrison in the provinces of 
Palestine I, II, III and Arabia, but contained 200-300 men with little 
experience of fighting in open combat. It was not the size of its 
garrison that enabled Caesarea to hold out for so long, but the fact 
that it could be supplied by sea (c. 635-640). Size was not the only 
problem that the garrisons faced. It was difficult for them to 
communicate with one another and so coordinated action was 
hampered. Heraclius may have initially have believed that the 
38 Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 24-25. 
39 Theoph. p. 337-338. 
40 Kaegi, Invasions p. 40-41. 
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superior techniques and better discipline of the Romans, and their 
possession of fortifications would allow a smaller force to triumph. 
So we must examine Heraclius' role before we turn to the effects the 
conquest had on the population that experienced them. 
Heraclius was much less active personally against the Arabs 
than he had been against the Persians. At no time do we hear of him 
engaging in personal combat as he did in the decisive battle against 
Rhazates. 41 Similarly, there was no opportunity to celebrate 
achievements for a poet like George of Pisidia. By now Heraclius was 
an old man, worn out by constant campaigning and politicing, with 
his great accomplishments in the past. He was again about to see 
whole provinces fall from his grasp, just as he had been forced to in 
the first decade of his reign. Then literature had centred upon his 
heroism in regaining those territories, but Heraclius was not to be 
able to repeat the same trick for his court poets. He was still 
involved in the defence of his empire, though not in the overtly 
personal role of the 620's: in the late 630's he moved from Emesa to 
Damascus and thence to Antioch before being forced across the 
Taurus by one defeat too many. And yet if his personal involvement 
was limited his personal culpability in the sources does not seem to 
have been. Nicephorus has a confused account (20) that begins with 
banishment of Heraclius' brother, Theodore, back to Constantinople 
for suggesting that Martina's presence is the reason for the Roman's 
lack of success. Nicephorus (like Theophanes) blames the ending of 
the rogia for the Arab invasions and mentions the death of a 
Sergius. He then goes on to provide a garbled version of the battle of 
41 Theoph. p. 318 and Niceph. 14. 
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Gabitha, where he says Heraclius' commander, Theodore, was 
rebellious and so attacked the Arabs contrary to the emperor's 
orders. Nicephorus provides no further information about the fall of 
Palestine and Syria, instead moving on to the occupation of Egypt 
(23). In Nicephorus Heraclius is presented as a delegator of military 
commanders, though the specific inclusion of Theodore's disparaging 
remarks about Martina shows that he is not favourable to Heraclius 
at this juncture; the emperor's marital situation dooms to failure his 
military arrangements and renders less relevant to Nicephorus 
Heraclius' handling of the Arab threat, which is consequently neither 
recorded in detail nor assessed. As far as Nicephorus is concerned 
the non-payment of rogae may have sparked off the invasions, 
and the insubordination of the general Theodore may have made 
defeat more rapid, but the result was never in doubt because of 
Heraclius' marriage to Martina. 
Theophanes has a far more detailed account than 
Nicephorus, in which Heraclius does not escape criticism. Though the 
narration of Roman defeats by "the desolate Amalek" is erroneously 
blamed upon Constans II and his religious policy (p. 332), there are 
certain parallels between the defeats of Heraclius and Chosroes II. 
Their main military role is the appointment of commanders, 42 and 
after failure they both retreat in despair, from Syria in Heraclius' 
case or to Dastagerd in Chosroes'. 43 The Roman defeat at the 
Yarmuk is sealed because a southerly wind blows dust in their faces 
at the crucial moment, as similar phenomenon that precipitated 
Persian defeats when Heraclius was a hero (p. 305). In Egypt too, 
42 Theoph. p. 317,320 and 336-337. 
43 Theoph. p. 323 and 337. 
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Heraclius is seen as a meddler, he replaces Cyrus with Manuel (p. 
338) and then reappoints Cyrus, and his role is repeated when he 
replaces John with Ptolemy as commander at Edessa because John 
had tried to buy peace from lad (p. 340). This is a similar depiction 
to that of Chosroes, who is portrayed as a meddler when he tries to 
dismiss Shahbaraz. 44 However, it is at the fall of Jerusalem that 
Theophanes' passive criticism becomes active. Here the champion of 
Chalcedonian beliefs against Heraclius' new Ecthesis, Sophronius the 
Patriarch, is held up as a pious hero of the empire, a role that 
Heraclius had filled against the Persians, but has now patently failed 
to maintain (p. 339). 
Theophanes provides a detailed description of Mohammed's 
life and teaching, which is even more extensive in Cedrenus, who 
otherwise followed Theophanes for most events in the East. This is a 
biased and derogatory view of the man and his new religion, one that 
stresses its supposed wantonness and sinfulness. 45 Although aware 
of its novelty, Theophanes does cite this as an excuse for Heraclius' 
lack of an early response to the crisis; he says nothing about the 
effect of the new religion or the unexpected nature of the invasions. 
The Syriac writers are even more hostile to Heraclius in 
their description of events. 46 Whilst they are quite happy to 
provide lengthy detail on the ferocity of the Arabs this is in no way 
an excuse for Heraclius' failure. They may not have liked him as 
emperor, but he was still expected to save the empire. Thus it was 
44 Theoph. p. 323-324. 
45 Theoph. p. 333-334. 
46 Moorhead, 'Monophysite Response', p. 579-591. 
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possible to be both anti-Heraclius and anti-Arab. As late as 636, 
when the Roman position was desperate, 1234 is scathing about 
Roman military attitudes: it provides the story of Theodore, the 
brother of Heraclius, advancing against the Arabs full of arrogance 
despite the recent background of the crushing defeat for the Romans 
at Dathin. This piece of narrative also brings another factor into the 
historiographical discussion. 47 1234 was a Monophysite chronicle 
and believed that Heraclius persecuted those of that persuasion. As 
proof, it has Theodore, while preparing for battle, promise a stylite 
that he will persecute the followers of Severus of Antioch. Thus the 
Roman chain of command is depicted in an impious light before its 
first significant defeat: persecution of Christians is expected to follow 
a Roman victory. 1234 is not so blinkered as to ascribe the Roman 
defeat solely to arrogance and the "wrong" Christian doctrine. In an 
earlier report it says that Arabs were a better and stronger army (p. 
241-242, the defeat of Sergius of Caesarea). However, after the 
Yarmuk there is personal vilification of the emperor. 1234 has him 
leave Syria with the words " Remain in peace Syria", so that the 
energetic campaigner of the 620's has become lethargic and 
withdrawn. 1234 says that Heraclius wrote to Mesopotamia, 
Armenia and Egypt with instructions that his citizens should stop 
raiding and thus provoking the Arabs. "Not to fight against the 
Arabs nor to stand against the decree of the Lord. He said that each 
should guard his post whether city or region until the matter 
surpassed his strength". 48 There was no noble exit. Although the 
chronicle preserves an account of Arabs murdering monks (p. 245), 
1234 also comments upon the ravaging of the retreating Greek 
47 1234 p. 243 -244. 
48 1234 p. 251. 
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army. "After that he raised the rod in his hand and gave his army 
leave to. ravage indiscriminately, as if Syria was already enemy 
territory". 49 We are left in no doubt as to where blame must be 
apportioned: failure due to the doctrine of the Chalcedonians which is 
epitomised by the emperor, whose mistaken beliefs are the reason 
for the decimated state of his empire. 
1234's accusation that Heraclius authorised widespread 
ravaging in retreat is exploited by Kaegi to attribute to Heraclius a 
scorched earth policy. 50 He believes that Heraclius did not flee as 
1234 narrates, but instead had been withdrawing north slowly ever 
since the Romans were defeated Ajnadayn, when he moved to 
Antioch from Emesa. However, Kaegi's theory on Heraclius' strategic 
decision-making is based on a tenuous link with the emperor's as yet 
unproven Armenian ancestry. 51 Kaegi twice refers to Heraclius' 
Armenian background. He says that Heraclius could rely for recruits 
on his Armenian "kinsfolk", and that he cut the roads leading north 
after the Yarmuk simply in order to "protect his homeland". 52 Kaegi 
misses the point here, for he dismisses a simple explanation for 
Heraclius' steady retreat north in search for a strategy that will 
continue his contrived theme of Heraclius' Armenian roots. Kaegi 
devotes a lot of space to the Roman objective of holding on to the 
province of Upper Mesopotamia, but the reasons that he gives for the 
Romans doing this could have applied to Heraclius' overall strategy. 
Kaegi sees the retention of Upper Mesopotamia as a diversion for the 
49 1234 p. 251. 
50 Kaegi, Invasions, p. 237-238. 
51 See Mango, 'Deux Etudes', p. 114 where he argues that Upper 
Mesopotamia may have been Heraclius' bithplace. 
52 Kaegi, Invasions p. 52 and p. 187. 
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Arabs who are moving north, as a preservation of an advanced 
Roman position and a means of protecting the recruiting grounds of 
Armenia and Upper Mesopotamia itself. 53 Whilst one can accept the 
point that Heraclius knew how strategically important Upper 
Mesopotamia was to his empire, because he was the first emperor 
since Julian to have visited the area (though Maurice had been there 
before ascending the throne), this should lead to a broader 
perspective on Heraclius' defensive strategy: he held Upper 
Mesopotamia because he was attempting to hold a line north of 
Antioch which would be difficult for the Arabs to penetrate, a line 
which would prevent them from ravaging Anatolia and provide the 
Romans with a base to launch campaigns to recover their possessions 
further south. 
The only balanced presentation of Heraclius by an eastern 
source is contained in the Nestorian Chronicle of Seert. It does have 
an unsympathetic picture of a beaten man, "plunged into despair" 
and records that "the majority of the inhabitants of the region took 
refuge in the interior of the Greek empire leaving their homes". 54 
However, the explanation for the defeats is not merely Heraclius' 
failings, since there is also a tone of divine intervention. The 
Chronicle has a report of Heraclius asking why God had given the 
empire which had belonged to the Romans for a thousand years, to a 
people who came from the desert and lived a nomadic life. The 
explanation for change was known only to God, while Heraclius, like 
any mortal, has to cope as well as he may with the changing fortunes 
53 Kaegi, Invasions p. 157-159 and refs. to Theoph. p. 337-338, 
Tabari 2347,2394 and Baladhuri 135,164,183-5. 
54 Seert CVI. 
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that afflict humanity. 
The histories of Baladhuri and Tabari focus upon different 
aspects of the conquests, but are no less scathing in their appraisals 
of Heraclius. Baladhuri is keen to stress the humaneness of the 
Arabs. At Damascus they impose a poll tax of one dinar and one 
jarib of wheat per adult in return for "lives, property and children", 
which must be contrasted with Michael the Syrian's assertion that 
the population of Dara was massacred for resistance, 55 though it is 
quite possible that different places were treated in different ways. 
When news of Adjnadayn came to Heraclius, "his heart was filled 
with cowardice and he was confounded. Consequently he took flight 
to Antioch from Emesa". However, Baladhuri reports that Heraclius 
was still actively reinforcing his troops to continue the struggle at 
Fihl (Clip. 5) and Marj as Suffar (Chp. 7). Despite this energy 
Heraclius was not popular with the local people, and in Tabari he 
seems to be equally unpopular with the army, since Roman soldiers 
are portrayed as being chained together in groups of ten in order to 
stop them fleeing. 56 The Roman state is seen by Baladhuri as a 
legitimate enemy and Heraclius is cast in the role of villain in order 
to justify this. But these are not traces of Monophysite propaganda 
in his work, since his real emphasis is on the sweeping nature of the 
Muslim conquests rather than Roman internal politics. 
The belief that the Arab invasions were a sign from God is to 
be found in all the sources, and is used to explain at least their 
coming if not also their success. This explanation eschews any 
55 Michael the Syrian, XI. vii (Chabot, p. 426). 
56 Tabari, Tarik i. 2089. 
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analysis of the economic problems of the empire, its exhausted 
military state or the fanatical zeal of its opponents. It is a more 
simple and yet deep-rooted explanation that has apocalyptic 
overtones. It is to be found in both Chalcedonian and Monophysite 
sources: Theophanes and Michael the Syrian both have a description 
of a comet in the shape of a sword which was visible in the heavens 
for thirty days before the coming of the Arabs, a clear divine portent 
of the disaster to come. 57 
This apocalyptic mood dominates the literature of the time. 
The contemporary Patriarch of Jerusalem, Sophronius, best embodies 
this feeling of a need for repentance and reconciliation with God in 
order to recover the lost territories. 58 In 634 he was optimistic, 
believing that imperial troops would quickly repulse the foolish 
arrogance of the Arabs and humble them once more, whilst 
bemoaning the fact that Christians in Jerusalem would be unable to 
visit Bethlehem that year because of the Arab presence. However, 
by 637 he seems in awe of the Arabs' success which by now was 
decisive, and describes their effect upon Syria and Palestine, without 
hope of reprieve, as a punishment inflicted because of the moral 
decline of their Christian inhabitants. A source attributed to 
Methodius, bishop of Patara, depicts the success of the Arabs as 
being only temporary as the end of the world will shortly follow 
it. 59 Like Sophronius he ascribes the success of the Arabs, not to 
God's favour, but to the sinfulness of the Christians. According to the 
57 Theoph. p. 336 and Michael the Syrian XI. iii (Chabot p. 414). 
58 On the sermons of Sophronius see, Constantelos, 'Moslem 
Conquests', p. 328-330. 
59 Constantelos, 'Moslem Conquests', p. 330-332. 
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Pseudo-Methodius God has allowed all this to happen in order to 
separate true Christians from the imposters. This may well be a 
comment on the morality of the empire as a whole rather than an 
attack on the person of the emperor, but St. Anastasius Sinaites, in a 
sermon in the second half of the seventh cent ury, and a Greek text of 
the Life of Theodore of Edessa (eleventh century) attribute the 
invasions to the anti-Monophysite policies of Constans II. 60 
- The Chronicle of 1234 also has a belief in the power of 
divine intervention. "However, God who exacts his due and who 
determines sovereignty among people on the earth, will give power 
to whom he chooses. He may even appoint the dregs of mankind to 
be their rulers. When he saw that the measure of Roman sins was 
overflowing and that they were committing every sort of crime 
against our people and our churches, bringing our confession to the 
verge of extinction, he stirred up the sons of Ishmael and enticed 
them hither from their southern land". 61 Because of these sins 
Divine Providence deserted the army of Theodore, but even then the 
army continued to commit unspeakable crimes. This meant that God 
deserted the imperial cause with the result that the city of Damascus 
is said to have welcomed the Arabs "joyfully" after the Yarmuk (p. 
251), though it is hard to see how much the city could have done to 
resist occupation when Heraclius' strongest army, its only hope of 
salvation, had just been slaughtered. The Arabs are in no way seen 
as perfect saviours, but they are nonetheless seen as saviours. 
60 Constantelos, 'Moslem Conquests' p. 333 from Anastasius of Sinai, 
Sermo No. III MPG 89,1156C and from B. G. Vasilievskji's 
publication of a Life of Theodore of Edessa in Pravoslavnji 
palestinskji Sbornik 11 seu IV. 2 (1886) p. 264-265. 
61 1234 p. 237. 
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Conrad had argued that this type of reaction has been written into 
accounts of the Arab conquests in order to preserve rights of towns 
that were captured, 62 whereas the inhabitants of Syria and 
Palestine had a long tradition of employing passive resistance agaist 
invaders: thus Procopius tells of cities locking their gates against the 
Persians in the 540's, and then negotiating the terms of their 
surrender. 63 Indeed, it is difficult to see what else the indigenous 
population could have done in a military context. They were not in a 
position to form a local militia, for under a law of Justinian (Nov. 95) 
private citizens had been banned from owning weapons, and their 
experience of warfare in the seventh century would have 
accustomed them to the necessity and practicalities of coming to 
terms with invading armies. 
The morale of the local poulation can be variously 
interpreted in as an element in Heraclius' failure to hold on to Syria 
and Palestine. Monophysite writers are willing to blame the emperor 
simply because he followed a different Christain creed. However, the 
two most disaffected religious communities, the Samaritans and the 
Jews, were also the smallest. As for the question of the 
Monophysites refusing to aid Heraclius, it is difficult to see how local 
citizens of any religious creed could have taken part in the defence of 
their homeland when they were barred from owning weapons and 
the imperial army was garrisoning their town for them: their main 
contribution would be to assist soldiers defend the walls during a 
siege, but they were less likely to resist when no soldiers were 
present. 64 The placement of military commanders in towns by 
62 Conrad, 'Theophanes', p. 26-27. 
63 Procopius, Wars ii. v. 12-ii. vi. 25, ii. vii. 3-9 and ii. xi. 14-ii. xii. 2. 
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Heraclius has led Kaegi to postulate that this was the beginning of a 
new administrative system. He believes that Heraclius' motivation 
for this was his desire to prevent towns from capitulating to the 
Arabs, and in so doing so lose the empire not only a defensive 
position but also tax revenue. 65 However, it is possible to diffuse 
Kaegi's theory without bringing in the controversial subject of the 
themes. The placement of military commanders in cities was not a 
new phenomenon in the 630's. 66 Indeed, Kaegi constructs his 
theory that Heraclius came from Armenia on the basis that 
Theophylact says Heraclius the Elder went back to his city 
(Theodosiopolis) to winter. 67 If there were few purpose-built 
military camps, and if the towns of the region were important 
strategic positions in the Roman defensive policy, then it is not 
surprising that the military commanders were to be found in the 
towns. 
The problem of whether the Monophysites betrayed 
Heraclius is an ambiguous one for all their sources are hostile 
towards him. We will discuss their role in the defence of Egypt 
below, but here it is sufficient to reiterate Conrad's point that 
surrender was often a legal device, asserted for tax reasons after the 
64 Procopius, Wars ii. v. where Sura on the Euphrates capitulated 
to Chosroes as soon as its military commander was killed. 
65 Kaegi, Invasions p. 279-285. For an examination of Shahid's 
argument that this was the beginning of the theme system is more 
relevant to the general treatment of Heraclius and the themes which 
is discussed in the next chapter. 
66 Malalas p. 441-442 concerning the fighting in 528 when Senators 
were sent out to protect eastern cities. Isaac, Limits of Empire p. 
252-255 on the garrisoning of armies in eastern cities. 
67 Th. Sim. I. 1 
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conquest, not necessarily a tactic in the 630's. Furthermore, many 
Monophysite Arabs fought in Heraclius' armies during the campaigns. 
Kaegi estimates that there were two to five times as many Arabs as 
other provincials in the ranks. 68 Evagrius had noted that it was 
good military policy to use Arabs against other Arabs. 69 At Mu'ta 
the tribes of Bali, Judham, Lakhm, Bahra B. Kalb and B. al-Qayn 
fought alongside the Romans. 70 Furthermore, there is no sign in 
cowardice in Roman ranks at the Yarmuk. Though Tabari alleges that 
the Roman infantry were chained together, Kaegi points out that this 
was common Roman practice, and is to be found in the 
Strategicon. 71 Indeed, Baladhuri and Tabari comment upon the 
bloodiness of the battle that was by no means a foregone conclusion, 
as testament to the determination of the Christian opposition. 72 The 
only note of treasonable behaviour towards Heraclius at this battle 
concerns the proclamation of Vaanes as emperor. This may be a pro- 
Heraclius tradition, an apology that the decisive defeat of his reign 
cannot be blamed on him because his soldiers were far from 
following his instructions. 73 Even after his defeat and the loss of 
Upper Mesopotamia there were still Arab tribes, such Iyad b. Nazir 
tribe, who were eager to remain under his rule. 74 
Certainly it is not possible to overlook the attitude of the 
local population when attempting to determine why Heraclius lost his 
68 Kaegi, Invasions p. 43. 
69 Evagrius v. 20. 
70 Tabari i. 1611-12. 
71 Tabari i. 2089. Strategicon 12.7, Kaegi, Invasions p. 127. 
72 Baladhuri 135 and Tabari i. 2097-2099. 
73 Theoph. p. 338 and for a similar reason for a Roman defeat 
earlier in the reign see Theoph. p. 313-314. 
74 Tabari i. 2507. 
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eastern provinces to the Arabs. Though it has been necessary to 
discuss their attitude in military and religious terms, there is one 
other local reason to add to this indigenous explanation for the 
defeats. Kennedy has called for a drastic altering of our perception 
of the economy of the region by the 630's. 75 He examines Syria and 
Palrstine in the preceding century to see if the sources and 
archaeology might provide any other reasons for Heraclius' defeats, 
and concluded that the sources paint a picture of a depressed 
economy at this time. According to Baladhuri the ship-building 
industry was located only in Egypt and many urban centres had to 
be repopulated and rebuilt.? 6 Kennedy ties this decline in 
prosperity with the outbreak of plague in 540, the point to which he 
ascribes "the transition from antique to Medieval Syria". 77 
Kaegi sees the loss of the eastern provinces in a purely 
military context. For him Heraclius' effort was a "strategic failure", 
and his retreat only prolonged the fighting and surrendered more 
resources to the Arabs. 78 This opinion is blinkered by the narrative 
that the sources provide. They are chronicling the invasions, so it is 
not surprising that the set-piece battles in those campaigns loom 
large. Neither do any of the sources say that Heraclius lost his 
eastern provinces because he lost three battles. When any blame is 
apportioned to the emperor it is in the form of vilifying him for his 
religious creed, not for his abilities as a general. It seems that the 
75 Kennedy, 'Last Century', p. 141-183. 
76 Kennedy, 'Last Century', p. 148. 
77 Kennedy, 'Last Century', p. 182 but see Durlait, 'La Peste', p. 107- 
119 for the argument that the role of the plague has been 
overplayed. 
78 Kaegi, Invasions p. 237. 
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triumph of Heraclius just half a decade earlier is forgotten by Kaegi 
and the sources alike. Heraclius retreated over the Taurus 
mountains never expecting a Roman emperor to have to wait 
centuries to make the return journey. He was falling back on his 
next most defensible position, and in doing so was preparing for a 
long contest, not a quick capitulation. That retreat may have lost him 
Syria and Palestine, but it avoided another major defeat which could 
have cost him Anatolia as well. When we discussed Heraclius' 
relationship with the Ghassanids it was clear that in the early 630's 
he was attempting to reestablish Roman authority that had been 
missing from those regions for over a decade. He must have been 
aware that his empire was exhausted, and his policy was to avoid the 
danger that Peter the Patrician had predicted almost a century 
earlier: a Romano-Persian conflict that left the two sides so weak that 
they were both taken advantage of by another nation. 79 The Arabs 
had seized territory from which Shahbaraz had only withdrawn his 
Persians in 629/630. 
The Arab invasion of Egypt is covered by all the sources that 
we have used earlier and involves the same issues of Heraclius' 
personal responsibility for the loss of the province and how he is 
depicted in these sources. 8 ° There is one notable addition to the 
sources, the contemporary account of John of Nikiu, a Coptic bishop, 
which allows us to resolve a controversy on which Hitti pronounced: 
"The native Copts of Egypt were instructed from the very beginning 
by their bishop of Alexandria to offer no resistance to the 
79 Men Prot. frg. 6.1 
80 Butler, Conquest Chp. 13-18. 
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invaders-in view of the religious persecution to which they as 
Monophysites had been subjected". 81 Hitti based his statement on a 
text later than the seventh century John of Nikiu, namely that of Ibn 
al-Hakam (d. 871). The evidence of John of Nikiu can be adduced to 
contradict the proposed Greek/Coptic division in attitudes to the 
Arab invasions. John sees the conquest as a calamity not a 
deliverance. He, like Sophronius believes that it was a judgement by 
God on the empire but he blames Heraclius for persecuting the Coptic 
Church through the figurehead of Cyrus the Patriarch of Alexandria. 
His view of the Arabs is the conventional Greek one, " they put to the 
sword all that surrendered, and they spared none whether old men, 
babes, or women". 82 Many Copts fled the invasions (CXIV. 1) and 
others apostasised and "embraced the faith of beasts". Antinoe may 
have cooperated with the invaders because of hostility towards 
Heraclius and Cyrus (CXV. 9), but Alexandria fell at the death of 
Heraclius, and many fled rather than become Arab subjects (CXIII. 
6). The Copts were praying for deliverance from "the enemies of the 
Cross who plundered the country and took captives in abundance". 
They did not see the Arab invasion as a relief rather it was a yoke 
"heavier than the yoke which had been laid on Israel by the 
Pharoah", and they wanted God to do "unto them as He did aforetime 
unto Pharoah" (CXX). Heraclius may have not got his religious policy 
right in John's eyes, but it was still imperial policy that the 
population of Egypt wanted, all be it one which was sympathetic to 
their doctrinal beliefs. 
If modern historians are interested in the Coptic/ 
81 Hitti, History p. 165. 
82 John of Nikiu CXI. 5-10. Compare this list with that of Baladhuri 
for those spared by the Arabs upon capturing Damascus. 
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Chalcedonian divide and the question of local disloyalty, 83 ancient 
writers were more concerned with the machinations that brought 
about the end of Roman rule. 1234 has the story of Cyrus being 
replaced by Manuel because Cyrus was prepared to treat for peace to 
the tune of 2,000,000 dinars a year. 84 Even at this late stage, with 
most of Egypt lost to the Arabs Heraclius was too aggressive. Manuel 
typifies this at a meeting with Amr "I am not Cyrus who used to give 
you gold. He did not wear armour, but a wollen tunic. But I, as you 
can see, am armed". This type of approach was too bellicose unless 
Heraclius had imminent plans for the reconquest of his former 
provinces. Indeed, it was soon to be replaced by an attempt at 
appeasement, Manuel was withdrawn and the more flexible Cyrus 
reinstated, but to no avail. The fall of Alexandria may have been 
hastened by the confusion following the death of Heraclius but it was 
not any the more surprising. Heraclius had not even attempted to 
increase his chances of holding on to Egypt. He did not appoint one 
military commander as soon as he was aware of the threat to the 
province. 85 Had Heraclius done this he would have succeed in 
coordinating a defence force who might have acted together instead 
of bodies of troops haphazard, localised and confused. Heraclius can 
take far more of the apportionable blame for the loss of Egypt, for by 
then he knew the nature of his opposition and still had the resources 
to combat it. Neither surprise, nor a passive indigenous population, 
83 Especially the Marxist historians, see de St. Croix, Class Struggle 
Chp. 8 for an attempt to prove the unpopularity of the empire and 
the exploitation of its masses. 
84 1234 p. 252. 
85 Presumably this would have been in 636 after the Yarmuk, and 
Heraclius would have known from his own (Nicetas') successful 
attempt to capture Egypt how important it was to organise its 
defensive resources. 
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can be cited in his defence. 
Heraclius' control of events surrounding the Arab invasions 
was never complete. He tried every conventional military tactic 
available and in the case of Syria he stayed on the scene as long as it 
was safe to do so in order to aid the recruitment of reinforcements. 
Perhaps his choice of commanders was not as astute as it might have 
been, but he had led his army from the front against Persia and this 
may have been out of expedience. Heraclius had accomplished all his 
major achievements by personal involvement, and it would be too 
simplistic to say that when his empire needed him he was too old to 
save it. In 616 the-Persians were at the Bosporus yet by 628 he was 
the all conquering hero. However, circumstances combined to put a 
tired emperor of an exhausted state up against a nation with nothing 
to lose, energised by a new religion. There could be only one short- 
term winner. The subsequent Roman failure to contain the Arabs 
should be analysed in the context of developments after 641, for all 
that Heraclius had failed to do was to avoid defeat. He had lost the 
first round, but he better than anyone would have known that he 
had merely taken part in the beginning of the fight and not its whole. 
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Heraclius the Reformer? 
The economy gave the emperor certain responsibilities and 
advantages. Only the emperor had the authority to mint coins which 
provided one vehicle for the circulation of his image around the 
empire, but it was also his duty to provide for the provisioning of the 
capital. The supply of corn to the capital had influenced the image of 
the prominent nobles of the Roman empire even before the 
Principate. I For Heraclius the maintenance of a constant supply to 
Constantinople was crucial in order to avoid a famine which would 
reflect badly upon the image of the emperor as benefactor and 
provider for his people: without a centrally organised supply system 
Constantinople might not have survived long enough to be preserved 
by the Theotokos in the 626 Avar siege. On the other hand, a 
consideration of the image of Heraclius has to take on board the 
suggestion that he was an economic reformer. The two reforms 
ascribed to him are not equally controversial: the reform of the 
coinage is attested in the Chronicon Paschale as well as the 
numismatic evidence, whereas the introduction of the themes as a 
system of military organisation is not so clear cut, and it cannot be 
convincingly attributed to Heraclius' reign. The evidence for their 
introduction in his reign comes from Theophanes but the impetus for 
making Heraclius responsible for their - formation comes from the 
secondary sources, modern historians who have seen the importance 
of the themes to Byzantine society and have used Theophanes' 
evidence as a means to date their genesis. The reign of Heraclius has 
1 Rickman, Corn Supply, for a discussion of the period up to 476. 
Teall, 'The Grain Supply', p. 89-139, discusses the case of 
Constantinople. 
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been credited with equal importance by some modern historians, on 
the grounds that the destruction of cities in his reign signified the 
end of the Roman empire and the beginning of the Byzantine age. 2 
In Heraclius' reign Egypt was still the major source of grain 
for Constantinople. However, in 616 that province was invaded by 
the Persians and Alexandria fell in 619. It was to remain under 
Persian control until 628. In 618 the disruption that this invasion 
must have caused forced Heraclius to rescind the grant of free corn 
that Constantine had made to the people of Constantinople. 3 The 
recipients now had to pay the price of three folles a loaf, the same 
price as they had been asked to pay during the famine of 463.4 
This did nothing to alleviate the shortage and in August the 
distributions were suspended. It is no surprise then that Nicephorus 
relates that after the fall of Egypt the capital suffered plague and 
famine, and that the situation had made Heraclius so despondent that 
he contemplated a return to Africa. 5 This mention of imperial 
despair is the furthest towards criticising Heraclius that Nicephorus 
goes on the subject. Theophanes simply ignores the problem. 
However, the corn supply was to be an ongoing problem for 
Heraclius. In 626 we hear from the Chronicon Paschale that John 
Seismos encountered the wrath of the people for attempting to raise 
the price of a loaf to eight folles; 6 John had also attempted to 
2 Whittow, ' Ruling', p. 20-28. 
3 C. P. p. 711 and on Constantine see, Malalas, p. 322 17-323.2. 
4 C. P. p. 593. 
5 Niceph. 8. 
6 C. P. p. 717. 
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remove the bread ration from the s ch olae, who garrisoned the 
capital, in favour of the newly arrived soldiers, who were there to 
counter the Avar threat. Eriksson has sought to transpose this 
incident to 615,7 a move supported by Haldon, 8 but criticised by 
Whitby on the grounds that there is a plausible increase in price 
from three folles in 618 to eight in 626, when Avar and Persian 
invasions would have seriously disrupted supplies from Europe and 
Asia; thus it is unnecessary to assume that the public rations for the 
scholae had been terminated and, as Whitby points out, they had 
resisted any removal of their privileges before and may well have 
done so again successfully. 9 The Chronicon Paschale, ends the 
account of the disturbances with the summary "And God destroyed 
his plan". 10 To give the final credit for the termination of the 
dispute to the Divine Power was an effective way of attaching the 
blame to John. He implemented a reform that must have been 
discussed (at least through correspondence) with Heraclius. Invoking 
the Divinity put the matter on a higher plane and thus avoided any 
close examination of how much official support John may have 
previously received. The Chronicon Paschale explains the final 
defeat of the Chagan to the intervention of the Theotokos for a 
similar reason. 11 The Emperor may have been absent but the 
Divine order, with which he was associated, still worked in his 
interests. As the departure of the Avars and Slavs, and the Persians 
automatically corrected the situation, the problems of the corn 
supply are not said to have been solved by Heraclius, and yet the 
7 Eriksson, 'Date', p. 17-28. 
8 Haldon, Praetorians, p. 442-443 n. 354. 
9 Whitby, C. P. n. 456. 
10 C. P. p. 715. 
11 C. P. p. 726. 
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sources do not portray their effects in a way that is critical of the 
emperor. 12 The Constantinopolitan-orientated Chronicon Paschale 
does not judge him harshly despite the fact that it would have had a 
first-hand view of the consequences that the emperor's short-term 
failure to address the problem provoked. This is explained by its 
contemporary nature which made it a propagandist journal for the 
imperial family. 
The minting of coinage was also a very important 
propaganda device, as we have seen in the revolt of Heraclius. 13 
Minting was an imperial prerogative although the mint was not 
centralised, so that Heraclius the Elder could draw upon the 
resources of the mint at Carthage for his revolutionary ends. 
Heraclius continued to bolster his image as he reverted to the 
practice introduced by Tiberius, which Maurice had partially 
abandoned, of using the symbol of the Cross on his coins. Grabar saw 
this as a "pathetic" action, since for much of Heraclius' reign the True 
Cross was in Persian hands. 14 Nevertheless, this did continue to 
emphasise the close link between God and emperor in all Heraclius' 
undertakings that he had stressed from his arrival in Constantinople. 
Heraclius' reform of the coinage was two-fold. He introduced a new 
silver coin, the hexagram, and he centralised the mint at 
Constantinople. The hexagram was introduced during a lowpoint of 
Heraclius' reign, when the Persians had advanced as far the 
12 Teall, 'Grain Supply', p. 133-134 concludes that the loss of Egypt 
caused a severe short-term problem. In the longer term the 
dramatic fall in population and the organisation of alternative 
supplies from Thrace and Asia Minor replaced the Egyptian supplies. 
13 Chp 2. 
14 Grabar, L' Iconoclasm p. 35-36. 
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Bosporus. 15 The Chronicon Paschale says that in 615 "there was 
made by law a six-gram coin and imperial payments were made with 
it, at half their old rate". 16 No further information is volunteered by 
the chronicle, but the reason for its introduction can be inferred from 
the next paragraph. "And the Persian commander, who was called 
Saen came as far as Chalcedon itself and to the regions of Chrysopolis 
and Cerconium, and he looked across to the other side". 17 The 
imperial treasury's lack of money would explain why it was 
necessary to pass a law to introduce the new coinage, to meet the 
pressing needs of defence, at a time when Persian armies were 
preventing the collection of taxes from the empire's richest 
provinces. The valuation of the coin was a false one, for although as 
bullion (i. e. a specific weight of silver) it had credibility, as coin 
hoards from outside the empire prove, it had the effect internally of 
halving the real amount of imperial expenditure. Thus, internally it 
contravened the gold-silver ratio of the Codex Theodosianus viii 
4.27, and the Codex Justinianus x 78.1. The savings made on 
internal expenditure could be used to finance diplomacy with the 
Persians, and to defend against the Avar threat in the Balkans, and 
so it may be relevant that there was an embassy to Persia in 615.18 
The coin itself had an obverse design of Heraclius and his eldest son, 
Heraclius Constantine. The reverse design of cross on steps and the 
appropriate inscription Deus Adiuta Romanis (0 God, help the 
Romans) was not a new one. 19 
15 Morrisson, 'Monnaie et Prix', p. 239-260, esp. p. 249-250. 
16 C. P. p. 706. 
17 C. P. p. 706. 
18 C. P. p. 706. 
19 Hendy, Studies, p. 494. 
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It is difficult to see any reason other than financial necessity 
for Heraclius issuing this coin. If he had been attempting to impress 
upon the empire the new and innovative nature of his rule he would 
not have issued a coin that was tariffed at double its intrinsic value. 
Indeed, if he was coining purely for the sake of propaganda he would 
surely have used gold, and it is hard to see how a new coin would 
have had a greater effect than regular issues of the solidus. 
Heraclius used silver either because he had run out of gold, as 
Nicephorus hints at in his anecdotal story of an imperial shipwreck 
off Africa, 20 or because he could not tamper with the gold coinage 
because of the image of security that it portrayed for the emperor 
and the need to use it as bullion. It had been the cornerstone of the 
economy since the standardisation of the solidus by Constantine. 21 
Whatever the reason Heraclius was responding to an emergency with 
a stop-gap measure. Another abnormal measure that reflects 
financial stringency is the story that Heraclius melted down the 
statue of the Ox, that stood in the forum of that name, to produce 
copper coins for the army. 22 
The only controversy that surrounds the introduction of 
silver coinage is its date. Eriksson argued for 626, which has been 
disputed by Hendy. 23 Hendy relies on the evidence of Theophanes, 
who under A. M. 6113 (622-623) states that Heraclius coined large 
numbers of nomismata and miliarisia. 24 If large amounts of silver 
20 Niceph. 8. 
21 Jones, L. R. E I p. 107-109. 
22 Cameron and Herrin, Parastaseis Chp. 42 and accompanying 
note, p. 229-230. The date is unknown but it is assumed to be 
during recruiting for the 620's campaigns. 
23 Eriksson, 'Date' p. 17-28, and Hendy, Studies, p. 495. 
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coin were struck in 622 the only place that they can be found 
amongst the numismatic evidence is in the issues of hexagrams. The 
hexagram could therefore have first been issued in 615, with 
substantial supplementary issues in 622 when the Church made 
available to Heraclius its treasures. It could not have been issued 
first in 626 because the gap of at least four years from the Church's 
loan is an unaccountably long one at a time when the need for 
coinage was so acute. This reform was not a lasting one, since 
although the hexagram was issued by Heraclius and Constans II in 
large numbers, by the end of the reign of Constans II these declined 
and remained at a minimal level. Thus, the significance of this 
reform lies not in its durability but in its inception. Heraclius was so 
short of money that he halved the internal expenditure to be able to 
maintain external expenditure. 
Heraclius' drastic and simplistic measure shows how 
desperate his financial situation was and also how the sources did 
not understand the problems and complications of the economy. 
There is no criticism of Heraclius' economic stringency which 
suggests that it may well have been merited. Economic policies of 
emperors were seen in black and white; Tiberius II was popular 
because he was generous, Maurice fell because his solution to rising 
military expenditure was seen as avarice by the soldiers. Economic 
difficulties were seen in the same terms; both John of Nikiu and 
Nicephorus have stories of lost imperial treasure, which serve as an 
explanation for why the state was impoverished at a given time. 2 5 
The remedies for such situations were equally simple, treasure was 
24 Theoph. p. 303. 
25 John of Nikiu CX 4 and Niceph. 8. 
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essentially bullion so Heraclius could convert the Church plate into 
solidi or hexagrams with which to finance his expeditions. This 
interchangeable use of treasure as bullion explains why the Statue of 
the Ox in the Theodosian forum was melted down for soldiers' needs 
if not their actual pay. 26 
Heraclius' second reform concerning the coinage was a far 
less drastic measure. It was the centralisation of the mint at 
Constantinople. The copper coinage of Phocas had come from 
Thessalonica, Cyzicus, Antioch, Alexandria, Carthage, Catania and 
Ravenna. There was also a mint at Jerusalem that struck coins 
between c. 608-c. 615, which reflected the appointment of Bonosos as 
comes Orientalis in 608; in its later stages the mint would have been 
used by Heraclius during his abortive attempts to defend the city 
against the Persians. The war against Persia influenced coinage 
production by more than just the introduction of the hexagram, since 
the location of the mints was rendered unstable. A mint was set up 
at Seleucia in Isauria in 615/616 to produce copper for military 
needs. This also explains its transfer to Isaura itself in 617/618. Its 
suppression there was no doubt due to Persian activity. Conversely 
when Heraclius carried the war to the Persians in 626/627 he set up 
a mint on Cyprus at Constantia. 
Not only were extraordinary mints set up but regional mints 
were also disrupted during the Persian war. No coinage is known for 
Nicomedia between 617/618 and 625/626, and for Cyzicus 614/615 
and 625/626. There was no minting at Antioch after 609/610 and at 
26 Cameron and Herrin above n. 22. See also the disagreement of 
Kaegi, Byzantium p. 34 n. 24 with Haldon, Praetorians p. 627-628. 
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Alexandria from 619/628. The loss of regional mints, combined with 
the use of extraordinary mints, has led Hahn to argue for a co- 
ordinated copper minting system being in operation. Hahn believed 
that the process began in Cyprus in 610/611 and went via Seleucia 
(615-618), Isaura (618/619), Antioch (618-626) and Cyprus (626- 
629): 27 the intention was to prove that there was a regionalised co- 
ordination of copper minting. However, in Hendy's view this theory 
of a planned development relies upon the interpretation of what he 
calls "barbarous and derivative" copper folles (folles which are 
minted locally by inhabitants who have the equipment and the base 
metal and who require coins), and upon a totally unknown 
recapture of Antioch by Heraclius in 618.28 In truth the empire was 
in crisis and change may have been haphazard. 
When Heraclius did regain Antioch in 628 he was in a 
position to restore the pattern of production to the pre-610 format. 
Indeed coinage is once more known for both Nicomedia and Cyzicus 
in 625/626 or 626/627, but this restoration did not last long. It may 
well have been due to the need to pay the soldiers who had taken 
part in the defence of Constantinople, or because Shahbaraz was still 
in command of a renegade Persian army at this time and Heraclius 
was in no position to scale down his military obligations. 2 9 
However, the latest known coins from Thessalonica, Nicomedia, 
Cyzicus and Constantina are all 629/630 and the mint at Antioch in 
fact never reopened. These closures can all be explained 
27 Hahn, 'Minting Activity', p. 307-308. 
28 On the mints in the period 602-627 see, Hendy, Studies p. 414- 
417. 
29 Chp. 4. 
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individually. Thessalonica had been isolated by the Slavs and Avars 
for a long time, 30 Nicomedia and Cyzicus had been devastated by 
the Persians and Antioch had suffered internal disruption even 
before the Persians sacked it in 614.31 Constantia had only been set 
up recently and it had now served its military purpose. There is 
however, an underlying consistency to these closures, since they 
come at the time of the doubling of the weight standard for the 
metropolitian copper coinage: in 630 the folles had a brief revival 
when it reached 11 g as compared to 5g in 624/ 625. Furthermore, 
there is a definite chronological compactness about the changes' 
timespan, and Constantinople was left as the sole source of copper 
for the East. Apart from Alexandria, all the regional mints outside 
the exarchates of Italy and Africa were shut. For an example of the 
consequences of this, between 628 and 631 the source of copper 
coinage in Sicily was switched from regional (Catania) to central 
(Constantinople). 32 These various coinage developments reflect the 
crisis through which the empire passed and reveal this relative 
weakness, at least when compared with its condition in the sixth 
century, of the victorious Roman state on the eve of the Arab 
invasions. 
It was not only coinage production that was affected when 
Heraclius returned to his capital after a six year absence. The 
regional bias of the fiscal administration underwent modification. 
The officium of the prefecture of the East was divided up for it had 
become too unwieldy, and the various secreta fulfilled functions 
30 Chp. 3. 
31 Theoph. p. 296 and 301. 
32 Hendy, Studies, p. 417-421. 
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that had previously been within the prefecture's sub-departments. 
Officials who earlier had headed fiscal institutions disappear, whilst 
others appear who were to lead later institutions. 33 The last 
mention of the Prefect of the East is in 629,34 and that of a comes 
sacrarum largitionum in 605.35 Meanwhile the sakellarios 
increased in significance, 36 and the first notice of a logothetes with 
the standing of a sekreton is in the context of 602, "Constantine 
Lardys the former praetorian prefect, logothete and curator of the 
palace of Hormisdas". 37 This was a consistent movement towards 
centralisation and is reflected in the next part of our investigation of 
Heraclius' economic reforms, the themes. For although they came to 
have territorial and administrative implications, as well as military 
ones, they never had a fiscal structure that was independent of the 
capital, since their fiscal controllers were responsible to the 
sakellion and the stratiotikon, and their taxation controllers to the 
genikon, all of which were the central bureau. 38 Were it not for a 
line in Theophanes modern historians would have seen the 
development of the themes in a post-641 light. Theophanes however, 
in describing Heraclius' departure from the capital for the east in 622 
says: 
"After he left the imperial city he sailed to Pylae. 
When he had reached the land of the themes he 
assembled his troops and added new forces to 
33 Haldon, Byzantium p. 180-194. 
34 Heraclius, Novel XXV. 10. 
35 C. P. p. 696. 
36 Bury, Imperial Administrative System p. 84-85. 
37 C. P. p. 694. 
38 Hendy, Studies p. 410-414. 
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them". 39 
This inclusion of the word 'theme' in the account of Theophanes for 
the reign of Heraclius has been important, since it has been seized on 
as a means of dating the inception of the thematic organisation. 40 
By the eighth century, when Theophanes was writing, the themes 
were an established military institution which had developed 
administrative functions. Theophanes' use of the word in the context 
of 622 has led Ostrogorsky to argue that they were already in 
existence, and consequently to give Heraclius the credit for their 
instalation. 41 In this chapter we will argue for a date in the second 
half of the seventh-century, following the line of Haldon and Hendy, 
showing why a date in the reign of Heraclius is untenable. 
Hendy uses the association of the apotheke, state 
warehouses for the selling of surplus state goods especially luxury 
items, with the provision and sale of arms and equipment to the 
military to place one element of the thematic system in the period 
654-659,42 when the seals of the genikoi kommerkiarioi, who were 
responsible for their operation quite suddenly became more 
common. 43 That apotheke came to be connected with the supply of 
arms is shown by two references in Theophanes to apotheke and 
Slav troops. 44 These concern Justinian II in 688-693, by which time 
39 Theoph. p 303. 
40 See Hendy, Studies p. 626-640, and Haldon, Recruitment and 
Conscription p. 28-40. 
41 Ostrogorsky, Themes', p. 31-66. 
42 Hendy, Studies p. 626. 
43 Hendy, Studies p. 626-634. 
44 Theoph. p. 364 and 365-366. 
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apotheke were a practice rather than a fixed institution. 45 The 
settlement of armies on land was a process forced upon the state by 
the series of defeats from 636-642. Hendy has shown that the losses 
of Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Egypt meant that half of the 
budget had been lost, even three-quaters if figures from the Ottoman 
empire for the reign of Suleyman I (1520-1566) are used. 4 6 
Moreover, although much territory had been lost, in the seventh 
century the armies were still by and large intact. As a result the 
army which previously took up over half of the imperial budget 
exerted an even greater proportional demand on the empire's 
resources after the withdrawal into Asia Minor. Now the only major 
resource that was available to the state was land. Anatolia had 
sufferred a demographic decrease due to plague, civil disorder and 
foreign invasion, so that there was probably empty land available for 
military settlement in a region where, according to Hendy, the crown 
owned 15-18% of territory, though it is hard to believe that the 
distribution of imperial land corresponded to the needs of the troops. 
The army was ultimately transformed from one based on service for 
pay into one where a land grant provided basic support, with 
payment perhaps only for periods of active campaigning. The 
consequences of this shift would be severe but still only one of 
degree rather than kind: it was not a movement from a "monetary" 
economy to a "natural" economy, for the "monetary" economy had 
only existed in order to provide for the army. When that was 
achieved by other means, such extensive use of money was no longer 
necessary, but gold was still used (for the payment of offical salaries) 
and hoarded but on a reduced scale. But one consequence of the 
45 Hendy, Studies p. 634. 
46 Hendy, Studies p. 613-619. 
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change in the financial base for the army was a need for an overhaul 
in the nature of the public provision, or supervision, of equipment, 
hence the development in the activities of the genikoi 
kommerkiarioi in the late 650's. If this theory is true then the 
thematic structure only began to emerge after Heraclius' death. 
When Heraclius came to the throne military reorganisation 
was clearly necessary; the revolt of Comentiolus, the escape of the 
Persians from Caesarea and the impotence of Heraclius to deal with 
the Avar threat all point to a lack of resources. Only after 621/622 
was Heraclius in a strong enough financial position -to do anything to 
rectify matters. When he had a loan from the Church, he transferred 
his troops in Thrace across to Asia Minor. In Cappadocia and Cilicia 
and from other scattered garrisons troops flocked to his standard, 
attracted by the magic of the abnormal presence of the emperor in 
the provinces and at the head of an army. It is at this point that 
Theophanes mentions the themes. Baynes has proposed that 
Theophanes uses the term anachronistically: "surely Theophanes 
was only using the geographical term for his day, the ninth- 
century". in He goes on to attribute the system to Heraclius' 
successors, using evidence from Constantine Porphyrogenitus. 4 8 
Oikonomides has questioned the first point, as he follows 
Ostrogorsky, 49 believing that the themes were military districts 
based upon new recruitment procedures. 50 However, if this were to 
47 Baynes, 'Military Theme System', p. 380. 
48 Baynes, 'Military Theme System', p. 380 and Con. Porph. De 
thematibus praef 20. 
49 Ostrogorsky, 'La Date', p. 49 from De thematibus c. II, 3 and c. 
I, 48. 
50 Oikonomides, 'Themes' p. 1-8. 
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be the case then Heraclius would have had to have made a tour of 
Asia Minor to assemble his army and Theophanes says that he went 
straight to Caesarea. Haldon has dismantled Oikonomides' argument 
that was based upon a connection between the occurrence of the 
word thema in Theophanes' account of 622 and that of a logothete 
in the Chronicon Paschale's entry for 626: 51 according to 
Oikonomides recruitment was to be based on land-holdings and the 
logothete was supposedly established to supervise them. However, 
a logothete is mentioned as early as 602/603,52 and the reference 
in 626 may only show that the centralisation of military finances had 
taken place. Haldon continues by questioning whether Heraclius 
would have had the time necessary to organise and administer the 
distribution of the holdings that Oikonomides has suggested. 
Heraclius' first decade was the most confused period of his whole 
reign, and confusion was still in evidence when he reached Caesarea 
in 622. According to George of Pisidia he had to collect his scattered 
troops before beginning his new training regime, a cumbersome 
process which was seen by George as a weakness. 53 Had the reform 
envisaged by Oikonomides been in place there would surely have 
been less of this confusion. Indeed, would George of Pisidia not have 
mentioned such a sweeping reform, for he could have portrayed it as 
an example of Heraclius' organisational skills? 
In Haldon's words the most that the term 'theme' can mean 
51 Theoph. p. 303 and C. P. p. 721. Haldon, Recruitment and 
Conscription p. 31-35. Haldon's views originate with Lilie, 
'Themenorganisation', p. 27-39,190-201, and 'Provinzorganisation', 
p. 7-47. 
52 C. P. p. 694. 
53 G. P. Exp. Per. 11 lines 55-60. 
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in Theophanes' context is a military unit, 54 and he seeks to explain 
the use of the term through the nature of recruitment. 55 From 
Theophanes we might assume that Heraclius recruited and trained a 
new force, 56 but if his account is compared with George of Pisidia 
we find no mention of these new recruits, only the reassembly of 
disorganised ones. 57 Haldon removes this discrepancy by arguing 
that Theophanes, when he uses the word airpaTeia, means the exercise 
of certain military duties rather than new soldiers, in this case a 
stricter re-application of hereditary enlistment. 58 Heraclius would 
have seen this obligation as being necessary to maintain the strength 
of the army in the future, and this would account for the v¬a aTpaTeia 
being imposed on those already enlisted; it also explains why George 
of Pisidia does not mention new recruits. This reform would 
alleviate the recruitment problem that had resulted from the loss of 
the Balkans, and Heraclius could justify the change in the light of the 
impending Persian campaigns. In order to implement the new 
regulations lists of those to be affected would have to be drawn up: 
"It is not unlikely that a relatively new term was employed to 
describe them, a term which, as Dölger suggested, soon came to be 
applied to the corps or divisions registered in the lists, and 
ultimately to the areas where the troops were stationed". 59 If the 
1ogothete of 626 was a military official then he may have 
supervised these lists. So, all that Heraclius was doing was 
54 Haldon, Recruitment and Conscription p. 30. 
55 Haldon, Recruitment and Conscription p. 35-40. 
56 Theoph. p. 300 10-13. 
57 G. P. Exp. Per. 1144. 
58 Haldon, Recruitment and Conscription p. 35-39. 
59 Haldon, Recruitment and Conscription p. 38. The reference to 
Dölger is 'Zur Ableitung des Byzantinischen Verwaltungsterminus 
Thema' Historia 4 (1955) 189-198. 
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reintroducing an old regulation not creating new military and 
administrative districts. However, recently Whitby, and Haldon 
himself, have argued against this thesis. Whitby reasons that 
hereditary service had always existed and so cannot be used as a 
definition for v¬a ßipaTeia. The explanation may be even simpler 
than Haldon has suggested; Heraclius raised a new army, and because 
circumstances were very difficult the presence of an officer in charge 
of supplies is not surprising. 
It would appear that in 621/622 Heraclius was dealing with 
a severe military problem rather than making use of the fruits of a 
military reform. We have already seen how long a reform of the 
coinage took to implement and how dependent it was upon the 
success of the eastern campaigns. The Thracian army was only 
transferred to Asia Minor in 619, so if Heraclius had planned to 
assign lands in Anatolia to these troops from Europe, then he would 
have had less than three years to institute a far wider reform than 
that of the coinage, in far less settled conditions. This suggestion is 
most implausible. The only time that Heraclius could have 
contemplated a reform of the kind proposed by Ostrogorsky and 
Oikonomides would have been after 636 when it would have been 
necessitated by the Arab success. Before 636 there would have been 
little to be gained from effectively concentrating Roman forces in 
Anatolia, in areas away from the eastern front. Are we to believe 
that a system that came into operation by 621/622, and was utilised 
in the Persian campaigns, was subsequently made obsolete by the 
eastward extension of the frontier and then left as a relic of a 
previous crisis until it was justified once more in the wake of Arab 
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success? We know that Heraclius did not expect to be attacked by 
the Arabs as a nation, so why did he plan for such an eventuality 
after 628? If the themes that Theophanes was talking about are 
considered solely as military units we have no difficulty in 
establishing an approximate chronology for -their metamorphosis into 
financial and administrative units in the seventh-century: this 
indicates a chronology whose starting point is post-641 rather than 
621. 
Nevertheless, the view of Ostrogorsky has continued to be 
accepted in a diluted form. Shahid, whilst accepting that Ostrogorsky 
may have exaggerated the innovations that Heraclius made, has 
recently advanced evidence from the Arab sources of the Arab 
organisation of Biläd al-Sham (Syria and Palestine) in the early 
Umayyad period. 60 He argues that the themes were introduced by 
Heraclius between his defeat of the Persians and the invasion of the 
Arabs, in order to prevent another Persian attack on the scale of the 
610's. He bases his argument on the assumption that the four 
Ajnäd (the. plural form of Jund, the Umayyad administrative unit in 
BilAd al-Sham) were Byzantine divisions that the Arabs simply 
adopted, in what Shahid calls "the most outstanding example of 
institutional assimilation" in Arab-Roman history. 61 Shahid 
advances five points to substantiate his theory. (1) Tabari 
"explicitly" states that Syria was divided into four districts in 
Byzantine times. (2) The strategy of the Arab invasion was that of 
an attack upon a region divided into four parts. (3) Umar wrote the 
administrative history of the area but he is not credited with its 
60 Shahid, 'Theme System', p. 391-403, and 'HTS Observations', p. 
208-243. 
61 Shahid, 'Theme System', p. 391. 
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division into a region by the Arab historians, as he would have been 
if he had indeed been responsible. (3) The Ajnad themselves were 
arranged to repulse a threat from Persia, to counter a naval attack, 
and the Arabs did not build any cities in these districts; two of the 
ajnad have biblical names . not found in the Koran, Jordan and 
Palestine. (5) The last point he adduces concerns the monetary 
administration of the Arab districts which he claims was a 
preservation of the Roman system. 
Shahid then goes on to try to show that these districts were 
the original themes and were conceived between Heraclius' final 
defeat of Persia and the Arab invasions. Shahid has contrived an 
argument from coincidences such as the fact that Heraclius was 
brought up in Africa, whose defence Maurice had provided for by 
dividing it into two military provinces, and the militarisation of 
provinces in Biläd al-Sham. His argument relies upon what he 
himself calls a "rare, a very rare, conjunction of events and 
circumstances". 62 The major weakness in his argument is that he 
believes because the districts were aligned to withstand an attack 
from the north and north-west they must have been set up after 
Heraclius had defeated the Persians. 63 Shahid believes that the 
Persian threat would have been uppermost in Heraclius' mind and so 
he reorganised his provinces to prevent a repeat invasion. However, 
we have already seen that Heraclius was not unduly worried about 
an immediate threat from Persia: indeed, he was keen to establish 
firmer links with that monarchy on a Christian basis. 64 Instead of 
62 Shahid, 'HTS Observations', p. 235. 
63 Shahid, 'Theme System', p. 395 and 399-401. 
64 Chp. 4. 
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Persia being the perceived enemy for these districts, it is as easy to 
see the threat coming from the north and north-west in the form of 
Roman emperors attempting to win back what had been lost to the 
Arabs at the end of the reign of Heraclius. The Arabs had a fleet by 
649, for Theophanes tells us that Muawiyah attacked Cyprus with 
1,700 ships. 65 This then would explain why the districts were 
organised by the Arabs to facilitate their maritime power at a time 
when they felt threatened from the north. 
It would be appropriate to conclude this examination of 
administrative and economic matters under Heraclius with a short 
review of theories about the state of urbanisation within the Roman 
empire. The cities of Syria are cited by Shahid in an attempt to 
prove that the Arabs merely took over the existing Roman 
administrative system. What has been of more interest to modern 
scholars is the continued existence of these cities and their 
counterparts in the rest of the empire. The theory of Kazdan that 
the Byzantine empire experienced its nadir between the seventh and 
ninth centuries is based upon a severe decline, if not complete 
disappearance of the cities. 66 The agrarianism of the economy that 
this led to was only ended by an upturn in the fortunes of 
Byzantium. The theory of Mango takes on board a greater span of 
history and includes the prevalence of natural disasters, epidemics, 
social conflicts and the strain of Justinian's wars of reconquest to 
explain a demographic decrease that limited the ability of cities to 
survive. 67 The few that did not disappear became socio-economic 
65 Theoph. p. 343-344. 
66 Kazdan, 'Byzantium' p. 324, and Kazdan and Cutler, 'Continuity 
and Discontinuity', p. 429-478. 
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contractions of their former selves. Foss saw this decline as being a 
result of the invasions of the Persians. 68 His is the only theory that 
specifically attributes the decline of urbanisation to events within 
the reign of Heraclius. He believes that cities such as Caesarea, 
Ancyra, Rhodes, Sardis and Ephesus never recovered from the 
Persian raids that they sufferred: for example the main road of 
Sardis was rebuilt in c. 660 but this time the material was not 
marble as before, but cobble-stones, and the lime for its bedding was 
nade in one of the rooms of the abandoned gymnasium. Foss dates 
this destruction and subsequent contraction of the cities to the reign 
of Heraclius on the strength of the Life of Theodore of Sykeon which 
ends in 613 without having reported any Persian ravaging in Asia 
Minor, and on the evidence of coin hoards. However, it would seem 
that this is far too exact an approach. Howard-Johnston, discussing 
the Balkans, believes that the "process of urban decline was gradual, 
uneven and in several cases, never completed", 69 since sources are 
prone to distort the effects of the invasions of the Avars and the 
Slavs for their own ends. In the case of the Miracula St. Demetrii 
the dangers the city faced are exaggerated to emphasise the 
achievement of Thessalonica's patron Saint. Kennedy addresses the 
subject of cities of the East in a similarly circumspect manner. 7° He 
does not see any evidence for abrupt change, rather a process during 
the sixth and seventh centuries of gradual metamorphosis of town- 
plan from classical grid to Arab souk. There were many reasons for 
this transition; the Islamic legal attitude to property allowed for the 
67 Mango, Byzantium, p. 60-87. 
68 Foss, 'Persians', p. 469-486. 
69 Howard-Johnston, 'Urban Continuity', p. 242-253. 
70 Kennedy, 'From Polis to Medina', p. 3-27. 
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escalation of private building, the decline of imperial patronage of 
secular buildings from the fifth century, and natural disasters which, 
meant for example, that Beruit was not rebuilt until after the Arab 
conquests after an earthquake in 550. Even before the Arab 
conquests there were signs of the modification of urban plans. 
Gerasa and Apamea had streets built over by private houses. This 
gradual transition was typical of the progression of the late antique 
economy. As with the other controversial developments that have 
been assigned to Heraclius' reign, it is only possible to see them as an 
ongoing process, whose chronological boundaries exceed those of any 
one ruler. Heraclius deserves neither praise nor blame for these 
long-term changes; he receives none in the ancient sources which 
tended to ignore such economic or administrative developments. 
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Sources In Context. 
The events of the reign of Heraclius were enacted upon an 
empire-wide stage and we have already seen that this is reflected in 
the contemporary accounts of his reign. The Chronicon Paschale and 
John of Antioch have a profound Constantinopolitan bias, John of 
Nikiu and the author of The Life of Theodore of Sykeon a more 
provincial -outlook, whilst George of Pisidia was concerned with the 
deeds of his hero rather than an accurate catalogue of all the events 
of his reign. The importance of these sources for an interpretation of 
the reign has already been discussed in earlier chapters. What this 
chapter sets out to do is to evaluate these sources in relation to those 
later ones to which we have already devoted many words in 
analysing Heraclius' actions. The patchwork of information that the 
range of sources gives us will be looked at from another angle, not 
how the sources relate to the emperor but instead how they relate to 
each other. For this the contemporary sources must be the starting 
point but, as we shall see, not all the contemporary sources are 
extant. In order to approach the subject with some degree of clarity 
we shall first put into context the roles of Theophanes and 
Nicephorus in formulating conceptions of Heraclius' image. An 
examination of their sources and influence upon later writers will 
widen the discussion to include other historians who followed either 
or both of their accounts. 
The Chronicle of Theophanes which ends in 813 was 
written by a monk in the monastery near Sigriane on the eastern 
shore of the Sea of Marmara. Unlike most Byzantine chronicles it 
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does not begin with the creation, starting instead with the accession 
of Diocletian in 284, and running up to the death of Leo V in 813. 
This is because he continued the account of George Syncellus which 
ran from the Creation to 284. Mango has argued that Theophanes 
was no more than the final editor of a chronicle that he believes to 
have been written by George. l Turtledove disputes this in his 
introduction to his translation of the chronicle. 2 He believes that 
the chronicle was written with the effects of the second period of 
Iconoclasm in mind and so it must be dated to 815; this would give 
Theophanes enough time to compose the work before his death in 
818, whilst being far enough removed from the death of George 
Syncellus to allow Theophanes' contributions to be original rather 
than merely editorial. Besides, Turtledove adds, the chronicle does 
not include some information found in Nicephorus' history, material 
which George would have been aware of, he argues, for he was the 
syncellus of Patriarch Tarasius whom Nicephorus succeeded, whilst 
Theophanes was in relative isolation at Sigriane. For our purpose 
this discussion is purely academic. In this chapter we shall be less 
interested in determining the bias of historians' work - attributable 
or not - and shall concentrate instead on the texts and the 
relationship between them, not the authors themselves. Thus I 
propose to study Theophanes and Nicephorus first and try to 
establish how much extant source material they have utilised, adding 
to the discussion the Chronicle of 1234 which shared Theophanes' 
eastern source. Then I will progress to investigate first Theophanes' 
and Nicephorus' influence on the later writers George the Monk, Leo 
the Grammarian, Cedrenus and Zonaras., The discussion can be 
I Mango, 'Theophanes', p. 9-17. 
2 Turtledove, The Chronicle of Theophanes p. xii. 
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concluded with a look at the shorter accounts of Joel, Michael Glycas 
and Constantine Manasses. An author by author discussion will 
inevitably lead to a certain amount of repetition, but a chronological 
analysis of the events of the reign would repeat mu ch of what has 
been discussed in earlier chapters whilst also obscuring the 
historiographical evidence. 
Mango believes Nicephorus' history to have been written in 
the 780's when Nicephorus was a young layman. 3 The history 
forms a series of bulletins that are Constantinople orientated. These 
range from momentous events involving Heraclius and the security 
of the Empire, such as the Avar Surprise, to undocumented or 
anecdotal stories, for example the account of the affairs of Boutelinos 
(4) and the shipwreck of imperial treasure (8). Often Nicephorus 
provides obscure detail for events in the capital, for example the 
story of the servant girl unwittingly spitting into Eudocia's open 
coffin (2). In common with the format of Chronicon Paschale 
Nicephorus does not have a detailed account of Heraclius' early 
eastern campaigns, and the first decade of the reign concetrates upon 
life in the capital. However, Nicephorus did not borrow from the 
Chronicon Paschale. Nicephorus has more detail on events in the 
east after the Avar Surprise: after the confusion of the Persian wars 
he concentrates upon the Arab invasions; and his only attention to 
any ecclesiastical event is the succession to Sergius (26). 
Nicephorus' history can be compared with John of Antioch 
and Theophanes for it shares some similarities with both. 4 The 
3 Mango, Nikephoros intro. p 12. 
4 See Speck, Dossier p. 213-423, for a discussion of Nicephorus' 
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start of Nicephorus' account of the reign of Heraclius shows affinities 
with the fragment we have of John of Antioch which records the 
involvement of Photius in the deposition Phocas, and Phocas, 
dressed in black, being condemned by Heraclius (1). Nicephorus then 
mentions Heraclius' offer of the throne to Priscus (2) which is hinted 
at later in the Chronicon Paschale (p. 708). This is followed by the 
tonsuring of Priscus, who also suffers by Heraclius' comparison of his 
actions to Phocas and himself in the roles of respectively son-in-law 
and friend. The funeral of Eudocia has the extra detail of the 
servant girl. Other details or notices preserved by Nicephorus alone 
are the story of Boutelinos (4), the shipwreck of imperial treasure (8) 
- probably fictitious and similar in its overtones to the story of 
Narses' shipwrecked treasure in John of Nikiu, 5 an embassy of Huns 
(9), the exchange of earrings and the betrothal of Eudocia to Ziebel 
(12), the ransoming of Avar hostages by Heraclius' sister Maria (21), 
a Hunnic revolt against the Avars and a peace treaty with the Huns 
(22), and finally the bridge of boats with screens made of trees 
constructed by the court to ferry Heraclius across the Bosphorus (25). 
Nicephorus also retains information not found in 
Theophanes. The birth of Constantine is not dated in Nicephorus (it 
is in Theophanes), but he tells us that he was betrothed to Gregoria 
the daughter of Nicetas, and that he erected a statue to Nicetas in the 
Forum (5). Nicephorus (6) has the speech of Shahin to Heraclius 
which is not found in any other source, but the reply attributed to 
Heraclius may well be a version of the message to Chosroes from the 
Senate found in the Chronicon Paschale for 615.6 The names of 
treatment of Heraclius' reign. 
5 John of Nikiu CX. 4. 
259 
the ambassadors are in both Nicephorus and the Chronicon Paschale. 
According to Nicephorus, Shahin dies on his return to Persia, but 
Theophanes dates this later to 626.7 In (8) Heraclius is in despair 
due to the loss of the Egyptian corn supply, which the Chronicon 
Paschale implies was in 618 when Egypt was lost. 8 After the 
Hunnic embassy and the Avar surprise Nicephorus condemns the 
marriage of Heraclius to Martina (11) saying that Heraclius' state 
affairs are in a mess and he cannot even manage his personal ones. 
Theophanes places the marriage much earlier (in 613) and does not 
have the detail that Martina had two handicapped sons Fabius and 
Theodosius. In chapter 12 Nicephorus has Heraclius go east because 
of the capture of Jerusalem. This is another chronological error as 
Jerusalem fell in 614, well before the Avar Surprise. Nicephorus 
makes a further chronological mistake in dating the alliance with the 
Khazars to the time when Heraclius first crossed into Asia (12). and 
Nicephorus says the church plate that Heraclius borrowed was to pay 
the barbarians and not necessarily for the Persian wars, which is the 
purpose in other sources: 
KaTI SC TÖv aJTÖV KatpÖV SLETT%T1PM KOVTO TM T(, ÜV 
EKKXijatWV KEt tOta KG. L e{ vnayw. iv -töpwv Tots 
papßäpotS Eýeveµtjen 9 
Ö paa'L%EÜS'HpäiXetos T1jV Eopii v TOO iiäaxa defu)c Tq 
SEUTEpq EOTTEpac EKLVljae KaTa IIEpaisos. X4WV Be TM T(3V 
6 C. P. p. 707. 
7 Theoph. p. 315. 
8 C. P. p. 711 
9 Niceph. 11.21-23. 
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Evaywv oiKwv XprjµaTa Ev Saveiw, änopl4 KaTEXoVeVOc 
t, \qe Kai Tljs ieyäX rS EKKÄTjaiaS noÄvKQ. vSnXM TIE Kai 
ETEpa oKEÜTI ÜnoUpyt d, Xapc as voµ(a. & ra TIE Kat 
µtw, pim. a nä4LnoXXa. 10 
Nicephorus also differs from the narrative of Theophanes 
in having the letter of Chosroes to Shahbaraz written for a different 
purpose, that is to keep Shahbaraz at Chalcedon and not return to 
counter Heraclius in Persia. On the actual siege of Constantinople 
Nicephorus has more detail than Theophanes. Nicephorus (14) like 
Theophanes has Heraclius in personal contact with Rhazates and has 
Heraclius actually kill the Persian general, whilst Theophanes merely 
records the injuries to his horse, when describing the personal 
involvement of Heraclius. The Persian political machinations before 
the fall of Chosroes are not mentioned in Nicephorus, but the role of 
Siroes is similar to that in Theophanes and his words to his father are 
in the same vein. Like Theophanes too (p. 327) Nicephorus has 
Siroes write to Heraclius, but Nicephorus also has Hormisdas write to 
the emperor without listing the intermediary Persian monarchs. In 
(17) Shabaraz requests the Persian crown, which is not in 
Theophanes, and Nicephorus notes that he and not Siroes (Theoph. p. 
327) returned the True Cross and that his son become a Patrician. 11 
Nicephorus' first mention of the Arabs only includes details 
of their original country (18), and then he deals with the breakdown 
of the betrothal of Eudocia to Ziebel and the return of the Holy Cross 
to the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Modestus: this is incorrect as Modestus 
10 Theoph. p. 302.32-303.3. 
11 Mango, 'Deux Etudes', p. 105-117. 
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was not ordained until after 1 September 630.12 The details of the 
return of the Cross are not in Theophanes. The return of Heraclius 
from the east follows the chronological schema of the other sources, 
but differs in the details. There are none of the olive branches or 
lanterns that are described in the account of Theophanes, instead in 
Nicephorus Heraclius brings four elephants, holds horse races and 
distributes largesse. He also returns the property that he had 
borrowed from the church and makes a provision for the rest of the 
debt to be repaid in an annual subsidy. Nicephorus then again 
differs from Theophanes' narrative format, as he leaves out any 
mention of religious disputes and without naming the Yarmuk 
chastises Heraclius, through the mouthpiece of his brother Theodore, 
for Roman defeats caused by his marriage to Martina. The death of a 
Sergius by suffocation in a camel skin at the hands of the Arabs 
might on superficial grounds be associated with the Sergius whose 
defeat near Caesarea is recorded by Theophanes, but this is unlikely: 
instead it is another example of Nicephorus differing from 
Th e op hanes . 
13 Roman division in the ranks is mentioned, but 
Nicephorus lays no stress on religious failings. Nicephorus having 
detailed the ransoming of Avar hostages and the Hunnic revolt 
against the Avars (21/22) then deals with Egypt. He has more 
names than Theophanes. John of Barkaina may, or may not, be the 
John who is named in John of Nikiu as commander of the local levies 
but Marinus is not mentioned in any other source, nor is the fact that 
when Cyrus is put in charge of Egypt he attempts to have Eudocia 
betrothed to the Arab commander al-Amr. 
12 Mango, Nikephoros, p. 185. 
13 Mango, Nikephoros, p. 187. 
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The detail of Heraclius sending his sons to and from Hieria to 
attend ceremonies in his stead and the bridge of boats and trees is 
unique to Nicephorus. The plot he describes in (25) is not found in 
any other Greek source. Nicephorus says that Heraclius' son 
Atalarichus and Theodore the son of his brother of the same name 
were conspiring, discovered and exiled. The death of Sergius is 
noted in (26) and the appointment of Pyrrhus, and Nicephorus 
provides more information about the latter's friendship with 
Heraclius than Theophanes. Heraclius then finally punishes Cyrus for 
using "pagan" tactics in attempting to marry Eudocia to an Arab 
general. Cyrus defended his policy of paying the Arabs from trade 
profits to stay out of Egypt. This is not in Theophanes, but 
Theophanes unlike Nicephorus has Cyrus sent back to the province to 
try to resurrect the deal with Amr. In Nicephorus Heraclius rejects 
Cyrus' protests and hands him over to the city prefect for 
punishment while Manuel, his temporary replacement according to 
Theophanes, does not even gain a mention. Heraclius' death from 
dropsy is due to his marriage to Martina but there is no mention of 
Monothelitism. Nicephorus says that he named his sons Constantine 
and Heraclius as his successors with a special place reserved for 
Martina. He adds that he died at the age of 66 having reigned thirty 
years and four months, ten days. Nicephorus' account of the reign 
represents an individual compilation, definitely distinct from that of 
Theophanes; the only significant overlaps are with John of Antioch's 
narrative of events in 610. 
Theophanes has the same details as John of Antioch for 
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Heraclius' route to the capital via Abydos but also refers to George of 
Pisidia (p. 298) "as George of Pisidia says they had reliquaries and 
icons of the Mother of God on their masts and carried a large army 
from Africa and Mauretania". 14 As Theophanes is very brief on 
Heraclius' actions at Constantinople, he does not use John of Antioch's 
full report. Consequently there is no mention of the death of 
Bonosus, or Photius. Theophanes has Phocas burnt at the Forum of 
the Ox, but he does not list the others cremated there - Leontius the 
Syrian and Bonosus and Domentiolus brother of Phocas. 15 He then 
goes on to mention the Roman defeat by the Persians near Antioch. 
The first decade of Heraclius' reign is very concisely 
reported by Theophanes. 16 He has only the funeral date for the 
death of Eudocia, and the date of Constantine's coronation and the 
fact that Sergius crowned him. Then Theophanes has a year by year 
list of Persian successes, incorrectly dating the fall of Jerusalem one 
year late, to A. D. 615 (A. M. 6106), and making a similar mistake with 
the capture of Egypt, dating it to 616 when modern scholarship 
suggests 618. After an account of the Avar Surprise Theophanes 
begins to follow the contemporary George of Pisidia very closely. In 
622 he describes Heraclius training his army and its first victory in 
the autumn, characterizing the army as lazy, disorderly and careless, 
exactly the same adjectives as George employs. 17 Theophanes even 
borrows phrases from the Expeditio Persica 11.18 Both writers 
14 G. P. Hera c. IL 10. 
15 All of whom are named in John of Antioch. 
16 For an -account of the sources of Theophanes see Proudfoot, 
'Theophanes', p. 367-437 
17 Theoph. p. 303.24-25, and G. P. Exp. Per. 11.45. 
18 G. P. Exp. Per. 11 lines 125 and especially 145-150 are in 
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stress the personal role of the emperor: Theophanes, p. 303.23-24 
"for he did not want his power to be that of fear but that of love", 
comparable to George (Exp. Per. 11.90) "for we declare that power 
does not shine out so much in fear as in affection". The training is 
described in exactly the same terms as well: 
KC. t TTQÖS - Ö&OS allVVEUaeW at4LOLTWV Six . 
19 
Kai np ,S 46vos ovvveüoZs a iwrwv SiXa. 20 
And whilst Theophanes has Heraclius motivate his troops by listing 
Persian atrocities (p. 303.29-304.3) George mentions this as well in 
the quotation of a speech (Exp. Per. 11.105-110). The detail of the 
first campaign is also similar, (Exp. Per. 1.225-305, Theoph. p. 
304.18-306.1) including the use of the moon and the sun in 
Heraclius' tactical manouvrings and the final comment of Theophanes 
(p. 306.6-7) is the same as Expeditio Persica 111 298.21 For the 
campaigning years from 624-628 Theophanes may also rely on 
George's information merely distilling it into a more easily accessible 
form although this hypothesis cannot be proved because any poems 
by George that dealt with these events have not survived. He does 
not give much detail on events in the capital in these years, and the 
siege of 626 is all but ignored as Theophanes prefers to deal with 
Heraclius' actions in the east, in line with the emphasis that George 
Theoph. p. 303.16-17. 
19 Theoph. p. 304.9. 
20 G. P. Exp. Per. 11 144. 
21 The final comment being that the Romans had not expected the 
Persians to turn their backs and run. 
265 
gave in his earlier writings. 
The discussion of Nicephorus has already highlighted the 
ways in which he is different from Theophanes, an indication that 
Theophanes did not use the contemporary account of John of Antioch. 
Another contemporary source that Theophanes did not use was the 
Constantinopolitan Chronicon Paschale. 22 Thus he does not include 
the seizure of Phocas from the imperial palace by Photius and Probus 
that is in the Chronicon Paschale (p. 700), and unlike that source 
he has Heraclius crowned and married on the same day as Phocas' 
execution. The Chronicon Paschale has more information than 
Theophanes on both the funeral of Eudocia and the coronation of 
Constantine. Eudocia died at Blachernae, her body went by boat to 
the palace, and the next day she was buried in the Church of the 
Apostles. The Chronicon Paschale has Constantine crowned not by 
Sergius but by Heraclius, then take the obeisance of the Senate in the 
Hippodrome and having been acclaimed by the factions there, he is 
carried to the Great Church by Philaterus (p. 703-704). Empire-wide 
events show the same emphasis. The Chronicon Paschale has an 
emotive account of the fall of Jerusalem and the loss of the True 
Cross, mentioning the suffering of monks, clerics and nuns, whilst 
Theophanes has 90,000 dead, the Patriarch Zachariah carried off to 
Persia and the vengeful role of the Jews against the defeated 
Christians (p. 301). Whereas the Chronicon Paschale follows this up 
with the use of the precious spear to restore morale in the capital 
and continues in this vein in 615 with the description of a new 
liturgical chant, Theophanes has the Persians take Egypt in A. M. 6107. 
22 See Speck, Dossier, p. 51-155 on the period covered by the 
Chronicon Paschale. 
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The two accounts may well supplement each other when Shahin 
arrives at Chalcedon. For Theophanes mentions an embassy to 
Chosroes in 613 - 614 (A. M. 6105), whilst the Chronicon Paschale 
has a letter from the Senate on behalf of Heraclius to the Persian 
emperor in 615 and the dispatch of ambassadors. Theophanes has a 
Roman embassy in 617 - 618 (A. M. 6109) to which Chosroes was 
unreceptive though he did not mistreat the ambassadors, merely 
sending them away once more (a reference to the previous embassy 
in Theophanes 613-614, p. 300). 
Both Theophanes and the Chronicon Paschale detail the 
Avar Surprise and have a similar account. That of the Chronicon 
Paschale is lengthier and both emphasise the Avar treachery. The 
real divergence in the two accounts concerns the dating of the event. 
Theophanes has 619, (A. M. 6110) and the Chronicon Paschale 623. 
This controversy has already been discussed in an earlier chapter, 2 3 
whereas here we are more concerned with the action rather than the 
date and there is little discrepancy about the actual event. The 
Chronicon Paschale, unlike Theophanes, does not describe Heraclius' 
preparations for his first eastern campaign, but it does detail 
Heraclius staying in Nicomedia to celebrate Easter in 624 before 
moving east (p. 714). The Chronicon Paschale provides more detail 
on events in the capital during Heraclius' absence. It includes the 
detail of the riot against John Seismos (p. 715-716) and has a far 
more extensive account of the siege of 626 (p. 716-726). In 628 the 
Chronicon Paschale preserves Heraclius' letter to his subjects that is 
not to be found in any other source, and also uniquely, the letter of 
23 Chp. 3. 
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Siroes to Heraclius (p. 735-736) at which point the chronicle breaks 
off. For Heraclius' reign the Chronicon Paschale offered a wealth of 
information that Theophanes did not exploit: the most obvious 
explanation for this failure is simply that Theophanes did not know 
this source. 
A further contemporary, or near contemporary, account that 
can be mentioned at this stage is the Coptic account of John of Nikiu. 
Not surprisingly this was quite unknown to Theophanes so that its 
unique details on affairs in Africa were not incorporated into the 
Greek chronicle tradition. Heraclius the Elder's preparations in Africa 
for the revolt, as well as details of Egyptian affairs during the Arab 
invasions written from a Coptic rather than imperial-orthodox point 
of view. In chapter CVII. 2 he spends money on the barbarians of 
Tripolis, Pentapolis and Mareotis to effect an alliance and the rest of 
the chapter details both sides' preparations for war, the capture of 
Alexandria and Bonosus' actions in Egypt. In chapter CVIII. 4 
Theophilus the Confessor predicts that Nicetas will be successful and 
that Heraclius will become emperor - another legitimisation story to 
add to the alleged race of Heraclius and Nicetas to the capital (in 
both Theophanes and Nicephorus). Alexandria is successfully 
defended by Nicetas (11), the fall of Manuf (12) leads to the 
submission of all Egypt to Heraclius' cause, and Bonosus leaves for 
Constantinople (13). John then returns to the prediction of 
Theophilus (14) before relating that Nicetas stabilised all of Egypt 
(17). It is only in CVIII. 25 that Heraclius' manoeuvres are 
mentioned. The senator Theodore the Illustrius (26) deserts Phocas, 
a point not noted elsewhere, before Phocas prepares to use the grain 
ships at Constantinople against Heraclius (29). There is a lack of 
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clarity in the unique information in chapter CX where Africa and 
Alexandria accept Heraclius, but we are not told if it is the Elder in 
Africa or his son on board ship who is about to begin the naval 
engagement at Constantinople (CX. 2). The Greens in ships (unlike 
John of Antioch) pursue the Blues (3) who make for S. Sophia, and 
Phocas and Leontius sink the imperial treasure (5). Phocas is then 
seized but there is no mention of the role of Fabius or Photius (6), 
though Photius' wife comes into the narrative (7, of Niceph. 1). The 
bodies of Phocas, Leontius and Bonosos are burnt but there is no 
mention of the Forum of the Ox. Heraclius is crowned against his 
will (9, Niceph. 2) and in (13) there is a brief mention of the death of 
Heraclius the Elder. The account of John now has a gap until the 
Arab conquest of Egypt due to loss of part of the manuscript. His 
account adds a few extra details, for example he names Theophilus as 
the commander-in-chief of Egypt after John, the commander of the 
local levies in Nicephorus (23), dies. Chapters CXII, CXIII, CXIV and 
CXV describe Arab movements in Egypt to a degree not found in any 
other source. In CXVI Heraclius dies grieved at the death of the 
commander of the local levies, though he also reports the allegation 
that his death was due to his stamping images of himself and his two 
sons on the coinage, which left no room for the Roman empire. There 
is no mention of Martina or of Monothelitism as the cause of his 
demise unlike the Byzantine writers' explanation of his end. 
Nicephorus' and Theophanes' accounts have very little in 
common. This might be due in part to Theophanes being a chronicler 
progressing through the events of Heraclius' reign year by year 
whilst Nicephorus is content to write a history proper concerned with 
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themes and issues rather than cataloging data. However, they also 
used different sources, since Nicephorus made use of John of Antioch 
whilst Theophanes followed George of Pisidia. It is proposed that 
Nicephorus wrote his history earlier than Theophanes and in 
Constantinople, 24 which is reflected in his more capital-orientated 
narrative of events. He could not have had recourse to Theophanes' 
work, but for whatever reason was unaware of the Chronicon 
Paschale which, as we have seen, had an analogous Constantinople 
orientation. 
The main overlaps betwen Nicephorus and Theophanes 
occur in Nicephorus (1) and (10). Describing the revolt of Heraclius 
Nicephorus and Theophanes legitimise Heraclius' right to be Emperor 
by providing the mythical story of the race to the capital, between 
Heraclius and his cousin Nicetas - the winner to claim the throne, 
since Phocas had seemingly forfeited his right to rule by 
misgoverning the empire. Nicephorus, unlike Theophanes, does not 
mention the role of the senate or of Priscus in inciting the governor 
of Africa to rebel, but he does have more detail than Theophanes on 
the battle for Constantinople. This is parallel to and may be derived 
from the fragmentary account of John of Antioch, from which also 
comes the germ of the rivalry between Phocas and Priscus over 
Priscus' statue in the hippodrome (1). Nicephorus also has Priscus' 
ambiguous attitude during the revolt and the Greens firing the 
Caesarion harbour. Unlike Theophanes, Nicephorus has Phocas seized 
by Photius whose wife he had dishonoured, and beheaded. The list 
of victims of Heraclius' newly gained power; Domentiolus, Leontius, 
Bonosus, and Phocas is from John of Antioch. So too is the repartee 
24 Mango, 'Theophanes', p. 9-17. 
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between Heraclius and Phocas, that Theophanes also fails to record. 
The real similarity between the two accounts concerns the race to 
Constantinople between Heraclius and Nicetas. This seems to be an 
appealing anecdotal story that could easily have found itself into two 
different authors independently. 
The other point of convergence with Theophanes in 
Nicephorus is the Avar surprise, but there is more detail in 
Nicephorus. He has the names of the ambassadors sent to the Chagan 
by Heraclius (Athanasius and Cosmas) and states that Heraclius 
headed for Heracleia having rested near Selymbria, which puts the 
ambush at Heracleia in a more understandable context than that of 
Theophanes. Heraclius' flight is described in more embarassing 
terms by Nicephorus: he is a comic figure with his crown "tucked 
under his arm" and donning "mean and miserable clothes", symbolic 
of his situation. Nicephorus notes that, the Avars desolated up to 
the Hebdomon and took an exaggerated 270,000 captives, details not 
found in Theophanes. Thus even when Nicephorus and Theophanes 
record the same event the separation of their accounts is apparent. 
From 628 Theophanes begins to use a source other than 
George of Pisidia, whose panegyrics probably culminated with the 
triumph over Persia in that year. 25 George's influence cannot be 
traced after Theophanes' reproduction of the same fire metaphor on 
the defeat of Chosroes (H e ra c. 90 and Herac. 11 230) and the 
analogy between God resting on the seventh day and Heraclius 
25 See Speck, Dossier p. 155-193, on Theophanes' text to 641. 
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fighting for six years and resting during the seventh. As the theatre 
of operations becomes Syria, rather than Armenia and northern 
Persia, Theophanes may well have been able to begin to draw on the 
Syriac source that Agapius of Membij, Michael the Syrian and the 
Chronicle of 1234 also preserve, as from this year Theophanes 
shows significant similarities with the nexus of Syriac sources for his 
knowledge of events outside of the capital. In order to determine 
what the nature of these sources was we must consider a comparison 
between Theophanes, Agapius, Michael the Syrian and the Chronicle 
of 1234, which preserve much of the lost work of Dionysius of Tell- 
Mahre, as well as considering very incomplete information from the 
earlier Chronicles of 637,641,755,819and 846. 
A look through the early extant Syriac writers will not show 
where Theophanes, Michael and 1234 (Dionysius of Tell-Mahre) got 
their information, but Conrad has in a pair of lengthy investigations 
suggested that the source was Theophilus of Edessa. 26 The 
information the other incomplete Syriac Chronicles provide ranges 
from the minimal in the Chronicle of AD 846 which has only the 
death of Phocas through the two relevant dates of the Chronicle of 
819 (627 the death of Chosroes and 636 the Yarmuk) to a more 
lengthy list of events and dates in the chronicles of 641 and 755. 
In that of 641 the Euphrates freezes in 610 whilst in Theophanes 
the sea (not named) freezes. Egypt is captured by the Persians in 
619 (not 616) but is evacuated at God's commmand in 629 - 
Heraclius gets no credit for his defeat of the Persians. Siroes reigns 
26 Conrad, 'Theophanes', p. 1-44. and 'Arwad' p. 322-348. Articles 
which have built upon the pioneering work of Brooks, 'Sources', p. 
578-587. 
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seven months, as he does in Theophanes. The battle of Caesarea is 
dated to 634 and in 636 Syria and Palestine are invaded. There is 
not so much chronological accuracy in the Chronicle of 755 (Zuqnin): 
it has the Arabs capture as far as the Euphrates in 621 and the death 
of Phocas and the reign of Heraclius in 622. Zuqnin was using a list 
of Byzantine emperors that was twelve years out of step with his 
main dating system which caused a comparable dislocation of many 
events. In 622 (Theoph. p. 632-633) it describes the sword in the 
sky and, a unique detail, that in 629 Heraclius began to build the 
church at Amida. 633 is its date for the Yarmuk, lad enters Edessa 
one year earlier than in Theophanes in 637 but Dara falls two years 
later than Theophanes' date of 639. The sparseness of detail in these 
sources shows that they were not operating in the same tradition as 
the source available to Theophanes, and their confusion about dates 
is not evidence enough to explain those places where the chronology 
in Theophanes and 1234 is confused. Theophanes' eastern source, 
identified by Conrad as the eighth century writer Theophilus of 
Edessa, had access to different information - not always accurate in 
terms of date but at least different in his errors which crop up 
consistently in the various sources which followed him. 
Theophanes and 1234 have information in common before 
628. These similarities may reflect nothing more than that an event 
of this nature occurred in roughly this year, or that the story was 
current. Two examples illustrate the differences in details and yet 
the general simililarity of their accounts. The letter of Chosroes to 
Kardarigan, falsified by Constantine, is in 1234, and is the reason 
that 1234 gives for the ending of the siege of Constantinople in 
626.27 In this the Chronicle betrays its eastern bias in its 
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presentation of facts as well as its unwillingness to credit God and 
the Theotokos for the victory, as all the Byzantine writers do. For 
1234, having a Monophysite stance, saw Heraclius as a heretic and 
could not therefore depict him as being smiled upon by God. 
Theophanes and 1234 both contain brief accounts of the siege, 
which differ very little in content, but Theophanes places the forged 
letter to Kardarigan, which 1234 sees as being so important to the 
raising of the siege, one year later than 1234. They also have 
similar accounts of the early history of Islam, though 1234 does not 
name Khadijn and it has Mohammed lead a raid into Palestine in 
622,28 but whilst 1234 gives details on Mohammed's teachings 
Theophanes has only a misguided description of Muslim paradise. 29 
1234 places this in its chronological context of 622 whilst 
Theophanes is content to wait until the Arabs come to greater 
prominence in Roman and especially Heraclius' affairs with the death 
of Mohammed. 
Theophanes and 1234's accounts of Heraclius' actions in the 
East immediately after his victory do not agree, for they are simply 
not following the same source tradition. Theophanes has Heraclius 
converting the Jew Benjamin in Tiberias, whilst 1234 has him 
saving the Jews of Edessa from a massacre through his messenger 
Joseph. 30 In 629 Heraclius meets Athanasius the Patriarch of the 
Monophysites. 31 1234 goes on to exemplify Heraclius' involvement 
27 1234 p. 231-233. 
28 1234 p. 227-228. 
29 1234 p. 228-230 and Theoph. p 334. 
30 1234 p. 235-236. 
31 It is now that Michael the Syrian chooses to mention his 
marriage to Martina which Theophanes dates to 613 (A. M. 6105) and 
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with the Eastern Church by including his irritation with Isaiah of 
Edessa when Heraclius meets Athanasius and the twelve prelates at 
Mabhug. This disagreement, which is not related at all by 
Theophanes, caused Heraclius to initiate .a persecution against 
the 
Monophysites, the sin which 1234 uses to explain the Roman 
defeats at the hands of the Arabs. 32 In Theophanes the wars 
against the Arabs begin in earnest with the defeat of Sergius at 
Caesarea. The Chronicle of 1234 provides a little more detail 
including the speech of Abu Bakr to his troops before they set out. 33 
The story of Sergius' defeat is told differently. Theophanes has 
Sergius as the first to die (Theoph. p. 336.16-19), whilst 1234 has 
him conduct a protracted personal act of cowardice: 
"The patrician saw this and began to flee 
headlong to save his skin... Sergius fell from his 
horse, but his attendants came to his aid and set 
him back on again. He stayed briefly in the 
saddle, then fell again. Again his compan ions 
held ranks and set him back on his mount. A 
few steps further on he fell to the ground for a 
third time. They were making as if to put him 
back in the saddle when he said "Leave me. 
Save yourselves. Otherwise you and I shall 
drink the cup of death together". 34 
which 1234 places after the siege of 626 but before the battle with 
Rhazates (p. 233). 
32 1234 p. 237. 
33 1234 p. 240. 
34 1234 p. 241-242. 
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After this defeat both Theophanes and Michael the Syrian, but not 
1234, add that a sign in the shape of a sword appeared in the sky 
for thirty days, symbolising the rise of Islam. 35 This is soon 
apparent in the sources. Sergius' replacement is Heraclius' son 
Theodore whose arrogance, according to 1234, contributed to his 
defeat, and was illustated by his conversation with Theophilus the 
Stylite. 36 
An element of confusion now enters the story-line 
concerning the battle of the Yarmuk. The problem is not so much in 
dating the battle but rather in distinguishing it from other less 
decisive ones. According to Theophanes (p. 337) Theodore was 
defeated near Gabitha but Baanes and a sakellarios Theodore were 
then successful at Emesa; this persuaded the Arabs to vacate 
Damascus although Heraclius also left Syria at this point. Then the 
next year Theodore was defeated and Baanes was vanquished at the 
Yarmuk. 1234 does not date the Yarmuk, but it has more detail 
than Theophanes. Theodore is defeated after speaking arrogantly to 
the Stylite, then there was a Roman defeat at Emesa which is 
described along similar lines to that of the Yarmuk, which according 
to Theophanes took place later. A substitution of Yarmuk for Emesa 
would seem to lessen the confusion as 1234 goes on to describe the 
fall of Damascus, and the terms it and then Emesa got from the Arab 
conquerors. 37 However, this is not a legitimate explanation for the 
confusion over the battle of the Yarmuk, for next the Arabs return 
the tribute and the Yarmuk is described, as in Michael, before the 
35 Theoph. p. 336, and Michael the Syrian, XI. iv (Chabot II p. 414). 
36 1234 p. 243. 
37 1234 p. 244-249. 
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departure of Heraclius and his letter to the other provinces. 3 8 
Like Theophanes 1234 now goes on briefly to Egyptian 
affairs. Cyrus and his replacement Manuel arrive and leave. 1234 
has the additional detail of the Coptic Patriarch Benjamin aiding the 
Arabs, 39 and then illustrates Manuel's aggressiveness towards the 
invader (Theoph. p. 338) but does not have the Arab reply to the 
reinstated Cyrus about swallowing a huge pillar. 40 Both sources 
have the story of Umar's entry into Jerusalem, and that of the pact of 
John with lad to preserve Roman influence around Edessa through 
money payments, and name Ptolemaeus as the man whom Heraclius 
used to replace John. Similarly both end with the massacres at Tella 
and Dara. However, 1234 has two pieces of extra information. The 
first concerns the immoral conduct of the Armenian general, David 
who began a campaign against the Arabs in Syria but ended up 
persecuting the local inhabitants there. 41 The local commander 
Titus tried to appeal to their common Christianity to prevent this but 
was rebuffed. His forces survived the Arab attack because they 
were brave but David's men, who got no help from God, all perished 
along with their commander. The second piece of information 
follows a description of Muawiyah's capture of Caesarea, which 
Theophanes dates later to 641.42 Muawiyah captured and 
massacred or enslaved the populoation of Euchaita. Theophanes now 
includes the story of Hormisdas' flight into the interior of Persia, 
38 1234 p. 249-251. 
391234 p. 253. 
40 Theoph. p. 339 
41 1234 p. 257-258. 
42 Theoph. p. 341. 
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which is introduced a lot later than1234.43 Umar's census is only 
mentioned by Theophanes before both report the death of Heraclius 
in a dry factual tone. 1234 does not mention his dropsy and 
calculates his reign at thirty years and five months, compared to 
Theophanes' thirty years and ten months. Within this "Syriac source" 
nexus there are links with the information that Theophanes also 
provides about Heraclius' actions in the east and the rise of the 
Arabs. Theophanes is the earliest writer on Heraclius to include 
detailed information on these events as result of the intercultural 
transmission that Conrad describes, and so his chronicle is the first to 
incorporate it into a criticism of Heraclius. 
The Syriac chronicle tradition does not end with Michael and 
the Chronicle of 1234. Bar Hebraeus has a lot of detail on Heraclius 
much of which is in line with the entries of his predecessors and with 
Theophanes. Bar Hebraeus dates the beginning of Heraclius' reign to 
the twenty-first year of that of Chosroes compared to Theophanes' 
twenty-second year date. Then Heraclius the Elder and Gregorius 
attack Constantinople and Phocas "was killed" - Bar Hebraeus 
provides no further details on the coup unlike Agapius who relates 
the race to Constantinople between Heraclius and Nicetas. Michael 
and Bar Hebraeus have Heraclius send ambassadors to Chosroes in 
the early years of Heraclius' reign with a similar message "Phocas 
killed your friend Maurice we have killed him". Bar Hebraeus has 
the same dates as Theophanes for the fall of Jerusalem and Egypt 
and the arrival of Shahin at Chalcedon, whilst he sides with Michael 
for the capture of Caesarea in 611 and the detail on the fall of 
Jerusalem, his only error being to attribute the capture of Antioch to 
43 Theoph. p. 341, and 1234 p. 247-248. 
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Heraclius and not to the Persians. 
Following the narrative format of Michael he then goes 
on to describe the rise of Islam in a more concise style before dealing 
with the siege of Constantinople and the story of the forged letter 
which Bar Hebraeus, unlike Theophanes and Michael says contained 
the names of 300 not 400 satraps to be killed, but otherwise has the 
same material as Michael's story. He is closer to Michael than 
Theophanes for the defeat of Rhazates and the nine month reign of 
Siroes but Bar Hebraeus has Heraclius winter in Edessa rather than 
Armenia, which he has possibly confused with Heraclius' movements 
the next spring. Bar Hebraeus introduces new information on 
Heraclius' opinion of the Arabs, where he describes them as an 
"early cloudy dawn". He also has extra details on Mohammed 
including his actions at Mecca and Medina, yet there is no detail on 
the meeting at Mabhug between Heraclius and Athanasius. Bar 
Hebraeus follows Michael for the defeat of Sergius and the Arab 
conquest of Syria and Palestine including the plan of the son of 
Shahbaraz to rule Persia with Arab forces and its failure due to the 
influence of the daughters of Chosroes with Umar. Both Michael and 
Bar Hebraeus use an anecdote to describe the end of the Persian 
empire, as a naked Arab carries all before him. Bar Hebraeus differs 
in his version of Egyptian affairs, according to him Egypt is 
conquered after Manuel leaves, but Michael and Theophanes have 
Cyrus return to an irretrievable situation. His story about Umar's 
entry into Jerusalem is also slightly different - Umar does not change 
his clothes. From this point onwards Bar Hebraeus closely follows 
Michael right up until the same dry reporting of the death of 
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Heraclius. 
Returning from the eastern source traditions and their links 
with Theophanes, the next Byzantine writer to be considered is 
George the Monk, who composed under the Emperor Michael III and 
his chronicle ends in 842. His account represents an amalgam of 
Theophanes and Nicephorus with a limited amount of additional 
information, such as a physical description of Heraclius. He follows 
Theophanes for the coronation of Heraclius in the church of St. 
Stephen, but uses Nicephorus for the end of Priscus' career, including 
Priscus' inability to act either as a son-in-law or as friend. Then 
George has the story of the Roman ambassadors being kept in chains 
in Persia which is in Nicephorus (7) and which Nicephorus and 
George both ascribe to the initiative of Shahin at Chalcedon. 
George may be using Theophanes for Heraclius' departure 
from the capital to the east, though in this context he mentions an 
alliance with the Khazars in a similar place to its inclusion in 
Nicephorus, whilst Theophanes dates it after the Avar Surprise; this 
is George's next entry and here he follows Nicephorus again (12), 
though he has only 70,000 men and women being captured by the 
barbarians, as opposed to 270,000. The account of the siege of 626 is 
brief enough to suggest Theophanes as a source: George does not 
include any personality in his account and he does not mention the 
naval battle that is in Nicephorus. George does not in fact follow 
Nicephorus' account for the siege as Proudfoot has suggested. 44 
George has few details on the final defeat of the Persian army, not 
even mentioning Rhazates. He does include the imprisonment of 
44 Proudfoot, 'Theophanes', p. 396. 
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Chosroes and his death by starvation, and the description of the 
temple of Chosroes: both are mentioned by Nicephorus, though the 
latter comes in a somewhat earlier context. 45 George repeats the 
comment of George of Pisidia that Heraclius fought for six years and 
then rested in the seventh, before describing his return to the 
capital, which is similar to that of Theophanes. 46 
George then deals in an abrupt fashion with the religious 
affairs of the reign. This is the same as the narrative format 
Theophanes employs but George is more concise. He merely says 
that Heraclius was deceived by Athanasius, and because of this 
Heraclius caught dropsy. The symptoms of this are described in 
Nicephorus' terms (27). George's last comment is on Heraclius' 
marriage to Martina (who is not named) which is also in Nicephorus. 
George moves about blocks of chronology; he has Shahin at 
Chalcedon and Heraclius sending ambassadors to Persia before the 
Avar Surprise, but he then places the alliance with the Khazars and 
the fall of Jerusalem together in one report after the Avar surprise. 
It is possible that he followed Theophanes for the alliance with the 
Khazars but the date of the fall of Jerusalem is way out of place. 
After he reports the death of Heraclius George has a unique 
disparaging account of Mohammed (p. 702.10-705.16), and further 
on the battle of the Yarmuk is to be found (p. 707.13-17) displaced 
to the reign of Constans. However, though this confusion obscures 
George's narrative it does not hide his sources: in view of the 
45 Niceph. 15 and 12 respectively. 
46 Theoph. p. 328.2-10. 
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discrepancies he may have read these in advance and then produced 
an account from memory, rather than copying them directly. 
Leo the Grammarian in the tenth-century wrote a slightly 
longer history than George, but one based upon essentially the same 
sources. He has the same physical description of Heraclius that is in 
George and like George has Heraclius crowned in the church of St. 
Stephen. However, the actions of Priscus after the coronation are 
from Nicephorus. Leo and George mention Priscus acclaiming 
Heraclius and then have him at Caeserea before mentioning his 
failings as both a son-in-law and as a friend. This information is to 
be found in Nicephorus (2) but not in Theophanes. Nicephorus' 
influence is also found in the point Leo makes about the 
despondency of Heraclius (Niceph. 8) who does, however, seem to 
place it later in the reign. Then Theophanes is used by. Leo to 
chronicle eastern affairs, the fall of Jerusalem and Chosroes' speech 
to the Roman ambassadors: 
oü etaoi. t vµwv Ews äv äpvfjoraee Töv Earavpwµ¬vov 
ÖV XEyETE 9EÖV ETVai, KaL TTpo6KUVTSai re T( Tjx(q 47 
E{ dpvTlaeTOCL Ö pmcnxEÜS vµc(v TÖV EQTttupwi vov KQL 
TTQOQI(UV1 ¬. 14) 4upp TTOLW ELQTýVTýV. }8 
and he follows Theophanes for the date of the fall of Egypt (616). 
Theophanes is also used by Leo for the Avar surprise, which is not 
47 Theoph. p. 301.23-24. 
48 Leo Gramm. p. 148.20-22. 
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dated, but Leo does not mention that peace " was made the following 
year. The sequence of events continues to follow Theophanes with 
Heraclius leaving for the east in 622, having minted nomismata and 
milliaresia and celebrated Easter. Then Leo's chronology becomes a 
little confused. He now inserts the story of the imprisoned 
ambassadors, which is to be found in Nicephorus, after Shahin has 
come to Chalcedon. 49 This is dated by the Chronicon Paschale to 
615 and the position of the event is well out of step with all other 
writers. We are then told that Heraclius prayed in penitent garb to 
ask God to forgive the Romans' religious failings before he began his 
Persian campaign - this seems to be Leo's own comment on the moral 
state of the Empire as it is not found in any of the earlier Byzantine 
sources, although it is of course the reason that the Monophysite 
Syriac writers give for later Roman defeats. Leo seems to be 
following Nicephorus at this point, for he too has Heraclius ally with 
the Khazars at this time whilst Theophanes places it later in 626 
(Niceph. 12, Theoph. p. 301). Leo, like George, ignores the early 
campaigns of Heraclius in the east and moves straight on to the siege 
of 626. Here he is shorter than Theophanes, but while George like 
Theophanes mentions only "the citizens" Leo does refer to Sergius 
and Bonus as defenders, and the final naval victory which is not 
actually recorded in Theophanes. Leo does not mention the battle 
between Heraclius and Rhazates, but moves straight to the fall of 
Chosroes. His description of Chosroes' temple is found in both George 
and Nicephorus (12), who places it much earlier in the campaigning. 
Leo now has Heraclius in communication with Shahbaraz. According 
to Nicephorus (17) Heraclius and Shahbaraz concluded a peace, which 
is not referred to in Theophanes (p. 327), who only has Siroes and 
49 Leo Gramm. p. 149.22-150.2, and Niceph. 7.13-15. 
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not Shahbaraz. 50 George of Pisidia's point, preserved in Theophanes, 
about Heraclius fighting . for six years and resting in the seventh is 
also in Leo, but Leo has a slightly different version of Heraclius' 
movements. Unlike Theophanes and George he has Heraclius go to 
Constantinople, then to Jerusalem, and finally back to the capital. 
Leo's version of Heraclius' return to the capital is very similar to that 
of Theophanes: 
of Be Tljs no' ¬w TTjv EXEUOly a. TOV nävTEs of Ev Tots 
na , MTiots Tft jpias e' i Gov ovv To natpt&pXr Kai 
KwvataVTivci ßaa Xt Tc viiy avrov, ßa6TgOVTEs KxäSovs 
EAatwv Kai XaµnäSas npös vnavii v Kai Eü4nµoüviec 
mÜTov. Kat 6 vev Ufos mÜToO npoaeX83v Eneaev ELS TOÜs 
nÖSMS TOO ncTpös, Ö Be' nEptnxcKEts mÜTÖV, KaTE4ýL%oUv 
G. X xOts EV SCKVUat 
, Kat OÜTWS 
Xgovlres TÖv ßa6VXEa 
EÜ(ýTnioOvTes Kat xmxpoviec ELay^jXeov Ev Tt nÖXEt 
S1 
ö SE Xaös Tfjs TT XEWI TJV EAEVmv aüTOV µa8ÖVTEc 
GLic ro ETgq TTÖ8({) Trc vTES ELS TI V 'Iepe(av EýTjXBov E{S 
avvävTTlßty aüTOV , avv Tcý naTplapXý Kai Kwvatavtvcy , 
i"4 pamaºEi Kai Uüy a1TOU", (icaTc ovTEs KX iSOUs EXatWv 
Kai X ILTT Sac, e4 jµ0ÜVTEs at+TÖV µETCL Xapäs Kai 
TTEQLTOOaKELs a4T({1 EßpEýav 4t46TEpot TT VY 4V TOts 
SGLKpuaty. TOÜTO eeaQC6i¬voc d %aO,, &TTcVTes 
EÜXapt6TTnptOUs ÜtVOUT To 6E(ß cVETTEVT10V, Kat OÜTW 
XaQÖVTEs TÖV ßa6thka QKtplr VTEs e ai X90V EV Tj 
50 This peace is located by the Chronicle of 641 at Arabissus, 
Nicephorus' only parallel with an eastern source. 
51 Leo Gramm. p. 154.18-155.3 
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TT Ö%Et, 
52 
Leo, like George, merely has the deception of Heraclius by 
Athanasius, which causes Heraclius' dropsy and which forces him to 
use planks to allow him to urinate, this is described in Nicephorus' 
terms (27); Leo also ends his entry in a similar fashion to George. 
Unlike George he does name Martina and he ends with a burial 
description which is not significantly different to that of Nicephorus 
(28), but is not in Theophanes or George. 
However, unlike George, but following Theophanes, Leo does 
describe the rise of the Arabs. First he has a chronological 
computation quoting Stephen of Alexandria, then he uses 
Theophanes (p. 333) for Mohammed's ancestry and early life 
including the vision of the angel Gabriel and the role of the false 
monk (p. 334), before detailing Mohammed's teaching (Theoph. p. 
334), but on paradise only. This material is not to be found in 
Nicephorus. 
There is no mention of the battle of the Yarmuk in Leo but 
he does make another comment on history not found in his sources. 
That is that the Arabs were successful because God had abandoned 
the Romans. This is not in Theophanes whilst Nicephorus (20) has 
Theodore brother of Heraclius blame Heraclius for the situation 
because of his marriage to Martina. Now Leo describes Heraclius' 
return to Constantinople, much later than his source Theophanes (p. 
328, see above). Finally, he deals with the religious problems of the 
reign that we have discussed above. In leaving Heraclius' religious 
52 Theoph. p. 328.2-10. 
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error to the very end of his reign Leo may be trying to preserve the 
image of a successful emperor for as long as possible, since he does 
not even mention the greatest defeat of Heraclius' reign, the Yarmuk. 
Of the later Byzantine writers the version of Cedrenus, 
written at the turn of the eleventh century, is the most extensive on 
Heraclius. We will see him lean heavily on Theophanes, though with 
a few significant exceptions. Cedrenus follows Theophanes for 
eastern events in the first decade of Heraclius' reign, from the fall of 
Apamea via the same words on the Saracens in Syria, Cedrenus only 
switches Xwp{a and iiKavä around, 53 and an almost word for word 
account of the fall of Jerusalem (Ced. p. 715,7-13). 
trapEXapov of rIEpaat Töv 'Iop&ivT v Kai Tijv IIaAawtivnv 
Ka. TTlV aytaV TTO>tV TTOXq. LQ , Kat a1TEKTEwaV EV avT1 
Stä xEtpWV Tc3v 'IovSaicav, cif 4aai TIVES, µvptaiSas 8' . 
aÜTOt yäp WVOÜiEVOt TOÜS Xpt6TtaV011s, Ka8 ' EKaaTOT 
fld1Top¬t, OGTTEKTEtVOV aÜT0Vs. ZaXapiav SE iov 
naTptäpXtlv 'IEpoaoXviwv Kat Tä TL4dta ýÜÄa x4ovTES 
auv aixµaxwaigc noXX Ev Ilepo St ämjyayov. 
......... rrapEXaßov of rIEpaat Tov IopSavnv Kat. Ttjv. aytav TT6XIV 
noX¬' tq Kai 1roXXovs dnEKTEwav Ev avTj Sim XEtpös TcZv 
'IovSaiwv, c magi Ttves, µvptä8as e'vv a. oZTOt yap 
WvoÜtcvot ToiS Xpt6Ttavo%T Kaea EÜTTÖQEL EKaaTOT 
äTTEKTEtVOV aÜTOÜs. ZaXapiav SE TÖV naipi4pXTIv 
'IEpoaoAüµwv, Kai, Tä Tiµta Kai {coonotd küxa XaßövTEs 
53 Ced. p. 714.23, and Theoph. p. 300.18. 
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ow aiXµa Xwa{. gc noAX e'v llepo(Sti änrjyayov. 54 
This parallelism extends to the Avar surprise where 
Theophanes merely has a few more words. But Cedrenus also 
demonstrates borrowings from other extant writers, Nicephorus and 
Leo the Grammarian. The involvement of Photius in the coup (Ced. p. 
712.20-713.1) is from Nicephorus (1), though the names are 
different, Photius in Nicephorus and Photeinus in Cedrenus, and the 
langauge is almost entirely different. As both writers have the same 
story Cedrenus may simply have been writing from memory, as no 
other source is obvious. The repartee over Phocas' government of 
the empire, and that between Heraclius and Priscus on the role of a 
son- in-law and friend is also from Nicephorus (Niceph. 2). In 612 
Theophanes says that Heraclius was at a loss, but Cedrenus is more 
definite in saying that he wanted a leave of absence from 
government which is closer to the remark of Nicephorus that he 
considered leaving for Africa (8). Cedrenus also includes a physical 
description of Heraclius that exists only in Leo and George the 
55 Monk. 
Oi ros 6 `HpäKAEtos rev Tnjv nXuciav µeai X, EvßAevijS, 
e iepvos, EvöýAaAµos Kat öýiyov ürröyxavKos, av80s 
Trjv TptXa Kat AEVKOs TYjv Xpotiäv, eXwv Töv rrWywva 
uXaTÜV cat npös ti oK EKKpeµrj. 6nrv(xa Se 1Tp6S To 
Tljs (3a0LXELas 48EV aL LGt la, EÜAEws EKELpa1O TTjv KÖ$T V 
Kat TO yEVELOV T( paoi. xuc(7 o taT%. 56 
54 Theoph. p. 300.31-301.5. 
55 Baldwin, 'Emperors', p. 19. 
56 Leo Gramm. p. 147.18-148.2. 
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O1 Tos ö 'HpäKXEtos i3v TJV T XU Lav i¬o'f g, E JaeeVý f 
EüoTEpvos, 6640a)µoS, öAiyov vnöyXavKOs, ýav6os TTv 
TQLXa, %EUKÖS 111V Xpotäv, EXwv Tov müywva ttXarüv Kai 
TTPO µriKoc EKKQEiii. 6TT1lVLKa Be 1Tpoc To TTjs (3a rLxetMS 
1X8EV 4tw*a, Ev9Ews EKELpa? o Tljv K09I1V Kat TO yevetov 
TW ßMCIXuc aXilµait 57 
In 622 also Cedrenus has information found only in Leo in 
his use of Stephen of Alexandria for a chronological computation, and 
his entry for 623 is a mixture of Theophanes and Leo. The narrative 
now switches to the imprisoned ambassadors to Persia, in the same 
way that Leo does, before Cedrenus returns to using Theophanes as 
Heraclius takes the Holy Image and crosses the sea to train his army: 
Theophanes (Theoph. p. 303) is the same as Cedrenus (p. 719.20). 
The manoeuvrings in Armenia, Pontus, and Persia are 
mirrored in Theophanes (p. 304), though there is no mention of the 
sun aiding Heraclius' victory over Shahbaraz (p. 305) but Cedrenus 
has the same words as Theophanes when Heraclius leaves Armenia 
to winter in the capital. Cedrenus then has a detailed description of 
Chosroes' heavenly chamber which is also found in Nicephorus and 
Leo the Grammarian, but is not recorded in Theophanes. 
KaL ElaeXeWV eV a rri E1upe TÖ . U6apoV EtSWXOV TOÜ 
XoopÖOU, TO TIE EKTliTro*a aÜTOL EV TTj TOÜ Tr XwTLOU 
a$a pOetSEt QTEyi 6EV oüpavcý KM8j"ACvov, Kat TTEpi 
T06TO t MOV Kai äßTpa. ots 6 SeW%SaiµWV uis 9EOTT 
57 Ced. p. 714.1-6. 
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EXOfpeue, cat äyyEAovs aüTCý axi irrpo46pouS rrEpIA"aTraev. 
EKEtBEV TIE aTayoas aTaJEty WS ÜETOÜS KQL r ou wS 
ßpovTäs !ý jx¬taOat ö 9eoµcxoc Tail µ1Xavais 
EneirexväaUTO? 8 
fºtffivtie 
Em Evos Be TouTwv EvprjTat, ws Xocporls Eauiov 
9EOTTOtnCrMT EV Ti TOÜTOU QTEyý EMUTÖV Ka8n. EVOV (i c 
iv ovpavc4 aEoTTjXWaeV, äQTpa Kat ae rvnv 
QUyKaTa6KEUcaas, Kai. äyy¬Xovs neptEaTwTas aÜTw, KaL 
ppovTrjv 8t VYIX&V js TTO%ELV Kat ÜEtV ÖnTÖT ' ttv 
eex 6aEiev 59 
tf\f/Vf 
GSv EUpEOr XoapOOU TO iUaapOV EKrUnTC*a, U MEP eV 
OÜpav( Ev Tj TOO OLKOU aTE4fl) Ka9ýIEVOV, äatpa Kat 
1"Xtov KaL aEA1jvIIV KG. TEQKEÜaaEV, KQL äyyEXoUS 
nEptEaTwTas avTC Kai ppovTijv Su VýXavfjs yiveaOat, Kai 
ßpEXEty öTav eeXiaetev. 60 
The account ends with Heraclius wintering in Albania - taken from 
Theophanes. For 624 Cedrenus has less detail of Heraclius' 
campaigning than Theophanes but they share the same words, p. 
310.19-21 and p. 723.17-21, and almost the same oration of 
Heraclius to his troops with Cedrenus only missing out "and God will 
give us our reward" at the end of the speech (p. 723.23-724.3, 
58 Ced. p. 721.20-722.4. 
59 Niceph. 12,43-47. 
60 Leo Gramm. p. 151.23-152.3. 
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Theoph p. 310.26-311.2). In 625 Cedrenus has Heraclius cross the 
Taurus mountains not the Saros river (p. 726.2, p. 313.13). 
However, when Shahbaraz speaks to Cosmas as Heraclius fights the 
giant on the bridge the words are again the same, Cedrenus again 
leaving out the end of the speech "like an anvil he spurns their 
blows" (Theoph. p. 314.14-17, Ced. p. 726.19-21). The battle ends in 
both accounts with the Persians afraid of the evening and Chosroes 
forcing Nestorianism on the Christians in Persia. 
Comparable similarities are evident in the entries for 626. 
Chosroes recruits a new army and Heraclius splits his army into 
three. Theodore defeats Shahin but Cedrenus does not add, as 
Theophanes does, that his body was preserved in salt and subjected 
to many indignities when it arrived back in Persia (p. 728.4). In 
connection with the Khazar alliance Cedrenus does not mention Tiflis 
or the number of men that the Khazars gave to Heraclius (Theoph. p. 
316.14). On the siege of Constantinople there is far more detail in 
Cedrenus than in Theophanes, and this caused Barisic's belief that 
Cedrenus used a lost source more closely than Theophanes. 61 Both 
chronicle the Avars moving canoes to the Golden Horn and the fact 
that after ten days they were defeated by God and the Theotokos, 
but only Cedrenus goes on to mention the vision of the Theotokos 
that the Avar Chagan has at Blachernae which impelled him to 
retreat (Ced. p. 728.23-729.18). This serves as Cedrenus' 
explanation for the defeat of the Avars in much the same way as a 
vision of the Theotokos by the Chagan does in the Chronicon 
Paschale. This may not be due to a lost source but could instead be 
61 Barisic, ' Le siege', p. 376-377. 
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a reference to a "folk memory" of the siege that was kept alive by 
hymns like the A ka thistos. The similarity is closer betw een 
Cedrenus and Theophanes for the year 627, especially in the 
description of the Turcomans abandoning Heracl ius in Persia, and 
Heraclius' speech to his troops is the same in Cedrenus as in 
Theophanes. 
yvWTe, dSeXmoi, 6Tt oüSetS i ttv avµµaXrjaat 80, et, AX Ti 
IÖVOc 6 OeOS Kct 1j TOÜTOV TeKOÜQQ dCMOpc BeOTÖKOS. 
TOOTO Be ytVETGtt ÖTTWS 8e tj EV j1ity Kat TTCIOI. TOÜTOts 
EUUTOÜ SUVC. 6TEtaV, KUTCGTTeii*ms 4tv TTjv (xÜToG 
polled v 
62 
yvd rE, "Exot, art OÜSEts TjµtV ßllµµaXý6aL 9ExEt, G%% TI 
govos ö 9EÖs Kai j To"TOV TEKOÜ6a dcno'pws µ1ITTIQ, iva 
SE(13 T'IIv EaUTOV SUVaaTEiav, KaTaTTEuTTEt TTjv PO "Utav 
aüroü "63 
On the battle with Rhazates Cedrenus only leaves out the 
name of Heraclius' horse Antelope and switches the Persian retreat 
and the plundering of the Romans around, but there is less 
information on the manoeuvres after the battle. Theophanes has a 
few extra details on the flight of Chosroes, a forty-eight mile march 
by the turmarch George to seize four bridges over the Lesser Zab (p. 
320), and Theophanes has 300 not 500 gazelles but no ostriches in 
Chosroes' palace at Dastagerd. Cedrenus does not remark upon 
62 Ced. p. 730.3-6. 
63 Theoph. p. 317.17-21. 
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Chosroes going to Ctesiphon for the first time in twenty-four years, 
but does make the point that Chosroes' speed of movement in retreat 
was five times faster than in earlier campaigns (Ced. p. 732.24-733.1, 
Theoph. p. 323.5-6). There is also a similar account of the falsified 
letter of Chosroes to Kardarigan, spelt Kap6api as but there is less 
detail in Cedrenus on internal Persian affairs, and no "eat what you 
have collected" remark from the Persians to their former ruler 
(Theoph. p. 327.2-3). There are practically the same words used in 
Siroes' promise to return the True Cross. 
TÖTE ypä4¬t Etpo typos 'HpOLKAEtov TTjV T010 µtapoi 
Xoapöov ävaip¬aty, Kai Eiprjvnv äetttayri rrpos auTov 
1TotTja(X'µevoc nävTaS Toüs Ev IIEpQLSt aiXaXQTOVc 
änESwKEV avTC a'v Tw rraTptäpXY) ZaXaptq Kai TOTS 
Ttlaots tU %Ots TOTS Et 'IEpoaoMvµwv Xr$8e atv ÜiTÖ 
Eappapg6 64 
Töle 6 Etpo' S YPm-ýEt np0 `Hp6Kxetov evayyeM o' ievoS 
air Trjv Tov µtapovu Xoapoov ävaipeozv, Kai etprjvrlv 
äetnayrj npöS MvTÖV notTa teVOS nävTaS ToüS Ev 
4povpatS XptwTtavoüS Kai TovS ev IlepatSt ncißrl 
aiXµa w'TOVS äfESWKev avTC ovv T(. naTptäpXp ZaXapl'4 
KUL Tots Tt{1LOts Kat {WOnOtOts ýuXot Tots eý 
`IepoaoAvµwv X 4eetaty vnö Zappapaýa, dTav Trjv 
'IepovaaAtjµ nape, \geV 65 
64 Ced. p. 734.18-23. 
65 Theoph. p. 327.10-16. 
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and from this point Cedrenus follows Theophanes in a more concise 
way, only failing to mention Heraclius' conversation with Benjamin at 
Tiberias and having Siroes reign eight months (Ced. p. 735.23) 
compared with Theophanes' two (p. 329.5). 
The entries for 630 both have the same words for the 
meeting between Heraclius and Athanasius: 
ÖVTOS 'HpaXetou Ev 'IEpa1TÖXEt, EpXETat TTQÖ% S aÜTÖV 
'ABaväca os 6 irarpt4xnc rwv'Iauwptr(Bv, SEwös ävip Kai 
Kauoüpyos Tj Twv Evpwv 194 üUT p rravovpy, 4,66 
'HpaK%E{ou ÖVTos 'v 'IEpaTTÖÄEt, 1A X8¬ TTQÖS aÜTov 
'ABaväatos, Ö TfaTptäpxljs TWv'IaKo 3tTWv, Sewo's dvljp Kat 
KaKOV"pyos Tq" T66v Evpwv Eµ(ýüTCq rravovpyia, 67 
but there are differences from then onwards. Cedrenus misses out 
the information by which Theophanes then (p. 330.11-15) describes 
how the Monophysites believed that they had won the debate before 
the two accounts come together to describe Sophronius. 
Ecooövtoc x¬tpoTOVetTat Enioxonos `IepoaoXvµWv, Kai 
wva8poiaas Tons vn ' avtöv En WWOTTOvs To 9ovo6EXy TOv 
66 Ced. p. 736.4-6. 
67 Theoph. p. 329.21-23. 
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Söyµa CLVEBEpmrLae, Kat Qdvo8u W Zepyic, p rc 
KWVCT TaVJrtVOUn0AeWs Kai 'Iw(xvvn Tcy Puiµns 
duearetXev. 68 
Ew4povtos XetpoTOVeiTat enioxonos 'IepoaoXüµwv Kai 
% vvvaepoißas roiS ün ' a}rav VTWKOTrovs TO µovo6EXTjTOv 
Söyµa äve0IEVdTtae Kai avvoStKc Eepytoy TC4 
K0ivaravTtvovrr0XewS Kai 'IwävvII ircy" 'Pcs 
dTr¬aTetxev. 69 
Cedrenus picks up the narrative with the death of 
Sophronius after Theophanes has spoken again on Heraclius' actions, 
"thinking he was doing something great" (p. 330.21). Theophanes, but 
not Cedrenus, thinks that the Monophysites have won -(p. 330.23-29). 
Cedrenus, unlike Theophanes, does not include the plot of Pyrrhus 
and Martina versus Constantine (p. 330.31-331.6). He does, 
however, have a muddled account of Theodore, Maximus and Martin 
in Cherson in exile which is similar to that of Theophanes but with 
less detail (Ced. p. 737.10-15, Theoph. p. 331.6-332.8), and the same 
end result "the desolate Amalek rose up and smote the people of 
Christ" (p. 737.16-17, p. 332.10-11). This entry ends with Cedrenus 
providing a small detail found in Theophanes (p. 351) and George 
the Monk, the death of the persecutor of the Church (Constans) in 
the bath house of Daphnae in Sicily. 
For the events of 631 there is a far greater divergence by 
Cedrenus from Theophanes. Cedrenus has a more concise account of 
68 Ced. p. 736.20-737.1. 
69 Theoph. p. 330.16-19. 
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Mohammed's life than Theophanes, but then at the point where 
Theophanes describes the Muslim paradise and then records the 
royal births (Theoph. p. 334.20), he has a fuller account of 
Mohammed's teachings alleging borrowings from Jews, Arians and 
Nestorians (p. 739.18). Cedrenus is prepared to deal with 
Mohammed's views on Christianity - that he allows for the 
crucifixion of Christ but not for baptism or the sabbath (Ced. p. 
740.6-8) or the Theotokos (p. 740.19); Mohammed is God's Prophet, 
and Christ is not regarded as the son of God. Cedrenus says that the 
sword-shaped star appeared for thirty days after the death of 
Mohammed rather than after the Arab victory over Sergius, as 
Theophanes relates (p. 336). 
Cedrenus then follows Theophanes for 634 having missed 
out 632 and 633, including Theophanes' explanation for why the 
Arabs raid north and the detail of the defeat of Sergius. But in 635 
Cedrenus gives his own explanation, namely that the Arabs were 
united and the Romans were not, before recording that the Romans 
are defeated at the Yarmuk. Cedrenus has 40,000 killed whilst 
Theophanes has 40,000 fight on each side. Cedrenus has no detail on 
Egypt save that the Arabs colonised it. The accounts are closer in 
636 when all that Cedrenus adds in connection with Umar's advance 
into Jerusalem is Umar's taking of the temple of Solomon; and 
Sophronius' quote is almost the same: 
ETT G>, n9ELas TOÜT0 EQTL TÖ ß5EAvyµa Týs Epr lLc (YEWc, 
earwi EV Törtcý äyüp. 70 
70 Ced. p. 746.14-15. 
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&I ' ATTO¬L TOÜTÖ EaTt TO pSEAvyµa Tijs EptIµciae »u To % 
Aavtýj)ý Toü npomrjTOV eaios Ev Töncp äyüq 71 
The death of Sophronius is also similarily worded and the same 
words are used for lad going into Syria. From p. 747-750 Cedrenus 
includes what amounts to a topological/biblical digression on the 
Holy Land that is now subjected to the Arab invasions. 72 Then in 
636 he reproduces detail found in Theophanes' entries for 631, on 
births in the imperial family, and for 632 on the Persian civil war 
and Heraclius being congratulated by the king of the Indians for his 
victory against the Persians: 
TÖTE 6 PWL\F. Üs TWV 'IVSWV TTEtTTEt MyXOCpLZ T(( Qw tXEt, 
µapyapiTas KM' ,I nµiovs n0AXovs73 
Ev aüTC SE TO KaLpcy 6 pacnXevs twv 'IvSwv n¬µnei. 
avyXapiMa TO `Hpaicaeicp Erri ii Twv Ilepawv vüctl , 
µapyapvras Kai. Xt8o iS Tiµiovs uc voüs 74 
There follow Romano - Arab rivalry and the battle of Mouthos and 
the end of rogae, and (633) the death of Sergius near Caesarea. For 
the years 637-641 Cedrenus follows Theophanes again: 
71 Theoph. p. 339.22-24. 
72 Ced. p. 447 from Exodus and p. 747-748 from Josephus. See 
Proudfoot, 'Theophanes', p. 399. 
73 Ced. p. 750.22-23. 
74 The oph . p. 335.10-12. 
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n eev 'Iwävvns o Kar{as, 
E1TLTpoiroS 'Oaporlvij 
, Trpos 
US 
Etc XaXKT)SÖVa , Kat 
E6TOLýn6E 8LS6vai auTf{1 SEKä 
µvpuxSac voiiw u rwv Trpös Tö µrj uepäaat Töv Ev#airnv 
{11ýTE ELQTVUC* µT4TE noX¬ . tLKGBs 
75 
TjXOEV 'IwävvTTs, 0 ETTCKXTIV KaTaias, 0 EtriTponos 
'O6po'nVTjs TTpcs 'Ids E{S XaXK{Sa, Kai EQTOLXiiQE SOÜVat 
m&i$ Kai EvutJ rv SEM µvpi. Sac voµ . cI LMTwv, TOO µnj 
nepäaat Tov Ev4päTnv, µrjTE E{p1Ivucwc, PUTE rroXEµucws, 
at oü Trjv TTO 0TfTa TOO Xpvoiov älrosiSwai. v. E 76 
In 641 he dates Heraclius' death as 11 March not just March 
but the reign is the same length, thirty years and ten months. Then 
Cedrenus uses information not found in Theophanes but which is in 
George the Monk and Leo the Grammarian, namely the explanation 
that Heraclius was seduced towards Monothelitism by Athanasius 
and Sergius: 
Ottos Be ö 'Hp6xXetos ürrö 'AAavacaiov iT rptä. pXov ýrcBv 
'IaK4LT(ZV Kai Eepy(OU TO Eüpov KwvaravrwovnöX¬Ws 
dTTQT1j6Ets ELc T1jv atp¬aly TGÜV µovoOEÄTmt1V 
EýEK X(ae r. 
77 
75 Ced. p. 751.16-19. 
76 Theoph. p. 340.2-6. 
77 Leo Gramm. p. 155.4-6. 
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dm; vttö 'AOavao{ov traTpLäpXov Twv 'IaKwßv, Twv Kai 
EEpyiov TOO EÜpou KwvaTavT%vouoXEws OLTTaT16et Etc 
TTIV aLpEQLV TWV iov09EXTITWV EFe xa8Tj. 
78 
God's revenge was the disease of dropsy which meant that Heraclius 
had to urinate with the aid of planks. An additional explanation for 
the disease was the marriage to Martina his second cousin (not 
named in George the Monk). Cedrenus' account of the reign ends 
with the funeral description also absent from Theophanes' account; 
Leo the Grammarian has a similar notice but he differs on details 
such as lying in state for four days and burial with garlands of 
flowers. Cedrenus' account is the most complex that we shall 
examine. He has copied large portions of the chronicle of Theophanes 
but at other points his source is Leo the Grammarian. This does not 
mean that his presentation of the reign is constructed with the same 
objective as Leo. Cedrenus merely adds details that may not have 
been available to Theophanes; Heraclius' coup, the fire temple of 
Chosroes, and the Islamic vision of Paradise. Cedrenus supplements 
Theophanes' narrative, while only leaving out his personal comments 
on ecclesiastical affairs. 
The twelth century chronicler Zonaras also appears to follow 
Theophanes, though occasionally inserting details from Nicephorus. 
His description of the coup is from many sources. Heraclius' mother 
and fiancee being imprisoned in a monastery is from Theophanes, as 
is his arrival at the harbour of Sophia. The involvement of Photius in 
78 Ced. p. 752.15-17. 
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the arrest of Phocas could be from either John of Antioch or the 
Chronicon Paschale, but because both Nicephorus and Cedrenus 
(Niceph. 1, Ced. p. 712.20) preserve the story but did not use the 
Chronicon Paschale it must come from John, and John provides the 
repartee between Heraclius and Phocas. The execution and 
cremation of Phocas in the Forum of the Ox is from John of Antioch 
yet there is no mention of Bonosus. The situation on the accession of 
Heraclius is from Theophanes (p. 300); the Avars control Thrace and 
the Persians Asia Minor, while Heraclius is only able to find two 
soldiers who fought under Phocas. But then Zonaras has the detail of 
Priscus being sent to Cappadocia from Nicephorus, using the form 
Crispus which is a firm indication that he is following Nicephorus' 
tradition. He follows this with Theophanes' mention of the birth of 
Constantine, the crowning of Epiphania and the death of Eudocia; the 
last has the extra detail of the servant-girl spitting on the corpse, 
that Nicephorus records. Zonaras also uses Theophanes for Romano- 
Persian relations. According to him Heraclius sent ambassadors to 
Chosroes not immediately after his coronation but after the capture 
of Damascus. They are unsuccessful and Chosroes' reply is similar to 
that in Theophanes (p. 301) for the year 617-618, with most changes 
resulting from a switch from direct to indirect speech: 
XEywv µßj äv TTOTE taaaeat Tc3v XptßTtUV(V, et µrj TöV 
eaTmvpu vov dpvrjaa vio Kai ßepmaeci(t Töv ýx ov. 79 
o; tewovu vµcsv E4ý äv äpvijailae¬ TÖV E6TMUpwieVOV, 
ÖV ÄEyETE 9EÖV ELVai, Kat Tfp00KUVTjc yr T(? AA4.80 
79 Zonaras p. 205.13-15. 
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Theophanes is also Zonaras' source for the Avar Surprise and like 
Theophanes he has Heraclius sue for peace the next year, a detail not 
to be found in George or Leo. Zonaras then gets completely out of 
chronological step and returns to Nicephorus for information about 
Heraclius going to Caesarea, and the honouring of Nicetas in the 
capital; 81 this is followed by Heraclius' address to the Senate and 
Priscus (cf. Niceph. 2). Then Zonaras mentions the birth to Martina of 
Fabius and David, not recorded in either Theophanes or Nicephorus. 
He continues with the fall of Jerusalem using Theophanes' details of 
the role of the Jews and 90,000 dead. This erroneous placing is 
similar to that in Nicephorus and George the Monk who also put the 
fall of Jerusalem after the Avar surprise. Theophanes' narrative is 
then picked up as Heraclius takes gold and silver from the Great 
Church (p. 302-303) and after Easter goes east leaving 
Constantinople in the hands of Sergius and Bonus. Zonaras describes 
the siege of the capital as being lifted by a sally, a point of view not 
corroborated by any other source. The campaign versus Persia is a 
concise version of Theophanes and then Chosroes flees to Ctesiphon 
before the letter, falsified by Sharbaraz, reaches Kardarigan. The 
coup of Siroes is described in more detail than in Leo or George, 
Siroes being jealous of Mardaisan and callous to his imprisoned 
80 Theoph. p. 301.23-24. 
81 This must be from Nicephorus because of the mention of Priscus 
(but not spelt Crispus as in Nicephorus), whose spelling is followed 
by George the Monk, Cedrenus, Glycas and Leo the Grammarian. 
Zonaras preserves the correct form of Priscus' name, whereas 
Nicephorus and all his direct copyists use Crispus. However, the fact 
that the rest of the information in this section is from Nicephorus 
suggests that he was responsible for the reference to Caesarea. 
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father (cf. Theoph. p. 325,327). Heraclius then takes the True Cross 
and is acclaimed in Constantinople in the seventh year, but there is 
no mention of the preceeding six years at war. The religious disputes 
of the reign are also a concise version of Theophanes (Zonaras. p. 
212.3-213.18) but follow an equally confused vein. Following 
Theophanes' narrative format Zonaras then deals with the history of 
Mohammed (Zonaras. p. 214.1-215.16) but he does not detail any of 
the conquests of the Arabs. His entry for Heraclius ends in much the 
same way as Nicephorus (27): Heraclius gets dropsy because of his 
Monothelitism and dies in the thirtieth year of his reign. Zonaras' 
presentation of the reign omits the defeats suffered at the hands of 
the Arabs which suggests that he may have innocently followed the 
same format of Leo the Grammarian, for Zonaras does not include the 
description of Heraclius' triumphal return to Constantinople at the 
end of his account. 
There are three other Greek sources that incorporate 
elements of all those examined so far. Joel, in an extremly brief 
account of thirteen lines of text, follows Theophanes for the marriage 
of Heraclius to Eudocia, for Heraclius is both autocrat and bridegroom 
on that day. 
E6? E4ýlj Be äµa avrw f VIEAV Tevµ¬vTI aüTQ EvSoKia 
Aüyoü(M Tots aT¬4 vots TOO y4tov, öµoü avtorpcTOpes 
% Kai 82 vvµýiot dvaSetXeEvi¬c. 
KM% T1] UÜTI) 1l¬p 6906 QÜTOKPaTWQ KCLt VUµ41, oc 
dvaeÜNUTm'L. 83 
82 Joel 46.16-19. 
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and for the fall of Jerusalem. But Heraclius' deception by Athanasius 
and lapse into Monothelitism is couched in the same words as George 
the Monk, Leo the Grammarian and Cedrenus; he notes Heraclius' 
dropsy but without providing details. 
Michael Glycas uses a similar mixture of sources in his 
chronicle that extends down to 1118; his account of Heraclius is only 
two pages long. As in Theophanes Heraclius' revolt is initiated by a 
letter from the senate (p. 511.5), and Heraclius carries an image of 
Christ, but the involvement of Photius (p. 511.8) is derived either 
from Nicephorus or a later writer, such as Leo, and the riposte of 
Phocas to Heraclius' taunt is from the same source: 
OÜTWS CL8ALE T1jV 1TÖALV StCQK1j6aS KCLL 64 WKds 6Ü 
KGL\Xtov StowK Qat EXEtc. 
84 
o ii w, , 
ä9Aie, rijv TToXLreiav 8 IcT aas, 8 SE av µäXXov 
KaiXXtov StouKeiv t¬XXe%T. 85 
Phocas' death in the Forum of the Ox is in all the main sources, whilst 
the tradition of ' Nicephorus is again employed for Heraclius' 
denigration of Priscus' behaviour (p. 512.1-2). The precis of 615- 
628 could be from any source: Heraclius negotiates with the Persians 
via ambassadors that are treated badly, after fighting Shahin and 
83 Theoph. p. 299.13-14. 
84 Glycas. p. 511.12-13. 
85 Niceph. 1 41-43. 
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Shahbaraz he captures Persia in six years, and then returns the True 
Cross to Jerusalem. The last point on his deception by Athanasius 
contains the same words as George the Monk, Leo the Grammarian, 
Cedrenus and Joel. 
Exactly how far the earlier sources can be confused is 
illustrated by the work of Constantine Manasses. This is a poetic 
conglomeration that runs up to 1081 and which leaves any particular 
source indistinguishable. Phocas is killed, the servant of Death 
defeated by God and the sea, ideas not used by any other writers. 
Nor indeed is the description of Heraclius which concentrates not on 
his physical appearance but on his personality. 
iv SE UTpaTTjyucwTaTOs , 
äAKtµos 
, OUVOXEWV, 
ÖITÄLTTTc 
KapTep(WLTaTOS, d)4Xe p, ßptapOXEtp. 
86 
He was deceived by men about dogma but there is no mention of 
Athanasius as arch-deceiver. Persian aggression "all quiver-bearing" 
is vividly depicted without any concrete facts, as are their atrocities. 
Chosroes is named when he turns to flight, but no other general. 
Siroes binds him like a "huge fish", but Siroes' callous remark 
included in earlier writers' work is not retained. The siege of the 
capital is described with the Persian army "gaping wide to swallow 
the blessed city". There is a description of Avar naval preparations 
and the battle itself. God and the people are responsible for the 
defence of the city; finally Heraclius dies without any mention of 
dropsy or the Arabs. 
86 Con. Man. p. 62C 
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The above discussion cannot pretend to have solved the 
problem that the sources pose for the study of the reign of Heraclius. 
However, it does point out the broad themes within their 
interrelationship. It is important to keep the accounts of Theophanes 
and Nicephorus completly separate in any discussion of their origins. 
Even though we can add to them other accounts who have no 
common material, the Chronicon Paschale, 1234, John of Antioch 
and John of Nikiu, we must accept that any source later than 
Nicephorus or Theophanes is likely to be a melange of one or all of 
these and their followers. 
Appendix. 
In addition to these sources most of which are interrelated, 
or could be interrelated, in some way, there are also three seventh- 
century texts with evidence on Heraclius which can be treated 
separately since they have no connection with any of the texts so far 
discussed: these are the anonymous Chronicle of Guidi, the 
Armenian historian Sebeos and the Life of Theodore of Sykeon. 
Sebeos begins his account (24) with two errors, that Heraclius was 
the Roman commander in Egypt and that Heraclius the Elder was the 
main protagonist in the coup of 610. Like 1234 he has Heraclius 
send ambassadors to Persia as soon as he ascends the throne but 
unlike the account of 1234 Chosroes sees Heraclius as a usurper and 
the presents that he has sent as already belonging to himself; the 
ambassadors he puts to death. Sebeos has Priscus in Caesarea and 
Philippicus as his replacement but he does not mention the tonsure 
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of Priscus in Constantinople. The next action of the reign concerns 
the fall of Jerusalem, where unlike Theophanes he says that 57,000 
died and 37,000 were taken prisoner. Chapter 26 begins with Shahin 
at Chalcedon and Heraclius' speech to him is not in any other source. 
Heraclius says that he is the avenger of Maurice so there is no reason 
for Persian aggression. Sebeos now has 4,000 Persians die in a naval 
attack. This is not a jump to 626 for Heraclius only leaves for the 
east after Chosroes has again insulted him, calling him a usurper. In 
chapter 27 Heraclius is in Persia/Armenia. Chosroes is killed on the 
orders of Siroes who cedes the frontiers to Heraclius using the same 
ambassadors as reported in the Chronicle Paschale (p. 730). The 
return of the True Cross is the responsibilty of Shahbaraz who has 
been aided by Heraclius (Chp. 28). Boran follows him in Persia then 
Zarmiduxt, Hormisdas and Yazdagerd (there is no mention of Ardasir, 
but Sebeos does have the name of the last Persian monarch unlike 
Theophanes). Heraclius then restores the True Cross and returns the 
borders to the days of Maurice. The True Cross is not removed from 
Jerusalem until the Arabs arrive, which is described in chapter 30, 
though there is less detail on this than in Theophanes and they are 
said to have been influenced by the Jews of Edessa, and Sebeos' last 
entry describes the Yarmuk. 
Like Sebeos Guidi can be used to add detail to the storyline 
that we have already patched together above. In chapter 21 the 
Persians capture Jerusalem because the Byzantines had shed "the 
innocent blood of Maurice and his children" and so God showed the 
Persians the location of the True Cross. If this is merely a different 
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slant to proceedings, in chapter 22 then Persians take Alexandria 
through the betrayal of Peter a personality who has not been 
mentioned before. Extra details follow; the Jews set fire to the 
churches in Jerusalem (Chp. 23), the Persians rebuild these churches 
(Chp. 24), Chosroes panics in flight at the sound of a semantron. In 
chapter 28 the death of Cosroes is reported differently, Nihormizd 
and Shamta ask Siroes for permission to kill Chosroes in revenge for 
his mistreatment of their respective families. Heraclius' death is not 
ascribed to dropsy but to the grief of Roman defeats by the Arabs of 
which Guidi mentions two (Chp. 37,51); on each occasion 100,000 
Romans die. 
If Sebeos can be used to corroborate some details and add a 
few more, and Guidi can supplement the story of eastern events, the 
last source The Life of Theodore of Sykeon by a contemporary of 
Heraclius, the monk George, can be used not only to explain the other 
sources but to fill in gaps in their chronology. In chapters 151-162 
he has details of the revolt of Comentiolus, brother of Phocas. A 
Domentiolos died at Constantinople with Phocas (John of Antioch) but 
the Life tells us that Heraclius spared another Domentiolus, the 
nephew of Phocas on the intercession of Theodore himself (152.10- 
18). This revolt explains John of Nikiu's remark that "great 
uncertainty prevailed in the churches because of the long duration of 
the war" (CX. 10-12). The other additional information concerns 
chapter 153.13-16 where Priscus at Caesarea is publicly expected to 
achieve a victory that does not materialise (Chp. 153.23-24). This 
story is picked up by John of Antioch but the Life of Theodore does 
not have any detail on the subsequent Heraclius-Priscus rivalry. 
Heraclius also visited Theodore en route for Antioch in 613 during 
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Lent when he was assisted by Nicetas, though Sebeos has his brother 
Theodore in that role. 
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